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Abstract:
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Chapter One:
Introduction and methodological review
This dissertation is a narrative of the changes in the practices, symbols, and
meaning of Election Day within the city of Philadelphia. It is an investigation into how
Election Day changed, and why it changed, from the popular and notable public event
o f the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries into the somewhat more muted ritual now
practiced. That historical question was used to illustrate a different point, about the
role of democratic rituals in a modem Western society like the United States. The aim
of this chapter is to explain how I constructed the narrative that I will present, and to
explain as well the relationship o f that narrative, specific to time and place, to the
more general theoretical points I wish to make.
The secondary literature used to construct the dissertation can be divided into
three different categories. The first o f these consisted of works dealing with the history
of American political culture. I include here histories o f public festivals, public
celebrations, and other public events, histories of the American political party system,
including campaign practices,1 and histories of mass media institutions and the press.2
Taken together, these accounts tended to agree, in their rough outlines, about how
American party politics has evolved over time. The narrative they construct, which I
have used to frame my own account, runs as follows. A deferent political culture
controlled by a relatively small number of men in the colonial period gives way,
following the revolution, to a more ideological and egalitarian electoral politics in the
early republic, eventually dominated at the national level by the clash between
Federalists and Republicans, two groups which differ fairly substantially in their views
1
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on the direction the new nation should take, and on the implications of the revolution.
At this time, the legitimacy o f party is tenuous. Although some form of proto-party
organization exists, it is underdeveloped in comparison with its later institutional role,
and the notion of party is often used as a synonym for self-interested and seditious
men, in order to attack the political opposition.3 The Federalist Era is succeeded by a
short period in which the Democratic-Republican Party (associated with Jefferson,
Madison, and other prominent Virginians) dominates national politics, and where
legislative or party caucuses tend to control candidate nominations.4 This era in turn
evolves into the Jacksonian Age, which sees the introduction of a number of important
political innovations. These include a more explicit and extensive use of political
symbolism to appeal to voters, a more populist, democratic approach to politics
generally, the beginning o f national nominating conventions, and the development of
the national Presidential campaign. It is at this point that two major national parties,
the Whigs and the Democracy, begin to develop a sophisticated and formal party
organization that links the individual partisan, through a network of ward, city or
county, and state committees and offices, to a national political body, represented by
the Presidential candidate.5 Although this system undergoes a “realignment” just prior
to the Civil War, when the new Republican Party essentially enters the political
vacuum left by the Whigs, a more important, though less obvious change takes place
in the late 1890s, when the parties begin to rely to a much greater extent on mass
media campaign literature, and on propaganda produced by party workers in a national
office. Presidential candidates, who up until now have generally refused to campaign
2
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personally, relying on other party notables to do that for them, begin to take on a more
active role and start the tradition o f the national tour. As a result, locally organized
campaign events, like pole raisings, torch light parades, and so forth, become less
important to the electoral system and gradually disappear.6 These changes in electoral
practice are accompanied by a general shift in the social construction of the voter, in
the argument o f Michael Schudson. In accordance with Progressive ideology, the
importance o f party loyalty and party mobilization give way to an emphasis on voter
knowledge and on good arguments designed to inform the electorate and persuade the
voter through reason and fact.7 This technocratic vision of politics, voters, and citizens
in turn gives way following the Second World War to what Joel Silbey has called a
more personalist view of politics.8 The percentage of independent voters in the
Electorate goes up, as does the tendency to vote a split party ticket, while the system
experiences a gradual decline in the percentage of voter turnout.9
This general narrative, as mentioned, served as the template for my description
of the changes in the way that Philadelphia voters have understood themselves, as a
public, over the course of Election Day. In presenting it here, I do not wish to give the
impression that I believe that American historians and political scientists are basically
agreed about the course of American political history. I am well aware that they are
not. I have generally attempted to stay clear of their debates, however, since to enter
into them too extensively would move me away from my own point. On those
questions in which their disagreements touch directly upon my argument—for
example, the issue of the extent o f corruption and of bribery, and its effect on voter
3
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turnout—I make note o f that, and provide my own opinion o f the most plausible
interpretation o f the evidence.
The second general body of historical literature that I used was that dealing
with one or more aspects of the Election Day performance itself—voting practices and
the style of ballot, the definition and social construction of the electorate, election
returns, and other practices such as bonfires, betting, and Election Day violence. These
works, too, suggested a general narrative: a gradual extension of the constitutional
boundaries o f the electorate, which is accompanied by growing use o f techniques such
as literacy tests, residency requirements, and changes to naturalization laws, to control
these boundaries in other ways; the development of the secret ballot—with the
introduction o f the Australian ballot in most states during the 1890s and early 1900s; a
decline in Election Day corruption and violence; and a dramatic shortening of the time
required to deliver the voting results to the population.10
These two bodies of literature provided me with a theoretical as well as a
historical starting point. In many, although not all, of the works cited here, there is an
implicit or explicit argument about communication made: that the practice of electoral
politics sends a message to the practitioners o f what politics is, and what political
participation in a modem nation-state means. Some also highlight the fact that many
of the norms we hold now about what makes for “good” democratic communication—
norms which clash with past styles of campaigning and voting—are historically
contingent: the result of past battles betweens various classes and interest groups, and
not simply advances in the theory and practice o f electoral democracy. I wanted to
4
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develop this idea as it related to a certain defined event, Election Day. That meant,
first, making a series o f arguments about what that event communicated to the
successive historical publics that performed it. Second, it meant looking for
commonalities in these various performances, so as to make a more general argument
about what Election Day communicates to a democratic public.
I decided to proceed by combining two different strategies. The first was to
create a model o f Election Day as ritual, and to argue that as ritual, it communicated a
message to the public in a fashion that other forms could not. I make this argument
more fully in the next chapter and so will not expand upon it here. The second strategy
was to illustrate that theoretical claim about Election Day’s distinctiveness with an
historical account of a specific American city, Philadelphia. In this work,
Philadelphia’s Election Day serves as an example of a general form of
communication, and as such, I argue, shares important features, as communication,
with other examples o f that form. In other words, I understood my use of
Philadelphia’s Election Day, in relation to the larger argument that I was making, as
analogous to Geertz’s use of the Bali theater state, to advance an argument about
political theory.11
In order to create the narrative of Philadelphia’s Election Day, however, I
needed to get a great deal more information about its particular history and practices
than was contained in the more general literature. To find that information, I went to a
third set of historical works, those dealing with the history of Pennsylvania and
Philadelphia, and especially of their politics.12 These writings provided me with an
5
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understanding of the unique social and political context in which the event had
occurred over time, and, often, also provided accounts about what past Election Days
had looked like.
A more important source for actual accounts, however, were primary source
materials drawn from diaries, journals, personal letters, statutes, government
documents, memories, court cases, and newspaper articles. Many of these primary
sources I obtained from citations in the secondary literature. Other sources were
suggested by my reading of the secondary literature, or on the advice of historians o f a
particular period, or in the course of my archival work. The archives I used for
primary source material were personal collections and letter books in the Library
Company o f Philadelphia and the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, several
manuscripts in the Rare Books section of the University of Pennsylvania library,
previously published collections o f letters, diaries, government documents, and
journals in the University of Pennsylvania library and elsewhere—the Penn-Logan
Correspondence, for example, or the Pennsylvania Archive series, or the edited papers
of politicians such as Benjamin Franklin—and legal and government documents from
the library o f the University of Pennsylvania’s Law School. This data was especially
valuable for earlier periods, when journalistic accounts of Election Day were rare,
although it was useful throughout the narrative in that it provided an alternative view
of Election Day from the accounts in the newspapers. The relationship of this primary
material to the narrative in general, then, was to help flesh out and fill in the rough
picture of Election Day that the reading of the secondary histories had provided.
6
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Finally, in addition to this research, I undertook archival research on the
representation of Election Day in the city’s newspapers. My choice of journals was
determined by the following criteria. First, I relied on secondary histories for
suggestions about which newspapers played important political roles in the city’s
history at various periods: examples would be the Pennsylvania Gazette during the
colonial era, The Aurora and the Gazette o f the United States during the federalist era,
the Public Ledger, The Democratic Press, The North American, and The Inquirer
during the nineteenth century. Also, for almost every period after the revolution I tried
to balance the coverage between opposing newspapers, examining the Gazette’s
coverage along with the Aurora’s, or The Age’s coverage along with the Press and The
Inquirer. For some periods this was more difficult than others, especially in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Philadelphia’s Democratic Party was
very weak and does not seem to have been able to support a newspaper for any length
of time, as far as I can tell. In that case, I used non-partisan papers, like the Public
Ledger, to provide balance to the coverage of the Republican papers like The Press,
The Bulletin, and The Inquirer. This work left me with at least one journalistic
account, and generally more than one, of every Presidential Election Day in the city of
Philadelphia since the election o f George Washington (the exception being 1800,
when Pennsylvania did not hold a popular vote for Presidential electors).
During the colonial period, the relatively limited number of papers available
meant that I could examine election editions for almost every year, starting from 1717,
the first American Weekly Mercury published, to the revolution. In each year, I would
7
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begin with the newspaper two weeks prior to the first of October, and end with the
edition that carried the returns from the election. After the revolutionary period, and
especially after the 1796 election, I began to focus on years of Presidential Elections.
For every Presidential election in the city o f Philadelphia, I looked at newspaper
coverage from at least one newspaper from the Sunday preceding the Election Day to
the moment when victory was announced for one candidate or another. In the years
preceding the conglomeration of the general and presidential Election Days, I
generally started the coverage in the last week of September or the first week in
October. It was not always possible to get the all of the necessary issues of all of the
newspapers I searched, since the archives for some of the newspapers I looked at are
incomplete (for example, The Democratic Press in the 1810s). In addition to this
coverage I also examined newspaper stories cited in secondary literature that seemed
relevant to the topic, either because they discussed voting or discussed elections.
The use of newspapers and other news media sources provided two different
types of information. First, especially following the victory of Jackson and up to about
the Second World War, they were probably the most extensive and complete
descriptions of what happened on Election Day itself. Because o f their generally
partisan intent, their descriptions needed to be handled with some care. This was one
reason why the use of newspapers with differing political agendas—Whig, Democrat,
or independent—was so helpful in providing a fuller account of what a particular
Election Day might have looked like. At the same time, as a form of media that
framed and gave form to the Election Day experience for many Philadelphians, the
8
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newspapers were part o f the ritual that I was describing. As the city newspaper
changed in style and tone, as its institutional role changed, the experience of Election
Day itself changed. This was the other reason why the study of newspaper coverage
was important. The history o f Election Day is, in part, a history of the changing form
and role of the mass media on Election Day.
Thus, the use of the sources in the dissertation could be described as follows. I
attempted, in effect, to combine the theoretical literature on ritual in the next chapter,
with the historical work o f American parties and voting practices mentioned in this
chapter, to provoke a rethinking about what Election Day had meant in the history of
an American city like Philadelphia, and what its continued relevance may still be for
the future of public life. The use of the historical secondary literature about the politics
o f Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, in combination with the primary sources I
discovered, provide an account of the history of a single public event, from the
beginning of the nation’s history to the modem times, in order to illustrate the more
general point I wish to make about political ritual, and an Election Day ritual in
particular.
1 Besides the works cited below, which tended to deal with American political culture and party
practices of specific periods, I relied as well upon: Richard Jensen, “Party Coalitions and the Search for
Modem Values: 1820-1970,” in Party coalitions in the 1980s, Seymour Martin Lipset, ed. (San
Francisco, CA: Institute for contemporary studies, 1981); Robert Dinldn, Campaigning in America: a
history o f election practices (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989); Paul F. Boiler, Jr., Presidential
Campaigns (Oxford: New York, 1984); Richard Jensen, “Annies, admen, and crusaders: types of
presidential election campaigns,” History Teacher, 2 (1969); Michael Schudson, The good citizen: a
history o f American civic life (New York: Free Press, 1998).
2 Kevin Bamhurst and John Nerone, The form o f the news: a history (New York: The Guilford Press,
2001); Thomas Leonard, The power o f the press: the birth o f American political reporting (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986); Michael Schudson, Discovering the news: a social history o f American
newspapers (New York: Basic Books, 1978); Frank Mott, American Journalism: a history, 1690-1960
(New York: Macmillan, 1962).

9
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3 For a general understanding of party politics in the period, I have relied upon the accounts of Jackson
Main, Political parties before the constitution (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1973);
George D. Luetscher, Early party machinery in the United States (New York: Da Capo Press,
1971 [1902]); Michael Schudson, “Sending a political message: lessons from the American 1790s,”
Media, culture, and society, 19(3) 1997, pp. 31S-318; Ronald P. Formisano, “Deferential-Participant
Politics, the early republic’s political culture, 1789-1840” The American Political Science Review, 68(2)
1974, pp. 473-487; William O. Lynch, Fifty years o f American party warfare (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbsmerrill, 1931); Gordon Wood, The radicalism o f the American revolution (New York: Vintage Books,
1992), as well as the state histories of Pennsylvania and Philadelphia mentioned in note 12, below. For
discussions of public life of the period I have relied on: Albrecht Koschnik, “Political conflict and
public contest: rituals of national celebration in Philadelphia, 1788-181S, Pennsylvania Magazine o f
History and Biography, 118(3), 1994; Simon Newman, Parades and the politics o f the street: festive
culture in the early American public (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); David
Waldstreicher, “Rites of rebellion, rites of assent: celebrations, print culture, and the origins of
American nationalism,” The Journal o f American History, 82(1), 1995, pp. 37-61; and Waldstreicher, In
the midst ofperpetualfetes: the making o f American nationalism, 1776-1820 (Chapel Hill, Omohundro
Institute, 1997).
4 McCormick, 7Tie Presidential Game: the origins o f American presidential politics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1982); also Sanford W. Higginbotham, The Keystone in the Democratic Arch: PA
Politics, 1800-1816, PhD dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 1951.
5 The literature on this period, as with all others, is fairly extensive. My primary sources of orientation
were: Mary Douglas, Civic wars: democracy and public life in the American city during the nineteenth
century (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997); Jean Baker, Affairs o f party: the political
culture o f Northern Democrats in the mid-nineteenth century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1983); Joel Silbey, The American political nation, 1838-1893 (Standford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1991); Lee Benson, The concept o f Jacksonian democracy: New York as a test case (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961); Richard McCormick, The Second American Party System: Party
formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel HiU, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1966); William
E. Gienapp, “Politics seemed to enter into everything,” in Essays on American Antebellum politics,
1840-1860, eds. Stephen Maizlish and John J. Kushma (College Station: published by the University of
Texas, Arlington by Texas A & M University, 1982), pp. 15-69; Mark Wahlgren Summers, Run,
Romanism, and Rebellion: The Making o f the President, 1884 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2000).
6 Besides Dinldn, Campaigning in America; and Jensen, “search for modem values,” mentioned in note
1 above, see also Paul Kleppner, Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics, 1893-1928 (Westport,
CT, Greenwood: 1987); Michael McGerr, The decline o f popular politics: the American North, 18651928 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
7Schudson, The good citizen, pp. 69-77.
* Silbey, The American political nation, pp. 6, 7.
9 Works I have used for my understanding of the modem American voting public are Walter D.
Burnham, “The changing shape of the American political universe,” The American Political Science
Review, 1965, 59(1) pp. 7-28; Burnham, “The Appearance and Disappearance of the American Voter,”
in The Current Crisis in American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Ruy Teixeira,
Why American’s don’t vote: turnout decline in the United States, 1960-1984 (New York: Greenwood
Press, 1987); University of Michigan Survey Research Center (Angus Campell, et al.) The American
Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960); Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American voter
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1996); Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, John Petrocik, The
changing American voter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1979). The argument for the
emergence of a “postmodern public” based on lifestyle and cultural attitudes, evolving out of modem
public resting largely on class distinctions, is made by Ronald Inglehart. See for example
Modernization and postmodernization: cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

10
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10 For a general discssuion of voting practices and Election Day events, I have used: Cortlandt F.
Bishop, History o f Elections in the American Colonies (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968); Robert
Dinldn, Voting in provincial America: a study o f elections in the thirteen colonies (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1977); Dinldn, Voting in revolutionary America: a study o f elections in the thirteen
original states, 1776-1789 (Estport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982); Kate Kelly, Election Day: History o f
an American Holiday (New York: Facts on File, 1991); Joseph Harris, Election administration in the
United States (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1934); Richard McCormick, The history o f
voting in New Jersey; a study o f the development o f election machinery, 1664-1911 (New Brunswick,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 19S3); John F. Reynolds, Testing Democracy: Electoral behavior and
Progressive reform in New Jersey, 1880-1920 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1988).
There were a number of works from the earlier literature, mentioned in note 1, also important in this
task. These include: Summers, Run, Romanism, and Rebellion; Schudson, The good citizen; and Baker,
Affairs o f party. For changes in the ballot as a technology, I have used: Peter. H. Argersinger, “A place
on the ballot: fusion politics and antifusion laws, The American Historical Review, 85.2 (1980); Paul F.
Bourke and Donald A. DeBats, “Identifiable Voting in Nineteenth-Century America: Toward a
Comparison of Britain and the United States before the Secret Ballot,” Perspectives in American
History, 11 (1977-78); L.E. Fredman, The Australian Ballot: the story o f an American Reform (Arm
Arbor: Michigan State University Press, 1968); Evans, Elder Cobb. A history o f the Australian Ballot
System in the United States, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1917; and Ronnie Dugger,
“Annals of Democracy: counting votes,” The New Yorker, Nov. 7, 1988. My discussion of the changes
in returns drew from Thomas W. Bohn, “Broadcasting National Election Returns: 1916-1948,” Journal
o f Broadcasting, 12.3 (1968); Thomas Bohn, “Broadcasting National Election Returns: 1952-1976,”
Journal o f Communication, 30.4 (1980); Thomas Littlewood, Calling Elections: the history o f horse
race journalism (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1998); John Morely Matheson, Steam Packet to
Magic Lantern: a history o f Elections Returns coverage in four Illinois cities, PhD dissertation,
Southern Illinois University, 1967. Reports of violence on the election grounds came from various
sources but included: Michael Feldberg, The turbulent era: riot and disorder in Jacksonian America
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Paul Gilje, Rioting in America (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
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Chapter Two:
Election Day and ritual
By Election Day, I mean the moment in which a vote occurs, when the
declarations o f individual citizens concerning their choice for political representative
are sent out, accumulated, and then represented to them as a collective decision of the
people. I will treat Election Day in the city of Philadelphia as an instance of a modem
ritual, performed by a group of people who create themselves, through the
performance o f Election Day, as a modem democratic public. The importance of the
Election Day ritual, for the purposes of this dissertation, is a particular message that
this event sends: that message is the identity and the character of the public itself.
Studying the history of Election Day from the point o f view of a certain sub-set of the
American public—the citizenry of Philadelphia—is therefore to study the changes in
the way that this public has performed an image o f itself, for itself, through the means
of the democratic vote.
Part of the reason for engaging in this project is to present an alternative vision
of the democratic public from that of thinkers such as Jurgen Habermas and others in
his footsteps, who tend to define the modem public through reference either to forms
of conversation—non-institutionalized discussions among members of the public—or
through argument.1 Seen from the viewpoint of the conversation or argument, a vote
can only be a deficient form o f communication. It lacks much if not all o f the qualities
of both: it is not dialogic, at least not in the usual understanding of the term. It is not
subtle. It is not analytical. But I will argue that it is because of the very differences that
a vote has with these other forms of democratic communication that it is essential to
13

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the construction of a democratic public. The vote is not a deficient form of
communication, rather it is communicating a different sort of message, one that may
be especially well-suited to its characteristics.
In making this argument, I wish to provoke a re-evaluation both o f the role of
the democratic vote as an aspect of popular political communication, and the role of
the political ritual or ceremony. In the past, political ceremonies have often been
linked to the concepts of fascism or totalitarianism (especially drawing on the
argument of Benjamin), or medieval, hierarchical polities (as in the work of
Habermas).2 What I want to argue here, in part, is that rituals and, by implication,
other kinds of public ceremonies—spectacles, festivals, and contests3 —are a
necessary element to democratic life, as necessary as a free press, honest argument,
and passionate discussions in coffee houses.
What I share with most of the writers just cited is the belief that for a public to
act, it must first of all have a notion of itself as a public. An individual defines herself,
as a person, through certain acts and statements she has made, as well as the internal
communication she carries on within herself, and then proceeds to act from that
understanding. A public defines itself through the common acts it undertakes and
through the communication that it conducts.4 Therefore the style in which public
communication is conducted will play a role in deciding what that public is. But if this
is the case, then it is important to have some sort o f an understanding o f what those
styles are. By ignoring one important form of communication that goes into the
making of the public, which it seems to me that as communication scholars we have
14
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done, or to regard it as inherently undemocratic, then we must necessarily mistake the
nature of the democratic public, its potentials and its problems.
One can think of any number o f different ways to consider what a vote does.
One can consider it from the viewpoint of the political system, for example, and ask
how it contributes to the stability o f the regime, and to its proper functioning, how it
translates public opinion into effective policy. One can think about it from the
viewpoint o f social cohesion, and consider the way that the vote brings a population
together via a shared symbolic act. One can think about it from the viewpoint of elite
rule, and ask how a vote serves, in an unequal social structure, to deflect popular
pressure or to structure it into safe (and perhaps ultimately political neutered)
channels.5 These are perfectly legitimate ways of thinking about elections and voting,
but they are also incomplete. They look at the object from only one angle, so to speak.
A metaphor for what I am trying to do here is to turn a piece of art—a small carving,
for example—upside down, or look at it from the back, and then consider how this
new perspective might add to one’s knowledge about what it is and what it does, and
what sorts o f questions we can ask of it. I refer to this as the ritual perspective.6

The ritual perspective:
If public events are constructs that make order, then the logics of how
they are put together is crucial to how they work,...To enter within
such forms is to be captured by, and caught up within, the logic of their
design—and so to be operated on by the event, regardless of why it
came into being, or for whatever motives it is enacted.7
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The ritual perspective on communication begins from the claim that social
groups as such exist through the performance o f rituals. Carolyn Marvin and David
Ingle argue that ritual is: “memory inducing behavior that has the effect o f preserving
what is indispensable for the group.”8 In other words, a ritual—which I will define
presently—is not something that it would be good for a group to have, in order to aid
in integration, or for members to become more fully human.9 Rather that rituals are
something that groups enact. All of them. Ritual, following Marvin and Ingle,
provides an “indispensable” message, not merely an “important” one. For Marvin and
Ingle, what is indispensable to the group is to be re-enact, in some fashion, the totem
secret: the periodic bloodshed that recreates the borders of the group.10 For the
purposes of this dissertation, what is indispensable about ritual is that it allows the
members of the group to define themselves against other groups, to say, this is who we
are, because this is what we do. This is not to argue that all rituals are good. Some may
be, some may not be. Some may be better than others. But some form o f ritual would
seem to exist, in one form or another, across all cultures, in all times and places.11
From the ritual perspective, a Catholic is not a Catholic because she has faith
in God, or has undergone a rebirth in Christ, or believes in the historical fact of the
Resurrection. Many people share these experiences and beliefs, and yet are not
Catholics (and it may be added, many publicly recognized Catholics may not share
these experiences or beliefs). A Catholic is a Catholic because she goes to Mass, has
been baptized in a Catholic church, has been confirmed in the faith by a Catholic
priest. A member of the democratic public is not a member of the public simply
16
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because he believes in the tenets o f a constitution, or his rights to life, liberty, and
happiness, or even because he talks about public matters. A member o f the public is
such to the extent that he participates in the rituals of citizenship—voting, attending
party functions, watching the Inauguration on television or attending in person, or
protesting the policies of the administration in a demonstration.
Rituals create groups because it is through rituals that societies or tribes or
publics answer the most fundamental question that any group must answer: what it is.
A ritual defines the group, first o f all corporeally. Membership in the group comes
about by virtue o f participation in the group’s rituals. Those who perform the ritual are
members of the group. Those that do not, are not. Second, rituals define the character
of the group, by the distinct manner in which they are performed. Catholics and
Episcopalians do not celebrate Mass in the same way. The different manner in which
the Mass is celebrated, along with the difference in performers who celebrate it, will
create a different church. It is these differences in ritual acts and liturgy, as well as the
fact that the performers of these rituals are different, that allow these groups to
distinguish themselves from one another.12 Here, I would note that one of the
advantages o f the vote or any other ritual, for the purposes o f providing a clear,
understandable image of the public—for the purposes of defining itself from other
groups—is that it is so clearly and formally structured. It draws or creates very rigid
and clear lines—between voter and non-voter, between winner and loser, between
before and after, between public and private space, between members of different
parties.
17
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Democracies characterize themselves as such, both to themselves and to
others, in part through the fact that they hold democratic votes for their leaders. In the
United States and most other modem Western democracies, for a democratic vote to
count as a vote, for it to be considered a proper vote at all, it must have certain generic
qualities. It must first of all provide at least the opportunity for opposition. Moreover,
it must establish a method o f ensuring that the opposition forces are taken to be, at
some level, legitimate players by the opposing side. That is, it must in some sense be a
contest with prescribed rules. Secondly, it must provide citizens with an opportunity to
consider and weigh the various options open to them. In other words, it must be
preceded by a campaign period. Third, it must have a way of communicating the
decisions of the various voting members of the public to a central organization that
gather and count those messages. So it must have a method o f voting, and a method of
accumulation. Fourth, it must have a way of delivering the result back to the public. It
must have some sort of return. It must have a way o f reintegrating the competing
forces that have resulted from the vote into a single whole, o f convincing the losers to
accept the result, if only by guaranteeing them that at some point in the future, they
will be assured of competing anew. Finally, it must assure the public that the person
who wins the election will wield a certain amount of power, as a result of this victory.
That is, it must construct political authority. Above all this, it must find a way of
assuring the public that each stage of the process was done in an appropriate and
legitimate fashion.

18
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All of these techniques for establishing the vote can be considered from the
point of view o f communication. That is, a campaign, a vote, a return, and the message
of reconciliation, the legitimation of the whole process to the public, are
communicative acts. In each case, there are a number of options open to a public for
answering the necessary requirements. For example, a public vote and a secret ballot
do not simply reflect different understandings o f politics; they create different publics.
A contest between individuals, as opposed to a contest between popular parties, also
creates different images for the public of what it is. The specific manner in which the
public chooses to perform each stage in the process will distinguish it from other
democracies in both space and time. So too will the various communications that help
to frame the context in which a vote occurs. I mean by this the method by which the
press, for example, frames the vote, and the participants who perform it, but also other
acts taken by the public itself on or near the date of the vote that help it to frame the
event: parades, bonfires, Election Day bets. I will generally not concern myself with
the question of the conduct of the campaign, or with the vote’s changing role in
creating political authority, except to the extent that these two elements help to frame
what occurs on Election Day.

The modem mass media and national rituals:
Any discussion of a modem national ritual needs to address the role that the
modem mass media plays in such rituals. In this dissertation, I am interested in four
different ways by which the mass media—by this, I mean primarily but not
19
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exclusively print and television—affect the meaning and the performance of Election
Day. First, the media play the role of interpreter of the ritual; this is what Dayan and
Katz call their hermeneutic function.'3 As interpreters, the media guide the public
through the ritual process by explaining possibly arcane symbols or practices that
might be encountered in the course of presenting a televised ceremony. They also
provide a narrative frame that drapes over the whole of the ritual, in order to place it in
a cultural context—the Royal Wedding as fairy tale, the victory of Jimmy Carter as the
triumph of the outsider. The role that a medium plays as interpreter will change as its
relationship to the ritual changes. Newspapers in the nineteenth century, as we will
see, were more self-consciously aware of their partisan role in the construction of the
Election Day ritual than the modem news media, who in contrast are more likely to
put themselves forward as objective, disinterested interpreters of Election Day’s
meaning.
The media also affect the membership of performers in the ritual. While it may
be true that all ritual links performers to other members of the group, perhaps in space,
but certainly over time, the rise of the modem mass media would seem to radically
alter the manner in which performers understand these other groups in relation to
themselves. A celebrant of a medieval Mass or Passover Seder would no doubt have
been aware of the fact that she was performing the same ritual that countless, unknown
others were performing in concert with her. However, she lacked any communicative
medium that could readily allow her to coordinate her actions with these other
members of this imagined group. The modem mass media do allow for such
20
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coordination. Voters in Philadelphia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries went to
the polls in the understanding that they were engaged in a common act with numerous
other American citizens. Almost at the same moment that they themselves knew what
they had done, they knew what these other groups had done as well. Thus the mass
media could give a comprehensive, cogent portrayal of a national public performing a
national ritual.
Related to this point is the change in the performance space that the mass
media create. With the advent of the newspaper, a public event such as an election no
longer happens in the center of the village or the market square. It takes place on a
national stage, created by the media itself, of which the physical stage is only one part.
To see the whole of the performance, one must turn to the journals or the television
screen. In combination with the change in the group performing the ritual, the change
in the space through which the ritual occurs creates the ability for a national public to
see itself performing for itself. Thus it is the case that when the American mass media
broadcast or report on a national ceremony or ritual—like the Super Bowl, or the
Fourth of July—they often show clips from various parts o f the country in order to
present bodily images of the national public celebrating the event.
Finally, the mass media also change the character of the ritual itself in that they
replace some forms of mediation with other forms. The mass media provide at least
the possibility for a performer to watch or even perform a ritual without being in
physical contact with other performers. This does not mean that the ritual is less real,
but it presents certain difficulties, which arise in the first place from the fact that the
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body remains the richest communicative tool in human experience. Any other medium
will necessarily sacrifice some of the information that actual physical sensation will
pick up.

Electronic mass media try to counter this deficiency by providing an

experience that physical presence cannot match: analysis, quick jumps from various
stations or personalities in order to keep the viewer occupied, reports from various
points in the physical performing space so that the viewer gets to see the “whole
affair.” To a certain extent, television will also attempt to mitigate the viewer’s
distance from the physical ceremonial space, by moving into it through stages—first
the anchor, then the on-site reporter, then a feed from the performance site itself.14
What this argument suggests is that, because certain forms of media are better
at presenting information in one style than another, they will emphasize that style, and
perhaps through this emphasis suggest, either explicitly or implicitly, that it is in some
sense intrinsically better than another form o f mediation. Moreover, the presentation
of the information about the ritual in a certain way educates the audience to read it in
that way. Both of these points will be important when we look at the role of the media
in changing conceptions o f Election Day.

Ritual as public event:
For the purposes of this dissertation, I will draw largely on the work of two
different writers, Roy Rappaport and Catherine Bell, to define both what a ritual is and
describe what it does. A ritual here is defined as a public performance o f a sequence of
more or less formal acts and utterances not encoded by the performers, whose
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fundamental efficacy lies in its ability to have people embody assumptions about their
place in the world. The performance of Election Day seems to me to be captured in
this definition.15
One of the most important elements of ritual is its character as a public event.
A ritual is necessarily performed in public space, because otherwise it could not do
what it needs to do, which it to provide an image for the public of itself. The
publicness of the performance first of all acts as a kind of a guarantee. The fact that a
person performs a ritual, and that I can see that she performs the ritual, means that I, as
a fellow member of the group, know that she has accepted the ritual worldview as a
legitimate one. Moreover, the performer herself knows that she has been observed, and
that she is therefore considered trustworthy. The ritual performance also signals
acceptance to the performer herself. By voting, and by accepting the results of a vote
as legitimate, a citizen declares, to herself and to the rest of the world, that she is a
member of the American public.16
When I say that rituals embody assumptions about the performers’ place in the
world, or that ritual performers accept the ritual worldview, I mean by this latter
phrase certain moral claims about the world, at least as experienced from within the
confines of the group. This is accomplished by the very fact that the performer
engages in the ritual at all.17 The performance of a democratic vote implies that the
voter accepts this method as the legitimate way o f choosing a political leader. That
may seem a banal point, but it is nevertheless an important message to send to one’s
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neighbors, standing in line to wait with you to vote, if they wish to have some
assurance that you will obey the laws set down by this leadership.
The publicness of the ritual performance is important for another reason, which
relies upon an argument about how human beings understand themselves and the
world around them. That argument is, we understand at least some social concepts best
not by reading about them or about having them described to us but by performing
them, either by ourselves or in concert with one another. “[E]very society,” in other
I ft

words, “constructs itself from the bodies of its members.” Ritual ceremonies require
that the body itself engage in the actual performance of acts. That is to say, a ritual
aims to teach us, not through instruction from a text only, but by having our bodies
perform acts in a certain way. This is why the correct performance of a ritual, its
formality, is so central to its character.
As this relates to democratic politics, the argument would run as follows. We
understand democracy not by reading about it in civics class, but by performing it,
either in ritual or in our daily lives. Holy or sacred texts also tell people about their
place in a larger world. But the assumption of this dissertation is that if citizens
understand democracy only through what they learn in civics class, or by reading a
copy of the constitution, then they will have at best a rather desiccated vision of both
democracy and of citizenship, and therefore one that is easily dispensed with.19
A final way in which the public nature of a ritual is important is that it provides
a moment for reflection. One definition of cultural performances describes these
events as “occasions in which as a culture we reflect upon and define ourselves,
24

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

dramatize our collective myths and history, present ourselves with alternatives, and
eventually change in some ways while remaining the same in others.”20 This is close
to what I will argue about Election Day’s role in American political culture.
Performers of a ritual may think about the ritual, and the group, and about what the
performance of the ritual means for the group’s identity and character, in the
performance of the ritual itself. At least some probably do. They certainly think about
such matters before and after the event. Americans think a great deal and talk a great
deal about elections and voting, and whether these are done correctly or could be done
better, so as to make for a better, more healthy democracy. Performances that are
carried out in private—whether this is in the privacy of one’s own home, or behind the
closed doors of state institutions—do not allow for this sort of public reflection.
Conceiving the Election Day ritual as a form of social drama hopefully makes
the questions I will ask about it clearer, but also highlights an important limitation of
this work. Huizinga has noted an important element of play—which term I extend to
the reflection of a public upon its public performances—is that it is in a sense selfcontained. The point for players in a game, as for actors in a play, as for the audiences
that view both, lies within the event itself. The interest in the event is in how well the
various players perform their roles, the skills they display. At least in our formal roles
as audience and players, we do not concern ourselves with the effects of this
performance outside the realm of play.21 But elections, along with marriage
ceremonies, bar mitzvahs, knightings, etc., formally act upon the world. Elections
create political authority, which in turn will enact certain policies, to either the
25
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detriment or the benefit of the nation and the public. At least theoretically, it could be
possible for an election to be satisfying for the performers of it, to deliver an important
message to the performers and the audience as play, and yet not produce policies that
lead to economic wealth, the improvement of the social welfare, or the protection of
freedoms. This is precisely the argument that some make about the elections of
nineteenth century America: that they worked well as political theater, not very well in
other ways.22
To make the point clearer: the population of the performers on Election Day,
and the style o f that performance, will presumably have some effect on the policies
that proceed from that performance. But what exactly that relationship might be is not
an argument that this dissertation will answer.

Election Day’s dual message:
Related to the notion of reflection over the ritual performance is the idea that
rituals often send rather complicated messages that require some puzzling over. Earlier
I claimed that one reason rituals are such valuable expressions of a group identity is
that they are able to create distinct lines between social categories—between us vs.
them, or between winner and loser. Rappaport’s way of putting this is that rituals turn
information that is inherently analogical, or fluid, (ex., public opinion) into binary
information (a numerical vote count). It imposes unambiguous distinctions upon
ambiguous differences.23 When rituals cannot accomplish this task, they fail. The
central reason that the 2000 Election was so spectacularly unsuccessful was that it
26
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failed to provide the public with a clear message about who won, and who lost, the
Presidential race.
But at another level, many ritual acts and symbols also embody or contain
several meanings, and therefore their expression sends several messages at once. They
are multivocalic. Turner found, for example, that the symbols o f a coming of age rite
for young women in Africa represented both concrete, natural concepts and more
abstract, social ones.24 The central figure of most Christian rituals is likewise said to
be “the Word made Flesh.” It would seem that one reason for such symbols is that
they may serve to express certain ambiguities or paradoxes o f life as lived within the
symbolic system of the group practicing the ritual, as Mary Douglas has suggested of
symbols of defilement or danger.25 Some rituals embody contradictory or ambiguous
messages not only in their symbols but in their very structure. One example of this
would be the ritual abasement of the king in Gluckman’s analysis of the south African
Ncwala ritual, in which members of the group ritually insult the leader, then re
establish him as their leader at the end o f the ritual.26 Other rituals attempt to display,
or perform, both a message of conflict and unity, or rather unity through conflict.
Turner has created a general model of ritual based on such a principle, in which breach
of the peace is followed by crisis, then redress, and then reintegration.27 This could be
applied to what happens in elections, and I would argue in an ever more concentrated
form, on Election Day itself. At the beginning of the day, a breach occurs, in which
members of the public separate themselves into warring factions, each supporting their
own champion. Then a moment of crisis occurs, as the public awaits to see which
27
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group has won the contest. Then a moment o f redress, once the result is known, and
the winner offers a peace to all of the American people, and finally, a moment of
reintegration, as the following day, newspapers celebrate the fact of the ritual itself,
and its importance in American life.
It is less important for me to fit Election Day into Turner’s schema, however,
than to point out this dual message that it sends about both division and unity. If a
ritual allows a public to tell itself a vision of itself, then this aspect of the Election Day
means that part of the public’s character, as declared by the performance of the ritual,
is this ability to reconcile the notion both that it is divided, but that it is through this
very ability to reconcile these divisions that it achieves its unity.
Another way that Election Day delivers a dual message is in its treatment of
equality. A democratic vote for President is in one sense a hierarchical event. I do not
mean this in the sense that Presidential candidates are generally wealthy, and gain
their support by appeals to the wealthy, and that their victory invariably means a
victory for the ruling class. I mean that even were Americans to live in some utopia
where money and social power were not allowed to influence the choice of political
representative, Election Day would still have a hierarchical feel, because it would be,
on one level, the victory of one man (perhaps some day one woman) over an
opponent. If Hannah Arendt is correct, that politics is in its essence the display of
excellence in the public arena, then the subject who displays excellence in an election
would seem to be, on the surface at least, the candidate, not the democratic public.28
However, Election Day, as opposed to the rest of the election, is also a display of
28
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political equality. A vote equalizes each citizen’s voice. It declares that the candidate
is in some sense at least not superior to the rest of the public, since he must defer to
that public—that is, a group of equals—in order to lead them, or rather, represent their
views. This contradictory message can be seen in the way that Americans talk about
their President. Sometimes, he is taken to be the symbol of the nation itself, even “the
leader of the free world.” At other times, he is reminded—or reminds himself, before
the rest of the public—that he is no more than a “servant of the people.” As we will
see, depending on the wider context in which it takes place, this message is negotiated
differently. In colonial Pennsylvania, when candidates were taken to be the social
superiors of the rest of the electorate, the need to “ask” voters for their votes, to
demean oneself by performing a kind of dance of equality, even for only a day, was
difficult for many politicians. The problem is rather different in modem America.
Here the task is to prove to the electorate than one is not their superior, or at least,
does not take oneself to be so.
Finally, the performance of Election Day sends a dual message about the
democratic citizen. It requires, on one hand, that the citizen remove herself from her
particular social position. In order to aid this task, the voter is placed in a completely
private space, away from undue social, physical or psychological duress. This allows
her to vote her conscience, to vote for that person she believes will best serve the
common good of the public. At the same time, the act of voting, like any ritual act, is
an event that a citizen undertakes only as a member of a defined social group.
Moreover, as I have already argued, the fact that an Election Day, or any ritual, is a
29
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public event goes to the heart of what it does as a form of communication. A ritual
works—as a form of assurance between members of a public, as a way to understand
politics on the part of the performers, and as a performance that can then serve for
reflection—only to the extent that it is public. A completely private Election Day
would not be a ritual at all. This suggests an inherent tension in terms of the modem
American Election Day. To the extent that Election Day practices work to separate the
voter from social pressure, then these practices seem to place him outside of the
public. On the other hand, a vote delivered in full public view is suspect, because its
integrity—its ability to symbolize the voter’s independent, honest opinion—is
compromised.
I will argue in this dissertation that the manner in which Philadelphians have
attempted to address these tensions—the tensions between difference and unity, the
tension between equality and hierarchy, and the tension between individual and
group—has changed over time. These different manners of negotiation, in turn, have
meant for different sorts of publics enacted on that day.
There is one final tension within Election Day, of a somewhat different sort
than the first three, since it refers not to the style of the day, but to the makeup of those
who perform it. The very word “public” almost invariably has connotations of
inclusiveness. The evolution of suffrage, from rather restrictive criteria to universal
adult suffrage, is generally taken as progress, and a triumph for democratic ideals. Yet
rituals are inherently exclusive. They would not be able to define the group if there
was not outside group to use as a comparison. This may be one reason why elections
30
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are rarely taken seriously as rituals. Rituals are what primitive, or at least pre-modem
people, have. They exclude. They are the result of fear, and they result in oppression.
And yet a democratic vote, as uncomfortable as it may be to say so, also excludes.
Universal suffrage is really a misnomer, at least in the absence o f a world government.
Not everyone is allowed to vote in an election. Non-citizens are not. Children are not.
The mad are not, nor are criminals and even ex-criminals in many jurisdictions.
But even this obvious point does not go far enough. If the actual performance
of Election Day is one that defines the public image of itself for itself, then that
public—that is, the public that actually performs Election Day, rather than one that
could perform it, or watches it being performed—has never included, throughout the
history both of Philadelphia and the United States, the whole o f the people. It did not
in 1740, it did not in 1882, and it does not now, when almost half the population
manages to avoid going to the polls, and probably much less than half pays anything
more than sporadic attention to the returns on television.29
It is this apparent lack of interest shown on Election Day by so many
Americans, a lack of interest or engagement in one of the most important rituals that
the nation has for defining its public, from which we will begin. What has happened to
the Election Day ritual performance that it so evidently fails to stir so many people?
The decline in voting among Americans has provoked a great deal of scholarly work,
and rightly so, since the phenomenon throws some doubt on Election Day’s implicit
claim to be product of the accumulated decisions of all members of the public. The
vote is the moment when the fiction of democracy—its claim to be a government of
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the people, by the people—most closely approaches fact. It is the moment when a
strong public, to use a phrase from Nancy Fraser, momentarily replaces the many
weak publics that normally constitute modem democracies.30 Thus the manner in
which it is performed ought to provoke some concern, perhaps even more concern
than there now is.
Beyond evidence of voting turnout, there is other, more qualitative evidence
that something may be wrong with Election Day. That is the sometimes jaded, even
cynical public discourse that surrounds what happens on the day. In the early 1800s, or
at least so claimed city historian Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer, Election Day was one of
the major social days in the year for Philadelphians. A reporter for the Philadelphia
Daily Evening News was so taken with the scene of the 1860 Election night that he
wished an “American Hogarth” could be found to paint it. In 1940, hundreds of
thousands of people streamed into the city’s downtown area to celebrate the third
election victory of Franklin Roosevelt.31 It is hard to imagine anything similar
happening in Philadelphia, or indeed in any American city, at the turn of the 21st
century. Instead, one reads statements like this this from a disillusioned young
university student named Lisa Levenson, who wrote on The Philadelphia Inquirer's
op-ed page in November of 1996 that although she would be voting for President for
the first time in her life, “it seems to me an inconsequential gesture.”32 Voting,
whatever else it might be, is certainly not an inconsequential gesture. Yet somehow
many Americans, and not only Ms. Levenson, seem to have convinced themselves that
it is.
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Chapter Three:
Election Day in colonial Philadelphia
Several recent historical works on colonial politics, notably Alan Tully’s
argument about the formation of the American political culture and Richard Beeman’s
essay on deference and democracy in colonial America, would seem to make a case
for Pennsylvania occupying a special place in the evolution of American political
institutions and thought. In the arguments of both, Pennsylvania, along with a very
few other states—Rhode Island in Beeman’s case, New York in Tully’s—seems to
presage certain ways of thinking about popular politics that would become more
widespread a century later. To put it in a manner consonant with this dissertation,
Tully, Beeman—and to some extent Gary Nash in his study o f protest politics in the
eighteenth century—suggest a public that has certain important elements in common
with later publics. Pennsylvanians, like other colonial Americans, lived in a world of
socially deferent manners and public attitudes. However, popular representation,
notions o f political equality, and the rights of the people against those of its rulers
played a much greater role in the public rhetoric of that province than it did in many
other colonial publics.1
The question for us is how that self-understanding is communicated to
members o f the public. Various writers give various answers: a culture of working
class radicalism,2 the tradition of protest politics in the colonial port city,3 popular
participation in contested provincial elections,4 and even the commonwealth’s unique
culture of drinking and the egalitarian sociability it implied.5 The role of the act of
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voting itself in transmitting a political understanding is rarely addressed. The
exception here is Tully’s work, but whereas Tully does mention some of the unique
characteristics of Pennsylvania’s vote and its Election Day,6 he does not consider how,
or whether, Election Day or the vote itself might be a distinctive manner of
communicating politics. This is in contrast to work on Virginia’s colonial election day,
in which the experience of voting has been quite extensively covered, by Charles
Sydnor, Rhys Isaac, Edmund Morgan, and Michael Schudson, among others.7
Virginia’s Election Day, with its boozy electors, open air voting, and
community celebrations, may be an especially dramatic example of how different a
vote can be from the modem experience, and thus an especially attractive subject for
historical work. What I try to argue in this chapter, however, is that Philadelphia’s
Election Day was just as much the performance of a political drama as Virginia’s. It
provided the political actors of that society with a unique set of political
understandings and media forms in which to perform the image of the polity, a unique
political ritual. This chapter, then, will be an examination of the various elements that
went into creating an Election Day in the colony—the ballot, the press, the candidates
and voters, the Election grounds. It would be these components, or variations of them,
that a later revolutionary public would draw upon, to create a much different public.

The ballot:
The electors o f Pennsylvania almost without exception voted by paper ballot.
Each voter in the city of Philadelphia was allowed to bring several pieces of paper to
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the voting window of the Court House—one containing up to eight names for
Assembly representative, one for sheriff and coroner, and a third for commissioner
and assessors, and one for the town burgesses. The voter would write the names on the
inside of the ballot, the offices on the outside. Election officials would take the ballots
and place them in the ballot box, and were forbidden to open them until the counting
at the end of the day.8
The ballot was a break with the traditional English method of declaring one’s
choice in the open air before one’s fellow citizens—known as viva voce—and was also
different from the royal provinces in North America, including Pennsylvania’s
immediate neighbor to the north, New York.9 Alan Tully has suggested that colonial
Pennsylvanians had the closest thing to a secret ballot anywhere in the American
colonies or the United States prior to the introduction of the Australian ballot in the
late 1890s.10 Although the ballot is now almost universally assumed to be the most
democratic from of voting, in the 1700s that was not the case. Montesquieu for
example, thought it a mean and vulgar practice that encouraged corruption among the
lower classes, and argued that it eventually led to the destruction of the polity.11
Nonetheless, as Tully has noted,12 Pennsylvanians themselves took the secret ballot to
be superior to viva voce :
The Law has directed the Election should be free, and for that end, has
appointed Tickets roled up by the Elector, which no other has a right to
inspect, before they are put into a Box, but those appointed as Judges;
and they so far only as to see they be not double; which Priviledge
every Elector ought to observe, and thereby be protected and enabled
freely to Vote according to a good Conscience, always preferring the
Public Good to any private Interest or Party, which will bring a
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Blessing on them and their Posterity; otherwise the contrary will
inevitably follow.13
Likewise, a correspondent to the Gazette in the early 1770s called the ballot an
“excellent mode o f voting,” as it gave electors, especially working class ones, “an
Opportunity, of acting agreeable to our Sentiment, without falling a Sacrifice to the
Malevolence of those who may disapprove our Choice.”14 As early as the 1690s, the
province’s Governor noted that electors were jealous of the right to vote by ballot and
generally insisted on it for Assembly elections.15
According to Cortland Bishop, the practice of using the ballot was probably
influenced by contemporary Whig political theory.16 William Penn was friends with
Algernon Sidney and a reader of James Harrington, who developed a ballot system for
his imaginary republic of Oceana, modeled on the Venetian practice.17 There may
have also been a religious connection. The other colonies that experimented with the
ballot prior to the revolution were almost exclusively those where dissenting groups
like the Quakers or Congregationalists held some political power—New England and
the Carolinas for a time, New Jersey prior to its becoming a royal province18—and the
use of the ballot has some structural affinities with Protestant views on prayer. In the
case both of the secret ballot, and the prayer, there is little or no opportunity, at least in
theory, for social hierarchy or for other members of the community to act as mediators
of the message. The contents of the communication are a matter of individual
conscience. It is in some sense the direct opposite of the ritualistic message, which
gains its distinctiveness in part from the fact that it is publicly performed.19
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But since a vote is also a public event—insofar as the vote itself concerns
matters relating to all—its status is always problematic. While Pennsylvanians may
have defended the secret ballot in theory, in practice many were often loath to leave
the matter entirely in the hands o f the free elector, and frequently attempted to
circumvent the secrecy of the ballot, in at least two different ways. The more direct
method was simply to confront any voter suspected of recalcitrance on the election
grounds themselves. A pamphleteer o f the 1720s remarked that one Election Day,
I must confess, I stood amazed at the Tann’d Impudence of a Fellow
two years ago, who Stood upon the Stairs [of the Court House] with
heaps of prepared Tickets; asked to see mine as I was going up; I was
not forward to Shew it, but being between my Thumb and Fingers, he
took it, look’d on’t, and then told me it was not the right one, would
have kept it, and offer’d me another, as it seems he had managed
several. With some Trouble I got mine again, but so provoking was the
Looby’s conduct, that our Neighbour Evan (his blood being up) asked
me, I did not spit in his face.20
Although such behavior may not have been common—the indignation of the writer
argues against it—this was certainly not an isolated incident, particularly during those
periods when party competition was keen and popular interest in the outcome high,
and following the infamous 1742 Election Day riots, Richard Peters, in a letter to the
Proprietor, noted with some heat that the “changing of men’s tickets...had been a
practice of which great Complaints were deservedly made.”21
Another manner of affecting the voter’s decision was by “setting the ticket,” or
creating a “slate” of candidates for the Assembly. The creation of party slates was in
practice as early as 1711—probably before that—and by the 1720s seems to have been
taken as a matter of course.22 Slates of candidates were put forward to the public
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sometimes through the course o f campaigning and visiting potential voters, and later
in the era by publicizing the names on partisan pamphlets.23 Perhaps the most common
and reliable method, however, was through spreading tickets and publicizing slates on
Election Day itself. Especially near the end of the colonial era, political partisans and
candidates assumed that it was their duty on Election Day to press their side’s
“Interest” onto voters, and often spent a great deal of energy going about the town and
the place of Election itself either distributing tickets or publicizing slates.24 Because
city voters continued to write out their ballots, the grip of political organization was
never fully secure on the electorate as a whole, and yet the patterns o f voting that we
observe at Philadelphia’s elections suggest that full departures from the slate were
relatively rare.25
The development o f the ticket slates was seen as essential work on the part of
party organizers,26 and losses at the polls were sometimes attributed to a failure of
industry on this score.27 All the same, the idea of a small group of men making setting
a slate stuck in the craw o f some. “If we have not the Liberty of nominating such
Persons whom we approve, our Freedom of voting is at an end,” wrote BROTHER
CHIP. “[0]ur Ballot is not worth throwing in on the Day of Election—the Gentlemen
may do without us.”28 Another writer complained of Philadelphians that “we do not
judge for ourselves at elections,” but instead were led by bias and corrupt men
practicing their arts on unsuspecting electors, “whom I would seriously advise, in
future, to be watchful, and inspect every ticket they receive, that they may be fully
ascertained of the particular names therein inserted.”29 Even so conservative a man as
40
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the elder Isaac Norris complained of “the unhappy way that a man must have eight
men crammed down his throat at once. And as the use o f tickets is managed, a man
cannot take and reject less than the whole.”30 The development of the slate, in a less
obvious but no less decisive manner than an actual confrontation on the Election
grounds, struck at the heart o f the ballot’s distinctiveness as a technology o f political
communication and representation.

The place of Election:
For most of the colonial era, Philadelphia’s elections were held the first of
every October at the city Court House, which sat at the intersection o f High (or
Market) street and Second Street. Hard by were the market stalls, closed on Election
Day so that the area could accommodate the numbers o f voters and others who milled
about the grounds in front of the polling booths during the day, keeping watch on the
action.31 Behind the Court House was the prison stockade, across the street the
Friends’ Meeting House. Several taverns and inns were nearby, where candidates and
other politicos sometimes waited throughout the day with their friends and
supporters.32
The day would begin by the Sheriff ringing the bells or simply announcing
from the balcony that the election was about to begin, sometimes using a mouth
trumpet if the crowd was quite large.33 Occasionally, other announcements might
come at this time: a warning to keep the peace, or a message from the sheriff himself
if he was not running for re-election, thanking the citizens for their past support.34 The
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next piece of business was to select election Inspectors, who would spend the day
inside the courthouse and keep watch over the vote. Until the mid 1740s, this was
done in the traditional manner, “by view.” That is, those who favored one Inspector or
the other would move to the North or South of the Court House, and the sheriff would
then determine which man obtained “a fair majority” o f the votes.35
The Inspector’s duties were generally to make certain that the election ran
fairly and efficiently and to “guard against tumult” on the day.36 Somewhat
paradoxically, however, the choice for Inspectors sometimes caused as much tumult as
anything else. The legislature periodically complained about Inspector’s election, and
continually fiddled with changes.37 Because it was an open vote, taken on the grounds
themselves, it was well nigh impossible for the sheriff to determine whether or not
ineligible voters and non-freeman were taking part.38 Also, if the grounds were
crowded, it could be difficult for partisans to get to the side of the Court House that
they needed to be on in order to select the Inspector of their choice.39 (The office of
the Inspector itself was a rather thankless task; since Inspectors were invariably linked
to one party or another, their actions were always open to suspicion by the losers of a
close election.40)
Once Inspectors were chosen then the Election could begin. The Court House,
a two-story building with a balcony, and stairs on either side, was where the voting
itself took place. As the main center of civic life in Philadelphia the Court House was
the logical spot for an election. The vote was a public act, a public assertion of power
on the part of the populace, and therefore required a method o f making the
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performance as broadly known as possible. Moreover, to the extent that the act of
voting was also an act of social distinction, given that not everyone could vote, then
the voters required others to take note o f their status. In the late 1700s, an American
observer to a British election, “judged there were assembled in the square, at the
windows commanding a view of it, and in the adjacent streets, twenty thousand
spectators, to witness freemen giving in their suffrages.”41 Philadelphia’s Election Day
audience would not have been so large, but given the location of the poll, it is probable
that at least in closely contested elections, large numbers of both voters and non-voters
were observers of the proceedings42 The central location of the courthouse gave
Philadelphia’s voters both a stage and an audience for their performance.
However, whatever advantages it might have held as a public stage for the
Election Day performance, this particular building also presented a problem to
Philadelphia’s citizens, having to do with the building’s balcony and stairs. Voting
would proceed by electors walking up one flight of stairs to deposit their ballots at
polling windows, then walking down the other flight.43 Since the stairs were the only
way to get to the polls, they could easily become crowded. Sometimes, it took take as
much as a quarter of an hour for a man to advance up the stairs to cast his vote, this
after having made his way through the crowded grounds themselves. With a heavy
election turnout, the slowness of the process could mean that the election might run
until well into the next day, as men waited hours for their chance to vote.44
There was a more dramatic problem associated with the stairs’ restricted
access, however. The person who controlled access to the stairs obviously controlled
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access to the ballot box and therefore controlled access to political power. That certain
citizens availed themselves of the possibilities afforded by the Court House
architecture is evident in the account o f the forced ticket-exchange above.4S By the
1740s, “The Trial of the Stairs” was an expected part of Philadelphia’s Election Day
experience, albeit grudgingly, and it played a role in the infamous 1742 Election Day
riots. On that day, a group of about SO sailors made two separate attacks on the
electors of the city at the Court House, once during the election of Inspectors, and a
second time as the voting had actually begun. During this second occasion the sailors,
later assumed to be either in the pay o f or encouraged by the leaders of the Proprietary
faction, were observed to be making a special effort to take the stairs, knocking people
down “in the most shocking manner Eye ever beheld.”46
That the stairs were part of what was behind the confrontational attitude of the
Proprietary group on the day seems evident from several comments overheard by
witnesses. “What could be expected but Disturbances, when such Rascals and Villains
usually attended Elections crowding the Stairs, and hindering the People from giving
their votes?” Mayor Clement Plumstead replied to Quaker partisans worried about the
sailors early Election Day morning,47 and a Proprietary supporter was later heard to
declare: “The method of stopping the Stairs, used several Years past, is not right; You
kept them last Year, but we will keep them this Year.”48 Richard Peters charged that
the Quaker party had taken control of the stairs every year since 1738, and even noted
privately that some among the Proprietary faction had met as early as August to plan a
method of securing them for the 1742 elections.49
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Like the practice of setting party slates or exchanging tickets, the battles on the
Court House stairs could be taken as a sort of refusal, on the part of certain members
of the community, to concede that the act of voting on Election Day ought to be left
completely in the hands of the individual conscience. It was an explicit and sometimes
rather violent method for presenting an alternative meaning of the vote to the one
embodied by the secret ballot: not the decision of the individual but of the group.
Philadelphians got rid of the immediate problem presented by the stairs when they
moved the election site to the new State House in 1766. That would not solve the
larger question of what the vote ought to mean, and how the central political ritual
ought to be practiced, however.50

The voter:
A voter in the city of Philadelphia in the 1700s needed to meet several basic
criteria in order to be counted as such. He needed to own at least 50 pounds of
property or 50 acres of land, ten of those cleared. He needed to be 21 years old, male,
a natural bom subject of the King or naturalized, and to have lived in the Province for
a period of at least two years.51 The justification for these restrictions in British legal
traditions basically came down to the question of reliability, and autonomy. A freeman
could be relied upon to take the care and time needed to make a good choice on
Election Day because he had a stake in the community. If the community suffered, he
suffered.52 Also, his status as property owner meant that he could not easily be
pressured upon to vote other than his conscience.53
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Given this construction of the voter, the public act of casting a ballot was a
performance of political subjectivity. It implied certain things about the performer. It
implied that he was a loyal and honest subject. The fact that he could be trusted with a
secret ballot further implied his personal integrity, the expectation that he would act in
the best interests of the community without the need for further supervision. These
things a Philadelphia voter declared, to himself and to those who watched him, when
he cast his vote at the Court House balcony. Naturally, with this status came certain
obligations. As the actual embodiment of the public, the voter was declaring not
simply something about himself but about the public o f which he was part.
This social construction of what the public act o f an election meant, about what
it implied about the voter as a political agent, took place within a wider set o f cultural
and political assumptions. At one level, Philadelphians lived in a world that historians
have described as “deferential.” This world was conservative and hierarchical: it
understood the social stratification of society to be a natural and just outcome of
individual differences and inherent personal superiorities.54 “One searches in vain for
evidence that Pennsylvania was ever conceived as an economic or political democracy
in nineteenth- or twentieth- century terms. Nothing could have been more natural than
the transplanting of an ordered society where position and power resided in those
whose stake in the venture was the largest.”5S The political implications o f such an
understanding of the human condition were two-fold. First, society was taken to be an
organic whole, with a single set of interests that could be discerned by the wise and
virtuous. Second, the assumption was that the higher class of men rightfully should
46

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

take the lead in political and other affairs, and that the lower classes had a moral
obligation to defer to the wisdom o f their social betters in public matters.56
Despite the influence o f radical political theory and his own Quaker
background, William Penn’s initial Frame of Government was not a democratic or
even a very republican document, as Gary Nash notes, adding that Whig
parliamentarian Algernon Sidney described the original frame as “the basest laws in
the world, and not to be endured.” Sidney thought that “even the Turk” was not more
absolute than the Proprietor of Pennsylvania.57 Penn himself often became exasperated
with the political independence shown by the colonists, and early on chastised their
Assembly’s presumption to constitute the representatives o f the people, apart from the
Governor and Provincial Council.58 Belief in the necessity and even desirability of a
social hierarchy was evident not only in private correspondence between colonial
leaders, but in popular public discourse. In a letter written to The Pennsylvania
Chronicle in the early 1770s, one writer attacked mechanics who presumed to stake a
claim to political leadership. Certain men were bom to certain duties, “A Brother to
the Brethren of the Chip” argued. Artisans were fit to create goods, and the wealthy
and wise were fit to lead the government. The “Brother” ended with a quotation from
Ecclesiastes to support his point.59
Such opinions were not simply the expression of wishful thinking on the part
of men in power. It was evident in the performance of the vote as well. Wealthy
merchants, professionals, and landowners overwhelmingly dominated the membership
of the Assembly throughout the colonial period.60 Perhaps the most vivid illustration
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of the extent to which Philadelphia’s voters deferred to their social superiors on
Election Day is that Benjamin Franklin was re-elected several times to the Assembly
when he was a resident of England and therefore unable to serve.61 The widespread
use of tickets was also an indication of the power of the elite, since it was that group of
men who generally set the slates of candidates, meeting in private clubs during the
summer or early fall to discuss their choices and strategies.62
The dominance of the political class over what happened on Election Day was
so great, in fact, some historians have argued colonial Pennsylvania’s politics were
essentially a game between two groups of the wealthy and high bom, battling it out for
political favors and power. In this understanding, the Election Day performance would
be simply a public affirmation on the part o f the lower classes o f the right of colonial
aristocracy to rule, and one could point to the large numbers o f poorly or even non
contested elections to support that claim.63 Later writers such as Richard Beeman have
complicated that picture. If the assumptions of social deference were widespread and
commonly voiced, so too was an alternative political vision, what we might call a
republican discourse, which often competed with the deferential view in
Pennsylvania’s society.64 This republican argument, combined, eventually, with even
more radical, democratic claims, often found a counterpart in the behavior of
Philadelphia’s voters at the Court House square.
Part of the political schizophrenia of Pennsylvania politics can be traced back
to Penn himself, who combined a paternalistic stance toward his colonists with more
liberal political ideals. Beeman notes, for example, the clear presence of an “explicitly
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popular vision” of political representation in the following passage by the colony’s
founder:
The estate goes before the steward; the foundation before the house;
people before their representatives; and the Creator before the
creature...Every representative may be called the creature of the
people, because the people make them, and to them they owe their
being. Here is no transessentiating, or transubstantiating of being, from
people to a representative; no more than there is an absolute
transferring of title in a letter of attorney. The very term representative
is enough to the contrary.65
Very quickly, Pennsylvanians began to take Penn up on the idea. Once of the first was
David Lloyd, a Quaker lawyer and leader of the Assembly, who clashed with both the
Proprietor and his governors for much of the early part of the eighteenth century.66
Pennsylvanians may have been loyal subjects of the King and legally subservient to
the Proprietor and his governor, but they were also Englishmen, and proud of their
tradition of political freedoms. Partisan pamphlets of the 1720s argued for the rights of
the Assembly and the people against the Governor. One writer gave his opinion that
“Kings and Rulers were appointed for the good o f the People; and can any Man tell
me who is or can be a better Judge of the Peoples good, than they are themselves?”67
Another was so bold as to complain that Pennsylvanians “groan under the Yoke of the
most tyrannical Aristocracy in the world.”68
There are a number of plausible reasons for the popularity of such sentiments,
including the spread of liberal political ideas, the lasting influence of Leveller thinking
among many of the working class immigrants to the city and the province, and the
generally anti-establishment attitudes of some sectors of the population, including the
Scots-Irish, who brought a strong distaste for English landlords with them when they
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crossed the ocean.69 Add to this the relative freedoms that colonists enjoyed as a result
of a relatively meager state infrastructure, and it should not be surprising that
conservative politicians complained o f elections that “were very mobbish, and carried
by a Levelling spirit.”70 A correspondent to The American Weekly Mercury cautioned
readers “not to be too well dress'd on the First of October next, nor to put on an Air of
Haughtiness and Defiance—There is a secret in it—A Man does not care to return
home worse that he went out, nor to take Pains for nothing: A Beggar is willing to be
call’d so if you give him Money; but a clear Coat will not bear a Bespattering, nor
does a high Look easily brook a Humbling.”71
It is worth noting in this respect that economic restrictions on the franchise did
not exclude as many of the city’s residents as conservatives no doubt would have
liked. Charles Orton has argued that the decision to divorce the elector’s status from
that of landowner allowed a great many of the city’s artisans and journeyman to
legally cast a ballot, since for most o f these men their tools alone were probably worth
almost the required 50 £ of property, and the practical difficulties entailed in keeping
ineligible voters from the polls meant that many men who did not formally meet the
requirements probably voted in any case.72
Perhaps the single person who most vividly embodied the populist spirit latent
in Philadelphia’s Election Day was Sir William Keith. A Scottish lord with suspected
Jacobite sympathies, Keith had come to Pennsylvania originally as Penn’s governor in
the late 1710s. In his battles with the conservative Assembly he came increasingly to
turn to popular appeals. By the early 1720s had been dismissed from his post. A year
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later he returned to the city and began to campaign for an Assembly seat, bringing
with him a more elaborate and populist approach to electioneering, in the British
style.73 He helped to create two different political clubs, a Gentleman's club and the
Apron Leather Club for tradesmen, which was often nicknamed the “T iff' club in
honor of its members’ proclivities to heavy drinking. Among their other uses, these
clubs helped develop and put forward slates o f candidates for Election Day.74
Not surprisingly, the members of Pennsylvania’s political establishment
despised Keith. They distrusted his political ambitions, and they looked with horror on
the effects his populist style had on Election Day behavior and the political culture
generally. Keith’s success at the polls was the occasion for riotous, drunken
demonstrations, featuring “Mobs, Bonfires, Gunns, Huzzas—a Keith for ever.”75 On at
least one occasion, a group of his supporters celebrated the election victory by pulling
down the pillory stocks and butcher stalls outside the Court House.76 In 1728, Keith’s
entrance into the Assembly several weeks after Election Day was marked with a
parade of eighty horsemen—most of them, an opponent remarked, “made o f Rags,
Butchers, porters, & Tagrags”—with Keith at the head.77
Many of these features of the 1720s Election Day seem to have departed with
Keith when he left for Britain at the end of the decade,78 but the populist spirit and
electioneering reappeared at occasional intervals, and the era as a whole shows a trend
toward greater turnout percentages, a rise in party activity, and growing popular
interest in elections.79 With this change came a greater confidence on the part of the
working classes, argues Olton. By the 1770s, the manufacturers, mechanics, and
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journeymen artists of the city had created their own political clubs: unlike the Tiff
club, these groups did not look to the sponsorship of an aristocratic patron, but created
their own tickets.80 Several artisans and mechanics ran for and were elected to city
offices; at least one went to the Provincial Assembly.81 In 1772, A MECHANIC
mocked the calls of the conservative Pacificus for harmony and peace at elections. It
was plain, the writer argued, that this Pacificus “views with Anguish of Soul the
growing Interest and Importance of the worthy Mechanics and Manufacturers o f this
City.... and that their Spirit and Resolution, so vigorously exerted, at the last two
Elections, was the first Shock that removed the Mist from his Eyes.”82

Candidates:
From what has already been said, it will be appreciated that a candidate’s role
on Election Day was a difficult one to navigate. The dilemma is pointed out by Sister
Joan Leonard with a quote by young Edward Shippen to his father,“It is a disagreeable
task to appear to solicit for one’s self, but if ‘tis necessary I must submit.”83 On the
one hand, the traditional assumptions about the candidate’s social status, and his
personal character as a sober, honest, and above all disinterested seeker after the
public good, required a sense of decorum and a display of the social superiority he
assumed by running for office.84 Even journalists of a more popular bent ridiculed the
open solicitation of votes on Election Day, for example.8S Among those in the political
class, examples of vote grubbing and electioneering were often adduced as evidence of
an opponent’s meanness.86 One’s friends, on the other hand, obtained success “without
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the least pains or asking one man for his vote or being at the expence of one
farthing.”87 And yet, a man needed to get the votes to obtain the office. Sometimes,
this required the implementation of the British tradition known as “treating:” ie.,
favoring the elector with a dram of whiskey or a glass of beer or even a small
monetary gift in exchange for his vote. Treating would appear to have been somewhat
commonly practiced by candidates for local offices such as sheriff and coroner.
Candidates for the more prestigious Assembly seats, however, seem to have been
more loath to practice it, or at least were more careful to avoid being seen doing so.88
(The exception here was Keith. In the first three days of October of 1728, one
journalist estimated, some 4500 gallons of beer were consumed in the city of
Philadelphia.)89 Similarly, whereas the practice of advertising for coroner or sheriff
was common by the end of the 1750s, few if any Assembly members advertised. Most
of the latter group used ads instead to inform electors that they did not wish to be re
elected.90
The informal bans on treating and advertising required the Assembly
candidates to search for voters without appearing to do so. Leonard points out that one
way to solve the dilemma was to exert oneself on Election Day for the interests o f the
slate and for other candidates, rather than oneself. By being active in this manner, the
candidate could both keep up a public profile at the election site and assure his friends
he was working for them (presumably with the understanding that they should return
the favor), while at the same time giving an appearance of disinterest.91 One did not
press the interest out of personal motives, after all, but because these men were the
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best hope for the people of Pennsylvania, the ones most likely to advance the public
good.92
The key was to keep one’s public dignity and honor intact in the face of the
challenge presented by the democratic crowd. On the day of the 1764 election,
following a campaign notable for its bitterness and abuse, Benjamin Franklin lost his
re-election bid to the Assembly. Yet an admirer noted that “Mr. Franklin died like a
philosopher,” with little show o f emotion or despair. This was in contrast to Franklin’s
compatriot on the Quaker ticket, Joseph Galloway, who “agonized in Death, like a
Mortal Deist, who has no hopes of a Future Existence.”93 Election Day allowed the
public to act as critics on the upper classes, to observe whether they were what they
presented themselves to be. Following the 1742 riots Richard Peters noted
disapprovingly in a letter to Thomas Penn that several young well-born supporters o f
the Quaker cause managed to enter the fray only after the battle was over: “to see
those sons of wretches, men o f remarkable pusillanimity lording it over the sailors
who were pinioned in the custody of the Constables calling them vile names and
beating them unmercifully, no man but what thought worse of them than the rioters.”94
A far more damaging instance of bad behavior, however, was that of leaders o f
the Proprietary group during the same election: in particular, William Allen, city
Recorder at the time and thus entrusted to help keep the peace, faced widespread
criticism after the riots. Instead o f taking preventative measures when confronted with
early information about the sailors, Allen replied with counter-accusations about un
naturalized German voters. Moreover, during the first round of rioting, he and other
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Proprietary leaders chose to look on and do nothing (they later defended themselves
by observing that this was the course of action preferred by most of the rest of the city
residents.)95 Even Allen’s sympathizers, while absolving him of blame in any charge
of conspiracy with the sailors, later conceded that his performance on the day had
damaged his cause generally.

The Proprietary group lost badly to their opponents,

and Allen, who had been expected to win a seat, came in over a thousand votes lower
than the lowest Quaker candidate. Numerous tickets were cast with his name scratched
off.97 Allen would not play a significant role in city politics for the next decade, and
over twenty years after the riots Proprietary opponents still found the 1742 election
useful in their election propaganda.98

Election Day and the role o f party:
If politicians in colonial Pennsylvania could agree on anything, it was that
party and faction was a sore on the body politic. This assumption came not just from
political theory, but also from Quaker theology, which put a premium on social
harmony." Party was dangerous because it elevated private interest over public good,
and introduced prejudice and passion over reasoned consideration. As a writer for The
Pennsylvania Gazette put it: “A People is traveling close to destruction, when
individuals consider their interests as different from those of the public.”100 Political
journalists excoriated “the Rage and Wildness of Party,” and noted its baneful effects
on electors every October first.101

55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

What is notable about these sentiments, aside from the consensus on the evil o f
political faction, is that they almost invariably came in the course of partisan attacks.
While party was everywhere and always disavowed, Pennsylvanians could and did
justify the honest defense o f the country against its enemies. As one writer noted,
“[w]ith regard to the approaching Election, I would only observe, that Unity and Peace
are indeed desirable, but not at the Expense of Liberty: And since even the Religion o f
Peace exhorts us to contend earnestly for the Faith, ‘tis to be hoped a moderate
Contention, for the Blessing next in value, will not be blameable...”102
At periodic moments throughout the colonial period, and increasingly as the
century wore one, partisan battles were more or less openly declared. By the 1770s,
Philadelphia had a developed of something like a nascent party organization. This can
be tracked, for example, through the existence of political pamphlets. For the period
running from 1705-1714, there were only two such pamphlets printed. In the years
1724 through 1734, there were 43. From 1755 to 1764 there were 109.103 Another
index of the institutionalization of the political contest is the existence of political
advertisements for office. The first such advertisement in The Pennsylvania Gazette
would seem to have been in the year 1744. By the early 1750s such ads were common,
and by the late 1750s and early 1760s, the issue o f the Gazette the week prior to the
vote was regularly carrying upwards of 12 advertisements announcing candidacies for
local offices.104
Partisan activity was noticeable as early as the 1708, when James Logan
complained of the opposition’s Election Day activism in a letter to William Penn, and
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hit its stride in the 1720s during the era of Sir William Keith.105 It seems to have died
down once Keith left, but if the complaints of Proprietary faction are anything to go
by, had reappeared by the end of the decade.106 Although often present throughout the
year, in the form of pamphlets and partisan writings in newspapers, party was
particularly noticeable on the day o f the vote. Because of the particular cultural form it
took, Philadelphia’s Election Day did not see the disappearance of factional activity
but rather its intensification. The effort put forth by partisans was one indication of
this. Factional bickering and fighting on the grounds in front of the polls meant that an
Election Day could often be a noisy and tumultuous affair. Henry Muhlenberg noted
in one of his diary entries, “[t]his is turbulent day, for the citizens of Pennsylvania are
electing their legislative government, and this seldom happens without altercations.”107
Besides the noise of partisan pleadings and treatings, there were pamphlets to be
spread about, and broadsides to be pasted.108 Election Day strategy also occasionally
required an ability to mobilize voters quickly when the opportunity presented itself,
and a sense of where and how to grab latent support. On the day of hotly contested
1764 election, there were so many voters that by midnight the Court House stairs were
still crowded. At about 3 o’clock in the morning, the sheriff made a move to close the
polls, “but (O! fatal mistake!) the old hands [ie., the Quaker group] kept it open.” The
opposition, alert to the change, dispatched couriers on foot and horseback to gather up
more support.109 From the time of the first call for closing to the end of the poll, at
nine or ten the next morning, Charles Pettit estimated that anywhere from 700 to 800
additional votes had been cast, about 500 of them for the Proprietary side.110
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Despite their best efforts, Philadelphians could not keep themselves from
provoking each other during the election. Part o f what brought the troops to battle was
the diverse population of the city at the time, and the ability of an election to heighten
differences among various ethnic groups and religious sects. An influx of secondwave immigration during the 1720s, bringing in large numbers of German speakers
and Scots-Irish, meant that colonial Pennsylvania had one of the most diverse
populations of any American colony, save New York.111 Established residents were
uneasy about the new arrivals, streaming into the country “like poles of shad.”1l2Isaac
Norris, for one, worried about “the ordinary and Profligate” coming into the province,
especially the Irish, “among whom a great part seem to be the very scum of
Mankind.”113 Already by the late 1600s, J.R. Pole has argued, Pennsylvanians were
introducing changes into the voting laws to restrict the franchise to older and more
established residents.114 In 1728, Lt. Governor Patrick Gordon announced a law that
would limit the “Crowds o f Forreigners who are yearly pour’d in upon us.”115 Worries
about the Scots-Irish continued for several decades, Pole notes, and in the 1750s laws
were passed restricting German immigration.116
The distrust that existed among various groups meant that political fights could
be, and were, carried out along ethnic and religious lines. The two main factions were
generally associated with religion: the Quakers (and affiliated German pacificist
groups like the Mennonites) on the one hand, the Presbyterians (at least within the city
itself) and Anglicans on the other.117 Political propaganda often explicitly
acknowledged this. Pamphlets supporting the old faction attacked Presbyterians,
58

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Proprietary writers went after Quakers. Germans, who tended to switch sides
throughout the period, were considered ignorant boors or honest yeoman, depending
on the circumstances.118
Links to religion gave partisans a ready tool with which to organize and
energize voters. The Quaker leadership was somewhat notorious for establishing their
slates during the church’s annual General Meeting, which brought in deputies from
throughout the Province to a central location. Despite the explicit ban on political
activity at these meetings, the opportunity and timing of the events—they took place
in early September—evidently proved too tempting to pass up.119 Presbyterian
religious leaders worked more directly on their flock. An observer of the 1764 election
noted that Presbyterian ministers “held Synods about the election, turned their pulpits
into Ecclesiastical drums for politics and told their people to vote according as they
directed them at the peril o f their damnation.”120 In the 1770s, William Goddard,
publisher of The Pennsylvania Chronicle, advised those seeking office to “bellow
loud, yes very loud...Against Bishops,” and further, “[d]on’t forget (...the never
failing argument) to declare the kirk is in danger.” Such a strategy, Goddard wrote,
would guarantee a candidate at least three to four hundred “Oliverian bigots” who
could each be counted upon to vote three to four times.121
The extent to which such practices worked to bring voters to the polls is
suggested by Muhlenberg’s statement that on election eve in 1765, so many Germans
had come to town to vote that his hall could barely contain them, and he had trouble
reading over a copy of the Charter in German.122 Muhlenberg himself saw the 1764
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election largely along religious lines, noting after that vote that the Presbyterians,
Anglicans and Lutherans had won the day, and that the Quakers, the Mennonites, and
other dissenting groups had lost out; the next year he gave the victory to the Quakers,
adding a suspicion that the other side had used foul means to carry their victory.123
The political strife provoked by the election had exactly the sort of divisive
effect on the city that opponents of party feared. Because of their obvious differences
with the established English population, both in terms o f religion and of language, and
perhaps also their unreliability, Germans especially were a favorite target for attack on
Election Day. Often, this would take the form of accusations that they voted illegally.
A 1765 letter from a party organizer in Philadelphia to one in Lancaster County
warned about the large numbers of un-naturalized Mennonites that (the writer
expected) would swarm the polls in favor of the opposition. To guard against the
possibility, it was suggested to publicize that “all of our party intend to come wellarmed to the Election and that you intend if there’s the least partiality in either Sheriff,
Inspectors or Managers of the Election that you will thrash every Inspector Quaker &
Menonist to Jelly.” Every man ought to be provided with a “good Shilely” club, and
potential frauds would be informed that any man trying to vote more than once would
be “that moment delivered] up to the Mob to chastise him.” Such threats would be
sure to dissuade the Mennonite voters, the writer assured, not one third of whom were
naturalized.124 University of Pennsylvania rector William Smith was so angered at the
way the “uncultivated Race o f Germans” unthinkingly supported the opposition in the
1750s, he recommended removing their right to vote and outlawing their press (the
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German journalist Christopher Sauer was credited with an almost preternatural ability
to stir his countrymen).125 A writer o f the 1730s, evidently referring to the German
presence on Election Day, noted that in Britain foreigners were forbidden to vote,
adding, “we have sufficient marks, to distinguish our Foes from our Friends.”126
One did not have to be a German speaker, however, to have one’s status called
into question. Losers especially were fond of raising doubts about the legitimacy of
opposition voters. After failing in his 1764 re-election bid, for example, Benjamin
Franklin fumed over the various tricks that opposition had played on election,
including the “many Perjuries procured among the wretched Rabble brought to swear
themselves intitled to a Vote.” Despite this, Franklin noted, “Your Artifices did not
prevail every where; nor your double Tickets, and whole Boxes of forged Votes.”127
The next year, a Quaker partisan credited his side’s victory in a smaller, run-off
election to the fact that there was “a better opportunity o f Scrutinizing into the Quality
of those who offered to vote: for the Presbyterians used very step in their Power to
secure this Election, but in Vain.”128 In an earlier era, Quaker leaders had countered
the accusations against their German voters in the 1742 election with the charge that
the other side had in the past brought ineligible tenants to the election site to vote.129
Laments about the tense, uncomfortable atmosphere provoked by elections
were frequently voiced. During the 1764 election, a pamphleteer remarked how
“[neighbours, who from their Infancy, lived in the greatest Harmony, cannot now
spend an agreeable Evening together.”130 An earlier journalist had already noted
something like the same effect. “You well know, my loving Countrymen, that you are
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most of you very warm & active this Time o f the Year; Your feeling is at its greatest
Perfection: An Affront now is given and taken in a minute, which two Months ago, or
two Months hence, would take an hour.” In order to counter the effects while the
election continued, the writer recommended his readers cultivate a studied “dullness”
in speech and manner, avoid drink, and sleep a great deal more than usual.131

Election Day and the media:
Beyond the experience

of the

vote

itself, colonial

Philadelphians

communicated the Election Day experience to themselves through three different
forms of media: letters, pamphlets and broadsides, and newspapers. These forms were
related institutionally. As a clearing-house for information, the post office was often
the location as well of a newspaper, and newspaper publishers like Benjamin Franklin,
in turn, often printed pamphlets.132 At the same time, each of these forms of mediated
expression displayed somewhat different characteristics; thus each played a different
role in explaining, interpreting, and framing the Election Day experience o f the age.
As a way to link the political class to one another throughout the province,
letters created a public that was in some sense much different than the public of
Election Day. The privacy they afforded gave them certain advantages over the more
public forms of written expression. Along with such practices as the Quaker general
meeting or the private club, the letter was a valuable method of organizing party
strategy and coordination, allowing Pennsylvania’s factional leaders to openly express
partisan attitudes to close associates, while publicly disavowing party designs and
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continue their expressed allegiance to the notion of a single unified public.133 Letters
also gave party leaders opportunity to give voice to elitist attitudes about the electorate
that might have seemed out of place in open public discourse, and thus cultivated a
sense of political leadership and identity distinct from the larger public.134
The primary role o f the pamphlet in the colonial political culture was as a
partisan tool to put forward party positions and, especially, to attack opponents.
Pamphlets were used by political groups as early as 1711, and ample use was made of
them by both sides during the Keithian era of the 1720s.135 But while pamphlets were
used as electioneering tools throughout the century, pamphleteers came into their own
with the hard fought 1764 campaign. It was during this later period when men like
David Dove made a career of pamphleteering, hiring out their services to each side.136
Pamphleteers were often brutal in their behavior toward the opposition.137 Franklin’s
opponents were so severe in the course of the 1764—accusing him, among other
things, of fathering a bastard child and allowing the mother to starve—that, Phillip
Gleason has argued, they affected his public reputation for the rest of his life, and even
influenced historians.138
The pamphlet or broadside had a number of advantages over other forms of
communication. It was a relatively inexpensive way to get a message out to large
numbers in the electorate. A run of several thousand pamphlets, Nash notes, might
cost the writer around 5 £, and could be passed among readers.139 Broadsides were
especially effective ways of putting forth one’s candidacy on Election Day for those
who lacked the resources o f a party organization. For example, a broadside allowed
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the engraver Robert Kennedy to make his case to his fellow tradesmen in 1770 as a
way to avoid the “prospect o f approaching Indigence to myself and tender
offspring.”140
The direct influence of pamphleteers on the Election Day ritual was in terms of
framing it as a contest. As campaign instruments, pamphlets created an environment in
which differences within the body politic were made explicit, and along the way
implicitly challenged the assumption of moral superiority of members of the ruling
class, who were regularly traduced by pamphlet writers of both sides. Their structural
equivalent in the modem age would probably be the party advertisement, and like
attack ads, pamphlet attacks often provoked complaints about the low character of
electoral politics.141
The newspaper’s role in the election was rather different, and in a vague sense
less directly partisan. The newspaper helped create the public by joining it into a
common act—the act of the reading the news—and then linking this community of
readers to an outside world, through the reporting of the election results.142
Newspapers also presented a popular, consensual image o f what Election Day ought to
look like. Journalists commonly defended general principles—the need to keep the
public good always in mind, to disavow faction, to pay little heed to the tumult
surrounding the election—and to express support for shared political values—social
harmony, freedom, the dangers o f tyranny—so that editions prior to the first of
October would often feature a column, or poem, or letter from a writer calling on the
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readership to avoid party strife, boorish behavior, and the demands of the ticket
hawkers and make their choices instead based on their own reason and observation.143
Nonetheless, compared to the role that the mass media would play in later
constructions of Election Day, the colonial press can seem somewhat muted in its
stance toward the event. Often, The American Weekly Mercury or The Pennsylvania
Gazette of the 1730s and 1740s would carry no information at all about the election
except the results of the vote, which themselves were often introduced in a relatively
pedestrian manner: “Thursday last being the anniversary Election, throughout the
Province, for Representatives, Sheriffs, Coroners, etc., etc., The following Gentlemen
were chosen for the following counties, viz.” This would be followed by list of the
successful candidates, and only very rarely a remark about Election Day itself.144 One
year, the editor of the Weekly Mercury, Andrew Bradford, noted the great deal of
activity about the election grounds; another year, Franklin’s Gazette followed the list
of successful Assembly with a note about how many were Quakers, and how many
were not. 145 Generally, however, even this much direct commentary was excluded.
There was no coverage of the 1742 riots in the Weekly Mercury, for example, although
the Gazette did have a story.146
In other words, journalists in this period rarely took on the role of analyst of
Election Day. Thomas Leonard has argued the colonial period in the United States was
the moment when the printed press began to assume the role of interpreter of public
events for its readership.147 As regards Election Day, Philadelphia’s colonial
journalists provided their readers with an interpretation of what Election Day ought to
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be, but were less comfortable acting as expert commentators on the event’s actual
results. There are a number o f explanations for this. First, analysis of a political event
like the election would create controversy, and perhaps lose the paper readership or
even get the editor into trouble with the authorities.148 Second, the institutional role of
the newspaper was still in its infancy, as was partisan warfare: “colonies did not have
the patrons for writers and traditions in quarrels that could nurture political
advocacy.”149 Journalists were still working their way towards an understanding of
what their role in politics should be. The general consensus against party and faction
also probably had an influence. Analysis of the day would have meant publicly and
explicitly acknowledging the presence of party, which would have gone against the
ideological understanding of the vote as an expression of the unified public.
When the writers did refer to Pennsylvania’s electoral politics, it was generally
either in general terms—concerning the proper behavior on the election grounds, for
example—or it dealt with it in a vague and allusive style. Like political correspondents
themselves, until the 1760s candidates were almost never referred to by name; even
factions or parties were rarely addressed explicitly. Instead, a writer might mention the
need to guard against any candidate who might give evidence of being an “ambitious
ringleader,” or a “selfish and designing Man,” (this coming during the period of
Keith’s political ascendancy),150 or defend one I—N—, a member of the assembly
(Isaac Norris) from attacks made on him by his opponents.151 Political electioneering
was written in a sort of code. As Bamhurst and Nerone point out, it is often difficult
for the modem reader to understand who exactly is being attacked or defended in
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broadsides or journalistic attacks, because of the use of nicknames and allusions
(classical or contemporary), and the contextual information that is assumed.152 They
add that this difficulty was probably not an accidental by-product of journalistic style.
The upper middle-classes of the colonial cities did not want their information read and
understood by just everyone.153 Thus the lack of interest shown by the newspaper in
the Election Day results, or in the interpretation of them, makes some sense.
Newspapers would not have wanted to explain to the general public how the election
results were likely to affect the politics of the province for the coming year. That was
not information that the common man, in the opinion of the newspaper’s public,
needed to know.
The relative lack of newspaper commentary on Election Day is important
because it is so clearly different from what will come after it. Almost immediately
following the revolution, as we will see, the press become much more involved in
discussions of Election Day. They also become more important and explicit tools in
the partisan fight. Once Election Day becomes a national rather than a local event, the
role of a medium such as print necessarily figured more centrally into the way that it is
communicated.

Conclusion:
The annual ritual of casting the vote on the balcony of their Court House every
October created a representative body of Philadelphians, and through this, provided
them with a portrait of themselves as a political entity. It established the public as a
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social fact by embodying it, and for this reason political writers continually stressed
the importance o f what happened that day, and tried to instill in their readers the need
to perform the event correctly. The voter was acting not simply for himself but for the
polity as a whole. Thus, to cast one’s vote wisely and well was “one of the most
important things to the Good of the Publick.” 154 Each free man’s vote, was “his
country due:/ Which his own reason should direct him to.”155 The correct performance
in the matter o f the vote would lead to good governance, whereas poor choices,
choices that resulted from selfish partisan passions or a simple lack of due
consideration, would lead to corruption in the polity itself. “This matter is too weighty
for a Jest.”156
As a portrait of the public, drawn by and for the people themselves, Election
Day really provided two different images. The first existed in the more optimistic
passages of political rhetoric, both popular and elite, of the age. That portrait was of a
group of independent-minded, well-meaning, sober, and honest freeman peaceably
walking up to the Court House steps every year and casting their ballots. Without
coercion, these electors had all, simultaneously, arrived at a common decision of
which group of men ought to represent their views to the government for the next
year. Assemblymen were chosen without effort on their part. Their success came not
because they wished for political honors but because their general excellence had
recommended them for the office. Party divisions and electioneering did not exist
because the choices for representative were obvious to all good and reasonable men.
Election Day was thus a portrait of social harmony, of personal independence existing
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alongside a proper respect for authority and social hierarchy, and evidence of the
general wisdom of the people of Philadelphia. Its leaders were excellent and honorable
men, interested not in private gain but in the common weal. Its citizens were wise,
free, and well behaved. The pride citizens took in their annual ritual, their belief in its
distinctiveness and superiority to the rest of the Engish world, comes through in this
passage from the provincial Assembly, during one of their periodic disputes with their
Governor.
He [Governor Morris] affects to consider us as a permanent Body, or
some particular Order of People in the state, capable of planning and
scheming for their own particular Advantage, distinct from that of the
Province in general. How groundless this must be, is easily conceived,
when ‘tis considered, that we are pick’d out from among the People, by
their Suffrages; to represent them for one Year only; which ended, we
return again among the People, and others may be and often are, chosen
in our Places. No one of us knows a Day before the Election that he
shall be chosen, and we neither bribe nor solicit the Voters, but every
one votes as he pleases, and as privately as he pleases, the Election
being by written Tickets folded up and put into a Box. What Interest
can such a Body have, separate from that of a Publick? What Schemes
can a sett of Men, continually changing, have, or what plans can they
form to continually aggrandize themselves,...if any of us had such
Schemes, the Want o f a single Vote in any election might totally
disconcert them, there being no tenure more precarious than that by
popular Esteem or Favour.15
Although a portrait of utopia, something approaching this sort of scene may in
fact have often been performed on Philadelphia’s Election Day during the colonial
period. Concerning those many election days that did not cause public controversy and
comment, we can assume this was in part because the performance of the citizens in
fact was close enough to the portrait just presented that it did not become a scandal.
True enough, it was these unremarkable Election Days that often drew the fewest
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voters, but low turnouts did not bother colonial Philadelphians as they did their
republican and democratic descendants.158
What did bother them was the boorish behavior often exhibited on the day, the
ignoble chasing after votes on the part of supposedly superior men, the way that ethnic
and religious prejudice insinuated itself into men’s actions, and above all the spirit of
partisanship so clearly evident. At one point James Logan wrote somewhat disgustedly
that,
I go to Elections, because I think it my Duty, but confess my self
almost tired of it—To see the vile Abuses of our Rights and Liberties,
and how easily the better and most modest of our People give into it.
Many of them seem to think and act as if a Set of burly Fellows were
appointed by Law to make the Tickets, and the People had only a Right
to choose which they liked best: The worthiest Men these People know
to be the most Modest and Decent in their Behaviour, and make
advantage of it, by timely Provision, Clamour, Noise and Impudence.159
Conservatives like Logan distrusted Election Day because of the way it provoked the
general populace and disturbed the social order. Republicans complained about
“caballers,” by whom “private acts are made, A Part attempted and the whole
betray’d.” More radical citizens complained of small groups of men presuming to
decide for the people, and of the people’s lack of spirit in opposing them.160 This
problematic image of themselves was one Election Day too often, and increasingly,
painted of the Philadelphia public. It was a public that hoped for unity but continually
created divisions within itself, that boasted of its love of freedom but constantly
seemed ready to defer to the dictates of party and political leadership. It was a public
in which many men began to suspect that the triumph too often seemed to go to the
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loudest, the most arrogant and brash, or the most servile, rather than the wisest and the
most trustworthy.
The distance between utopia and reality was communicated through various
means. There was above all the actual physical performance of vote on Election Day.
There, interested residents could observe for themselves the battles for the stairs, the
electioneering, the treating, the spectacle of the freemen delivering their ballots to the
voting windows, the occasional cheers and celebrations when the results of a
particularly contested election were announced. But the performance was also
communicated via printed mass media and the postal system, where Philadelphians
critiqued their performance, raised doubts about its propriety and suggestions as to
how it could be improved. It was in these forums that Philadelphians created an
interpretation of what the Election Day ritual meant, and began a long tradition of
worrying over whether the public that really performed Election Day was similar
enough to the one that should perform it. These worries would become a tradition in
themselves, and perhaps Election Day's most significant effect on that public.
1 Alan Tully, Forming American politics: ideals, interests, and institutions in colonial New York and
Pennsylvania (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University, 1994); Richard R. Beeman, “Deference,
republicanism, and the emergence of popular politics in eighteenth-century America,” William and
Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 49(3) 1992, pp. 401-30. Gary Nash, The urban crucible: social change,
political consciousness, and the origins of the American revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University, 1979)
2 Ronald Schulz, The republic o f labor: Philadelphia artisans and the politics o f class, 1720-1830 (New
York: Oxford, 1993)
3 Nash, The urban crucible; Sister Joan de Lourdes Leonard, “Elections in colonial Pennsylvania,”
William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 11(3) 1954, Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania, 1999), pp. 605-32.
4 Gary Nash, “The transformation of urban politics; 1700-1765,” Journal o f American History, 60 (3)
1973.
3 Peter Thompson, Rum-punch and revolution: tavemgoing and public life in eighteenth-century
Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999)

71

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

6 Tully, Forming American politics, pp. 341-46. Tully’s discussion o f New York is far more extensive
than his discussion of Pennsylvania. New York, like Virginia, had a viva voce system.
7 Charles Sydnor, Gentlemen freeholders: political practices in Washington’s Virginia (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina, 1952); Rhys Isaac, The transformation o f Virginia, 1740-1790 (Chapel
Hill: University o f North Carolina, 1982) pp. 110-114; Isaac, “Dramatizing the Ideology of Revolution:
Popular Mobilization in Virginia, 1774 to 1776,” William and Mary Quarterly, third series, 33.3 (1976)
pp. 376, 377; Edmund Morgan, Inventing the people: the rise o f popular sovereignty in England and
America (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988) pp. 184,185; Schudson, The good citizen, pp. 20-23.
* For descriptions of the voting process see “A supplementary Act, 1722,” vol. 3, The Statutes at Large
o f Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1809, ed. James T. Mitchell and Henry Flanders (Harrisburg, PA: np,
1896) p. 296, 297; also Sect. II. “An Act Amending the Several Acts,” 1745-46, vol. 5, Statutes at
Large o f Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1809, p. 18 (hereafter PA Statutes); and Lewis Evans, A Brief
Account o f Pennsylvania: in a letter to Richard Peters, Esq., in answer to some queries o f a gentleman
in Europe. 1753. p. 24, Manuscript Collection, HSP (source cited in Tully, Forming American Politics,
p. 530). The several tickets meant that it was legally possible for a voter to go to the polls several times
in the day to vote. Although there is little evidence this was a common affair, in 1764, Henry
Muhlenberg cast a vote in the morning for Assembly representative and in the evening for the town
burgesses: The Journals if Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, trans. Theodore G. Tappert and John W.
Doberstein, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Evangelical Lutheran Ministerium and The Muhlenberg Press, 1958)
pp. 122, 123. (Source cited in Nash, “Transformation of urban politics," p. 629.)
Cortlandt F. Bishop, History o f Elections in the American Colonies (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968),
pp. 140-175.
Tully, Forming American Politics, p. 347. For this reason, perhaps, there is little evidence that of
Pennsylvania landlords ordering their tenants to vote a certain way, as was the practice in New York,
ibid., p. 346.
11 Charles de Montesquieu, The spirit o f the laws, trans. and eds., Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn
Miller, Harold Samuel Stone, volume one, (Cambridge; New York , Cambridge University Press:
1989), part 1, book 2, section 2, p. 14.
12Tully, Forming American Politics, p. 529.
13 Paul Veritt, To my Friends in Pensilvania, (Philadelphia: np, I783[?]) p. 3. Collection of the
Historical Society of New York. (Source cited in Tully, Forming American Politics, p. 529.)
14 A BROTHER CHIP, The Pennsylvania Gazette, Sept. 27, 1770, p. 3. Hereafter PA Gazette. Cited in
Charles S. Olton, Artisans for Independence, Philadelphia mechanics and the American Revolution
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1975) p. 134
15 In a 1689 controversy over the election of several assembly members from Philadelphia county, the
governor noted with some surprise that residents had not used the ballot in this matter, since “they had
always heretofore insisted upon it as their Right.” (The decision to forgoe the ballot in this case seems
to have been provoked by the citizens’ desire to send a public message to the governor, who had refused
the election o f the two members, Samuel! Richardson and John Eckley). Pennsylvania Colonial
Records, vol. I (Philadelphia, Joseph Sevems and Company: 1852), p. 282. James Logan mentions the
use of the ballot on Philadelphia’s election in a 1705 election: James Logan to William Penn, Oct. 24,
1705. Correspondence between William Penn and James Logan, 1700-1750, vol. II (Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincott, 1872) p. 80.
16Bishop, History o f Elections, p. 167. This influence might explain why the colonists, in Pennsylvania
and elsewhere, sometimes used colored balls or beans to vote instead of paper (Venetians used balls
(“ballot” in Italian), and this was Harrington’s method.) See Colonial records o f Pennsylvania, vol. I, p.
279, also Leonard, “Colonial Elections in PA,” p. 392, note 33, for mentions of Pennsylvania cases:
there is little evidence that this method was common in Philadelphia, certainly not after the beginning of
the eighteenth century.
17 Harrington’s discussion of the ballot is in James Harrington, The commonwealth o f Oceana; and a
system o f politics, ed. J.G.A. Pocock, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). For a discussion
of Penn’s political theory and the clash with political reality see J.R. Pole, Political representation in

72

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

England and the origins o f the American Revolution (Macmillan, St. Martin’s: London, New York,
1966) pp. 76-93.
11Bishop, History o f elections, op cit.
19Rappaport, op cit.
20 Dialogue Shewing, What’s therein to be found, Philadelphia, 172S, (Early American Imprints, First
Series. American Antiqurian Society, general editors. Evans No. 2652. Hereafter referred to by the
Evans numbers of the document) p. 30. Cited in both Tully, Forming American politics, p. 346, and
Leonard, “Elections in colonial Pennsylvania,” p. 394.
21 Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, Nov. 17, 1742. Peters Letter Book, Richard Peter’s Papers, 17391743, p. 138, HSP. (Source cited in Thompson, Rumpunch and revolution, p. 132) See also the quoted
remarks of Mayor Clement Plumstead in the testimony of Anthony Morris, in evidence about the riots
before the Assembly: “Appendix: containing the depositions concerning the riot at the election.” Votes
and Proceedings o f the House o f Representatives o f the Province o f Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania
Archives, Eighth Series, ed. Gertrude McKinney, vol. 4. (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania, 1931) p. 2960.
Hereafter referred to as PA Votes. Also Leonard, “Elections in colonial Pennsylvania,” p. 394.
22 Isaac Norris to James Logan, Oct. 13, 1711. Correspondence between William Penn and James
Logan, 1700-1750, vol. II (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1872) p. 458. See letter of Isaac Norris, Jr., to
Robert Charles letter, Oct 11, 1740, Isaac Norris Letterbook, 1719-1756, Norris Collection, HSP, p. 3;
and letter of James Burd to Samuel Purviance, Sept. 17, 1764, Shippen Papers, vol. 6, HSP, p. 109.
Both sources cited in Leonard, “Colonial Elections in PA,” pp. 388,390
23 An instance of the earlier practice is mentioned in Timothy Telltruth, To Morris Morris, on the
Reasons published fo r his Conduct in Assembly, July 16, 1728 (Evans 3111) p.l (source cited in
Thomas Wendel, “The Keith-Lloyd Alliance: factional and coalition politics in colonial PA,” PMH&B,
92(3) 1968 p. 303), and the letter from Norris to Charles, Oct. 11, 1740, p. 2. An example of the latter
can be found in the pamphlet, To the Freemen o f Pennsylvania, Sept. 28, 1764, Papers o f Benjamin
Franklin, vol. 11, p. 364, and in a broadside of the era: John Dickinson, Fellow Citizens and
countrymen, Oct. I, 1772: Philadelphia, (Evans 42363). The latter work asks that the reader “will please
to write a few spare tickets, to furnish his Friends with,” as none are wrote to be delivered at the StateHouse.
24 Discussions of this sort of activity can be found in a letter from Charles Pettit to Joseph Reed, Nov. 3,
1764, Life and Correspondence o f Joseph Reed, ed. William B. Reed, vol. I (Philadelphia: Lindsay and
Blackiston, 1847) p. 36 (source cited in Beeman, “Deference and republicanism,” p. 426); James Logan
to William Penn, Oct. 20, 1706, Correspondence between William Penn and James Logan, vol. II, p.
188. In To the Freeholders and other Electors, o f ASSEMBLY-MENfor PENNSYLVANIA, Philadelphia,
1765 (Evans 10184) p. 1, the writer defends Benjamin Franklin against charges that he is anti-German
by reminding readers he was one of the most “active” on the Election grounds when the son of a
German was chosen sheriff for the first time.
23 For a mention of voters drawing up their tickets in various “shops” and “houses” on the day of the
vote, see a letter of Richard Hockley to Thomas Penn, Nov. 1, 1742, Pennsylvania Magazine o f History
and Biography (hereafter PMH&B) 28(1) 1904, p. 41. (Source cited in Nash, “Transformation of urban
politics,” p. 623.) For patterns of vote totals in the city of Philadelphia see, Robert Dinkin, Voting in
provincial America: a study o f elections in the thirteen colonies, 1689-1776 (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1977), Table 10, p. 160, and also p. 161.
26 Letter of Edward Shippen to father, Sept. 14, 1756. Shippen-Balch Papers, vol. I, p. 48, HSP, p. 48;
letter of Samuel Purviance to James Burd, Sept. 20, 1765, Shippen Papers, vol. 6, HSP. p. 107. Both
cited in Leonard, “Elections in colonial PA,” pp. 388,389.
27 Isaac Norris to James Logan, Oct. 13, 1711. Correspondence between William Penn and James
Logan, 1700-1750, vol. II, p. 458. Norris argues the slate would have been more successful had more
effort been put forth, and admits that he himself was tired “and therefore could not be more
industrious.”
2* A BROTHER CHIP. PA Gazette, Sept. 27, 1770, p. 3.
29 PHILADELPHIA. Pennsylvania Chronicle, Sept. 19-Sept. 26, 1772.

73

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30 Isaac Norris to James Logan, June 29, 1710. Correspondence between William Penn and James
Logan, vol. II, p. 427. Source cited in Nash, ‘Transformation of urban politics,” p. 614.
31 A general description of the election grounds and of the area around the old city courthouse in
colonial Philadelphia is found in two nineteenth centuries histories of the city: John F. Watson, Annals
o f Philadelphia and Pennsylvania in the Olden Time, vol. 1, (Leary Stuart and Co., Philadelphia:
1898), pp. 350, 351, (source cited in Leonard, “Colonial Elections in PA,” p. 394), and Ellis Paxson
Oberholtzer, Philadelphia: a history o f the city and its people, a record o f225 year, volume 1 (S.J.
Clarke Publishing Co., Chicago, Philadelphia: 1912) p. 148.
32 See the comments of William Allen on his actions at the start of Election Day, 1742. “Remonstrance
to House of Clement Plumstead, late Mayor of Philadelphia, William Allen, Recorder, and Joseph
Turner, Alderman.” PA Votes, vol. 4. p. 2846. Allen claimed that the crowd surrounding him in the
house was so large that he did not see the initial riot, suggesting that a good deal of drinking, and
perhaps treating, was taking place.
3 For a mention of the Election Day ringing of the bells, see Henry Muhlenberg, The Journals if Henry
Melchior Muhlenberg, p. 273. Edward Warner and Isaac Pemberton describe the opening of the 1742
Election Day and the use of the trumpet in their evidence in PA Votes, vol. 4, pp. 3001,3007.
34 The PA Gazette, Sept. 26-Oct. 5, 1732, p. 3, for example mentions the following speech from the
sheriff: “Gentlemen, I take this publick Opportunity to thank the good People of the County and City
for the Honours they have done me; I earnestly recommend Peace and Good nature to the Competitors
in this Election, and with the County a good Choice in my successor.”
35 Sect. One: “Supplemental Act,” 1727, vol. 4, PA Statutes, p. 77.
36 To the Free-Holders o f the Province o f Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1742, (Evans 5075) p. 2; See also
the preamble to “An Act directing choice of Inspectors,” 1766, vol. 6, PA Statutes, vol. p. 32: noting
that “great mischiefs” have arisen and “many frauds” have been committed during the course of the
Inspector vote.
37 Sect. One “Supplemental Act,” 1727, vol. 4, PA Statutes, p. 77; Sect II.“An Act Amending the
Several Acts,” 1745-46, vol. 5, PA Statutes, p. 18; Sections Five and Six: “An Act directing choice of
Inspectors,” 1766, vol. 6, PA Statutes, pp. 35,36.
3* See the preambles to “An Act Amending the Several Acts,” 1745-46, vol. 5, PA Statutes, p. 16; and,
“An Act directing choice of Inspectors,” 1766, vol. 6, PA Statutes, p. 32.
39 Depositions of Edward Warner and Israel Pemberton, Assemblymen. PA Votes, vol. 4. pp. 3002,
3007.
40 See the complaints raised against the inspectors in a “Letter from E.N.” The American Weekly
Mercury, Sept. 15-Sept. 22, 1737. p. 2.
41 Elkanah Watson, Men and Times o f the Revolution (Dana and Co.: New York, 1856) p. 218. Cited in
Edmund Morgan, Inventing the people: the rise o f popular sovereignty in England and America (New
York: Norton, 1988), p. 182.
42 In his evidence about the 1742 riots, Joseph Lownes, mentions women watching from a balcony: PA
Votes, vol. 4, p. 2971.
43 A visual description of the scene can be found in two colonial-era partisan broadsheets: The Election,
a Medly, Philadelphia, 1765. (Evans No. 9650); and David Dove. The COUNTER-MEDLY, being a
proper ANSWER to the all the DUNCES o f the MEDLY and their ABETTORS, Philadelphia, 1765.
(Evans 9943).
44 Letter from Pettit to Reed, Nov. 3, 1764, Life and Correspondence o f Joseph Reed, p. 36.
43 Dialogue Shewing what's therein to be found, op cit.
46 Depositions of John Hyatt, sheriff, Joseph Lownes, and Thomas Lynch. PA Votes, vol. 4, pp. 2962,
2972. 2999.; letter of Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, Nov. 17, 1742, p. 135. The practice o f battling
for the stairs is mentioned in both Ellis P. Oberholtzer, Philadelphia; a history o f the city and its people,
a record o f 225 years, vol. 1 (Chicago: J.S. Clarke, 1912) pp. 148-49; Joseph Watson, Annals o f
Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, in the olden time, vol. I (Philadelphia: E.F. Stuart, 1888) p. 35, and
Leonard, “Elections in colonial PA,” p. 394.
47 Deposition of Hugh Roberts, shopkeeper, PA Votes, vol. 4, p. 2957.

74

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41 The quote is from Thomas Bond and comes from the deposition of Samuel Burge, sadler. PA Voles,
vol. 4. (p. 2996-97).
49 Letter o f Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, Nov. 17,1742, pp. 133, 137.
30 Sect. 13: “An Act directing choice of Inspectors,” 1766, vol. 6, PA Statutes, p. 39. The act also
separated the city from the county elections, presumably to lessen the crowding at the polls.
51 See Penn’s 1700 “Charter of Privileges,” and 4 Anne, chapter 129, in A collection of all the laws o f
the province o f Pennsylvania: now in force (Philadelphia: B. Franklin, 1742), pp. 49, 67. The criteria
were more liberal for elections of sheriffs, coroners, and other local offices. Section One: “An act for
the better regulating of Elections,” 1717, PA Votes, vol. p. 139.
52 Chilton Williamson, American suffrage: from property to democracy. 1760-1860 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1960) p. 5.
33 Williamson, ibid., p. 11; also Michael Schudson, The good citizen: a history o f American civic life
(New York, Free Press, 1998) p. 28; J.R. Pole, Political representation, p. 3 1.
34 Gary Nash. The urban crucible, p. 26. The term deference is defined by Richard Beeman,
“Deference, republicanism, and popular politics,” as a society “consensual in its social and political
relations but hierarchical in its distribution of power and authority,” p. 403. Beeman credits J.R. Pole
for explicitly creating the idea of deference (see Pole’s Political representation), but argues that earlier
writers, including Bagehot and Charles Sydnor, worked with something like the same concept. Beeman,
ibid., pp. 403,404.
33 Gary Nash, “The Framing of Government in Pennsylvania; Ideas in Contact with Reality,” in Race,
class, and politics: Essays on American Colonial and Revolutionary Society (Urbana, IL: University of
Illinois Press, 1986) p. 71
34Nash, The urban crucible, pp. 33,36. See also Schudson, The good citizen, pp. 19-24.
37 Nash, The urban crucible, p. 79. Other criticisms of the Frame, many also made by friends and
acquaintances, can be found in ibid., pp. 79-80.
34 William Penn to “My Friends in Pennsylvania,” July 18, 1687, The Register of Pennsylvania, ed.
Samuel Hazard, vol. 4 (Philadelphia: William F. Geddes, 1830) p. 105. Cited in Nash, “The framing of
government in Pennsylvania,” pp. 77,78.
9 “A Brother to the Brethren of the Chip.” The Pennsylvania Chronicle Sept. 24-Oct. 1, 1770., p. 145.
For the expression of similar sentiments see, Isaac Norris, Sr., to Jonathan Scarth, Oct. 21,1726, Norris
Letter Book, 1716-1730. Norris Papers Collection, HSP p. 475. Cited in Nash, “The transformation of
urban politics,” p. 606.
60 Robert Dinkin, Voting in provincial America, pp. 54-57. Of the 36 members of the Assembly in 1755,
all but five were re-elected in October. One of those had died in the summer. Papers o f Benjamin
Franklin, vol. 6, p. 210, note 7.
61 “In none o f the 14 elections you mention did I ever appear as a candidate. I never did, directly or
indirectly, solicit any Man’s Vote. For six of the Years in which I was annually chosen, I was absent,
residing in England.” Benjamin Franklin, “Remarks on a late protest,” Papers o f Benjamin Franklin,
vol. 11, p. 433. See also the letter from Franklin to William Stahan, Dec. 2, 1762, ibid., vol. 10, p. 161.
62 For a discussion of one such meeting, see Peters-Penn letter, Nov. 17, 1742. op cit.. Isaac Norris to
Joseph Pike, Aug. 28, 1728, Norris Letter Book, 1716-1730, HSP, p. 516, argues that the clubs created
by Sir William Keith served a similar purpose. Source cited in Nash, “Transformation of urban
politics,” p. 614.
That is the argument made in Norman Coen, “The Philadelphia Election Riot of 1742,” PMH&B,
92(3) 1968, pp. 306, 207; and Olton, Artisans for Independence, p. 52. The generally low levels of
estimated turnout can be found in Dinkin, Voting in provincial America, Table 9, pp. 158-59.
64 Beeman, “Deference, republicanism,” pp. 423-427.
45 William Penn, “England’s present Interest considered,” The Selected Works o f William Penn, vol. 2
(New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1971 [1825]) pp. 285, 286. Cited in Beeman, “Deference,
republicanism, and popular politics,” p. 423.
44Tully, Forming American politics, pp. 75,76.

75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67 William Keith, The Observator’s Trip to America, Philadelphia, 1726 (Evans 2794), p. 17. Source
cited in Nash, Urban crucible, p. 243.
68 The Triumvirate o f Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, [1725?] (Evans No. 2712) p. 4. Source cited in
Wendel, “The Keith-Lloyd Alliance,” p. 300.
69 See Alan W. Tully, “Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics in Early America,” PMH&B, 107(4) 1983, pp.
498, 510, on the antipathy o f the Scots-Irish to the English; Ronald Schulz, The republic o f labor:
Philadelphia artisans and the politics o f class, 1720-1830 (New York: Oxford, 1993) pp. 5-14, on the
influence of radical political traditions among the city's working class, and J.R. Pole, op cit, for the
influence of Whig theory on Penn.
70 Letter from James Logan to Henry Gouldney, Feb. 9, 1723, PA Archives, Second Series, vol. 7, pp.
70-71.
71 The BUSY-BODY, No. 32, The American Weekly Mercury, Sept. 18-25, 1729, p. 2. Cited in
Leonard, “Elections in colonial PA,” p. 398.
72 Olton, Artisansfor Independence, p. 51.
73 Tully, Forming American politics, p. 346; Leonard, “Elections in colonial Pennsylvania,” pp. 387,
389,390.
74 Norris-Pike letter, Aug. 28, 1728, p. 516.
75 Norris-Scarth letter, Oct. 21, 1726, pp. 474.
76 Patrick Gordon to John Penn, Oct. 17, 1726, Penn Papers Official Correspondence, vol. 1, HSP, p.
243.
77 Norris-Scarth letter, Oct, 21, 1726, p. 475.
74 Tully, Forming American Politics, p. 345.
79 Gary Nash, “The transformation of urban politics; 1700-1765,” Journal o f American History, 60 (3)
1973 p. 631.
80 Charles S. Olton, Artisans fo r Independence, p. 55. See also the broadside, of engraver Robert
Kennedy, To the worthy TRADESMEN, ARTIFICERS, MECHANICS, &c, Philadelphia, Oct. I, 1770.
(Evans 11696).
81 A BROTHER CHIP, PA Gazette, Sept. 27, 1770, p. 3.
82 The Pennsylvania Chronicle Sept 20-27, 1772, p. 143.
83 Letter of Edward Shippen to father, Sept. 14, 1756, p. 48. Cited in Leonard, “Elections in PA,” p.
389.
84 Leonard, “Elections in colonial PA,” p. 389.
85 An attack on Joseph Galloway in The Pennsylvania Chronicle Sept. 19-Sept. 26, 1772, p. 3, notes
that the previous election Galloway had gone about handing advertisements for himself and “begging
votes.”
86 Norris-Charles letter, Oct. 11, 1740, p. 2; see also Norris-Scarth letter, op cit, on Keith’s behavior,
and Benjamin Franklin, “On the Conduct of Lord Hillsborough,” p. 223.
87 Norris-Charles letter, Oct. 11, 1740, p. 3.
88 See the preamble and section one: “An Act for Preventing Bribery and Corruption,” vol. 5, PA
Statutes, p. 159.
89 BUSY-BODY, The American Weekly Mercury, Sept. 18-25, 1729, p. 3. Source cited in Leonard,
“Colonial Elections in PA,” p. 385. It should be noted here, however, that the writer seems to have been
opposed to Keith, and so may have been using the figure for polemics.
An example of such an ad is run by Isaac Norris, Jr., in the PA Gazette, Sept. 26,1759, p. 1.
91 To the Freeholders and other Electors, o f ASSEM BLY-M ENfor PENNSYLVANIA, Philadelphia,
1765. (Evans 10184) p. 1.
92 A broadside by John Dickinson, Fellow Citizens and countrymen, Oct. 1,1772: Philadelphia (Evans
42363), begins by decrying faction and party but ends by recommending a slate of honest patriots to the
reader.
93 Pettit-Reed letter, Nov. 3,1764, p. 36.
94 Peters-Penn letter, Nov. 17, 1742, p. 136. Quoted in Thompson, Rum punch and revolution, p. 132.

76

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95 Several witnesses to the riots quoted complaints by William Allen and Mayor Clement Plumstead
about the un-naturalized “Dutch” that the opposition had brought to the city. John Dillwyn, deposition.
PA Votes, vol. 4, p. 2958; Thomas Lloyd, ibid., p. 2958; for the defense of Allen, Plumstead and others,
see “Remonstrance to House of Clement Plumstead, late Mayor o f Philadelphia, William Allen,
Recorder, and Joseph Turner, Alderman,” ibid., pp. 2844-46.
96 Hockley-Penn letter, Nov. 1, 1742, p. 41; Peters-Penn letter, Nov. 17, 1742, p. 137,
97Hockley-Penn, Nov. 1,1742, p. 41.
91 William Parsons, “The Bloody Election o f 1742,” Pennsylvania History, 36: 1969, pp. 304-306;
Hermann Welleneuther, “The Quest for Harmony in a Turbulent World: The Principle of 'Love and
Unity’ in Colonial Pennsylvania Politics,” PMH&B, 107(4) 1983, p. 552, both note the negative effect
the riots had on the Proprietary cause and Allen especially; for the use of the riots as propaganda, see
“To the FREEHOLDERS and other ELECTORS for the City and County of Philadelphia...” Papers o f
Benjamin Franklin,, vol. 11, p. 377.
99 Welleneuther, “The Quest for Harmony in a Turbulent World,” pp. 539-543.
100 PHILANDER, PA Gazette, May 12, 1768, p.l; To the Free-Holders o f the Province o f
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1742 (Evans 5075) p. 4
101 The Pennsylvania Chronicle Sept. 19-Sept. 26, 1772, p. 3
102A Letter from a Gentleman in Philadelphia to his Friend in the County, Sept. 8, 1742. Philadelphia
(Evans Number 4987.) p.2 Cited in Parsons, “The Bloody Election of 1742,” p. 295.
103Gary Nash, “The transformation of urban politics; 1700-1765,” p. 617, note 43.
104Compare the PA Gazette, Sept. 27,1744, p. 4, with the same journal on Sept 28, 1754, p. 3 (5 ads),
and the issue for Sept. 27, 1764, pp. 4 (14 ads).
105 James Logan to William Penn, Oct. 20, 1706, and Logan to Penn, Jan 6, 1708-09, Penn-Logan
Correspondence, pp. 188, 336. Both sources from Nash, Urban crucible, pp. 442,443.
106Evidence of TTiomas Lloyd. PA Votes, vol. 4, p. 2958.
107 The Journals i f Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, p. 618. See also Muhlenberg’s comments on the
“crowded and noisy” state of the town for an earlier Election Day, ibid., p. 517.
101 Two examples of Election Day broadsides are Dickinson, op cit., and Robert Kennedy, To the
worthy TRADESMEN, ARTIFICERS, MECHANICS, &c, Oct. 1, 1770. Phila. (Evans 9772); Charles
Pettit’s letter to Joseph Reed, Nov. 3, 1764, p. 37, notes that on the day of the 1764 election there were
“A number of squibs, quarters, and half sheets, were thrown among the populace on the day of the
election, some so copious as to aim at the general dispute, and others, more confined, to Mr. Dickinson
and Mr. Galloway, with now and then a skit at the Doctor, but these had little or no effect.” See also
Nash, “Transformation of Urban politics,” p. 617, note 43.
109Pettit-Reed letter, Nov. 3, 1764, Life and Correspondence o f Joseph Reed, p. 36.
"° Ibid.
1,1 Tully, Forming American Politics, pp. 11-27
112 Isaac Hunt, A Continuation o f the Exercise, had this Morning in Scurrility Hall, 1765. No. 5,
Philadelphia, 1765 (Evans 10019) p. 5. Source cited in Gleason, “A scurrilous election,” p. 82.
113Norris-Pike letter, Aug. 28,1728, p. 516.
114 Pole, Political representation, p. 89.
1,5 “Minutes of the Provincial Council,” Lt. Gov. Patrick Gordon to the council, Dec. 17, 1728.
Colonial Records o f PA, vol. 3, Third Series, p. 342.
116Pole, Political representation, pp. 111,112.
117Tully, “Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics in Early America,” p. 497.
111 Attacks on Presbyterians are in Thomas Wharton to Benjamin Franklin, Nov. 7, 1765, Franklin
Papers, vol. 12, p. 357; The Election, a Medly, Philadelphia, 1765, (Broadside, Evans No. 9650); and
To the Freeholders and other Electors, o f ASSEMBLY-MEN for PENNSYLVANIA, Philadelphia,
1765 (Evans 10184) p. I.
119 William Smith, A Brief State o f the Province o f Pennsylvania (New York: Joseph Sabin, 1865
[1755]) p. 19; Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, Aug. 25, 1742, Peters Letter Book, Richard Peter’s

77

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Papers, 1739-1743, HSP, p. 128. Source cited in Nash, ‘Transformation of urban politics,” p. 608. The
practice is also noted in Pole, Political representation, p. 102, and Thayer, Pennsylvania politics, p. 16.
20 Letter from Hugh Neill to the Secretary of the Venerable Society, Oct. 18, 1764. Historical
Collections o f the American colonial church, ed. William Stevens Percy, vol. 2 (Hartford, CT: The
Church Press, 1870) p. 365.
121 The Pennsylvania Chronicle, Sept. 19 to 26, 1768. p. 282.
122 The Journals if Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, vol. II, p. 272.
123 Ibid., p. 123,273.
124 Purviance-Burd letter, Sept. 20, 1765, p. 107.
125 William Smith, A BriefState, pp. 19,40-42.
126“Letter from E.N.” The American Weekly Mercury, Sept. 15-Sept. 22, 1737. p. 2,
127 Benjamin Franklin, “Remarks on a late Protest,” Papers o f Benjamin. Franklin. Vol. 11. p. 434.
121 Letter from Thomas Wharton to Benjamin Franklin, Nov. 7, 1765, Franklin Papers, vol. 12, p. 357.
129 Evidence of Israel Pemberton, Jr., PA Votes, vol. 4,2969.
130 The Scribbler: Observations on a late Epitaph, Philadelphia, 1764 (Evans No. 9772) p. 4.
131 The BUSY-BODY, The American Weekly Mercury, Sept. 18-Sept. 25, No. 32, p. 2.
132 For relationship between the press and the early postal service see Richard B. Kielbowicz, News in
the mail: the press, post office and public information, 1700-1860s (New York: Greenwood Press,
1989) pp. 13-19.
133 Purviance-Burd letter, Sept. 20, 1765, p. 107; Burd-Purviance, Sept. 17, 1764, p. 109. Edward
Shippen letter to his father, Sept. 14, 1756, p. 48.
134 See Norris-Scarth letter, op cit, and Edward Shippen to father, op cit.
133 Examples of pamphlets from the 1720s include: A Modest Apology fo r the Eight Members,
Philadelphia, 1728, (Evans 3065); Dialogue Shewing, what’s therein to be found', The Triumvirate of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, [1725?] (Evans No. 2712); and William Keith, A modest reply to the
Speech o f Isaac Norris, Esq. Philadelphia, 1727 (Evans 2890).
16 Joseph Jackson, “A Philadelphia Schoolmaster of the Eighteenth Century,” PMH&B, 35(3) 1911, pp.
315-332.
137 Compare a pamphlet of Isaac Hunt, A Continuation o f the Exercise, had this Morning in Scurrility
Hall, 1765. No. 3. Philadelphia, 1765 (Evans 10017), with the coverage in PA Gazette, Sept. 20, 1764.
134 J. Philip Gleason, “A scurrilous Colonial Election and Franklin’s Reputation” William and Mary
Quarterly, Third Series 18(1) 1961, pp. 68-84. Another example is What is sauce fo r a goose is also
sauce fo r a gander, Philadelphia, 1764 (Evans 9879). Source cited in Gleason, “A scurrilous election,”
d.76.

39 Nash, “The transformation of Urban Politics,” note 43, p. 617.
140 To the worthy TRADESMEN, ARTIFICERS, MECHANICS. &c, Oct. 1, 1770. Phila. (Broadside,
Evans 116%).
141 See, for example, Observations on a late Epitaph, Philadelphia, 1764 (Evans 9772), p. 4.
142 Examples: PA Gazette, Oct. 9, 1755, p. 2,3; The American Weekly Mercury, Oct. 8, 1728, p. 3.
143 As an example see PENNSYLVANUS. “Against Party Malice and Levity.” PA Gazette, Sept. 21Sept. 28, 1733, pp. 2,3.
144 The quote is from The Pennsylvania Chronicle, Sept. 28-Oct. 5, 1767, p. 146.
145 The American Weekly Mercury, Oct. 8, 1728. “[T]here appeared to be the greatest industry on all
sides for gaining of Representatives for the County of Philadelphia, that was ever have before on such
occasion.” p. 2; The PA Gazette, Oct. 7,1756., p. 3.
146PA Gazette, Oct. 9, 1742, p. 3
147 Thomas Leonard, Power o f the Press: the birth o f American political reporting (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985) pp. 13-22.
I4> Leonard notes that Benjamin Franklin, publisher of one of the main newspapers in the city, tended to
be a rather cautious editor for most of his career. Ibid., p. 35.
149 Ibid., p. 34.
150CATO, “To the Freemen, etc.” American Weekly Mercury, Sept 20-Sept. 27. 1729, p. 1.

78

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

131J.A., “Letter,” American Weekly Mercury, Sept 18-Sept. 25,1735, p. 1.
152Bamhurst and Nerone, Theform o f news, pp. 32-34.
153Ibid., p. 33.
154Peters-Penn letter, Nov. 17,1742, p. 138.
133 PENNSYLVANUS. “Against Party Malice and Levity.” PA Gazette, Sept 21-Sept 28,1733, p. 3
136ibid., p. 2.
137Pennsylvania Assembly, “Reply to the Governor,” Aug. 19,1755. Papers o f Benjamin Franklin, vol.
6. p. 156. See also Benjamin Franklin, “On the Conduct of Lord Hillsborough,” [August?, 1772]
Papers o f Benjamin Franklin, vol. 17. ed. Leonard W. Labaree (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1959) pp. 222,223. “But in most of the Colonies there is no such Thing as standing Candidate for
Election. There is neither Treating nor Bribing. No Man even expresses the least inclination to be
chosen. Instead of humble Advertisements intreating Votes and Interest you see before every new
Election, Requests of former Members, acknowledging the Honour done them by proceeding Elections,
but setting forth their long Service and Attendance on the Public Business in that Station, and praying
that in Consideration thereof some other Person may now be chosen in their Room.”
131 Compare turnouts for Philadelphia County in the relatively peaceful 1730s, with those in more
turbulent 1760s, for example. Dinkin, Voting in provincial America, Table 9, pp. 158-59.
139A dialogue shewing, p. 30.
PENNSYLVANUS, “Against Party malice,” PA Gazette, Sept. 21-28, p. 2. A BROTHER CHIP, PA
Gazette, Sept. 27, 1770. p. 3.

79

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter Four:
The Election Day In the early republic
This account of Election Day in post-revolutionary and federalist Philadelphia
will proceed from two general claims about the city’s public life. The first, evident in
traditional political histories, is that the electoral culture of the city and the state of
Pennsylvania was, for much of the period in question, a strongly partisan one.1 This
should not be surprising. Given their experience of electioneering in colonial politics,
Pennsylvanians had a ready-made set of cultural forms with which to understand
democratic politics, and were thus probably much more comfortable with the
emergence of party institutions than many other Americans.2
The second claim, which arises from recent work on the popular street culture
of this period, is that the city’s public life was a highly theatrical and festive one.
America during the 1790s contained many popular public performances, such as
parades and celebrations, that aimed at the construction and elaboration of a newly
emerging American identity, a distinct national community that had arisen out o f the
rebellion against British rule.3 As one of the first cities to commemorate both the
Fourth of July and Washington’s birthday, and as the largest city in America at the
time and its national capital throughout the 1790s, Philadelphia is an especially
appropriate site to study public celebration during this period.4
These two elements—partisanship and street theatre—often met in the
performance of a public occasion like the Fourth of July. Federalists and Republicans
both used these events to publicly distinguish themselves from one another and—
through marches and public toasts—to perform and personally embody an image of
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the new world they wished to create.5 As both Albrecht Koschnik and David
Waldstreicher have noted, these early Federalist public performances thus had
something of a paradoxical character. Partisans declared their loyalty to a unified
national culture, but at the same time vigorously contested their opponent’s moral
claims, by marking commemorations, and reporting on them, in a decidedly partisan
fashion.6
Partisanship and theater also met on November 5, 1796, which was the day that
Philadelphians chose their electors for President, following a keen campaign between
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. This chapter will end with a description of that
campaign and that Election Day. Before doing so, however, and in order to place that
event in some context, I will review both the evolution of Pennsylvania’s political
divisions and the arguments about Federalist imagery and celebrations that I have just
sketched. Following that, I will look at how the vote and the electorate were
constructed in the popular discourse, and then address the changing role of the press in
presenting and interpreting the Election Day performance. Having gone over these
elements, we can better understand what Philadelphians were doing on Election Day
in 1796. We will also better understand the role that the Election Day ritual, both the
performance of it on the Election grounds and the representation of it in the press,
played in the political culture o f the age.

The problematic existence o f partisan political culture:
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The historian Jackson Main has made a distinction among early American
legislators between the localist and the cosmopolitan, a distinction that helps us
capture the social and ideological divisions in American politics throughout this
period. Although there was not, at least prior to the 1790s, anything like a national
network linking politicians and voters, Main argues that competing groups in the
various states nonetheless had certain traits in common. The ranks of the localists were
made up mainly of small farmers, the urban working and lower middle classes, and
some of the larger plantation-owning gentry in the south. Localists were suspicious of
government power and opposed taxes and the increase or further development o f state
institutions. In their rhetoric, they tended to celebrate the common man, and
emphasized the principles o f egalitarianism and freedom. Cosmopolitans came from
the urban merchant, trading, and banking classes, and the wealthier classes generally.
They were more conservative in their social opinions than the localists, with a more
pessimistic view of human nature, hence a more positive opinion of hierarchy and
tradition, and the social restraints they produced. They were suspicious of unrestricted
liberty, associating it with license and anarchy, were more likely to be well read, and
favored the extension of state power and the development of economic and
communication infrastructures.7
The localist-cosmopolitan distinction helps orient us within Pennsylvania’s
political culture of the late 1770s and 1780s. Main’s localists are similar, both
ideologically and in terms o f their social bases of support, with what were known as
constitutionalists at the time; the politics of the constitutionalists’ opposition, who
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were generally called the republicans, fit with his description of the cosmopolitan
outlook.8 The creation o f these two factions came out of debates over the state’s 1776
constitution. That document was one of the most radical and egalitarian of the
constitutions produced in the revolutionary era, and served as a model for several
other states.9 It was too radical, in fact, for many Pennsylvanians, and much o f the
state’s political battles until the late 1780s were conducted through the prism of
debates over the constitution. Republicans distrusted the unicameral structure of the
legislature, and they drew on widespread discontent with such measures as the Test
Laws—requirements that citizens publicly declare loyalty to the new republic before
being allowed to vote, sit on juries, or serve in public office—to bolster their argument
and their support at the polls.10

Constitutionalists defended the original 1776

provisions and many later measures passed during the height of the war, when their
strength in the legislature was greatest."
The first step in the evolution of these groups came in the summer and fall of
1787, during the debate over whether or not Pennsylvania should adopt the federal
constitution. The ideological sympathies of the state’s constitutionalists meant that
many of them, and certainly the most prominent, tended to side with the antifederalists. Republicans and their sympathizers, more likely to support federalism,
won that battle, and in 1790 won another important political fight when they were able
to overturn the 1776 constitution with a more conservative document.12
In the early 1790s, the factions began to morph again, and began to mold
themselves into a culture that was more consciously a national one. At the national
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level Republicans—almost the direct opposites of Pennsylvania’s republican faction of
the decade before—had ideological affinities with the constitutionalists of the earlier
period, although historians differ over the extent o f institutional and personal
continuity.13 They were sympathetic to the ideals of the French revolution, and tended
to emphasize equality and liberty in their popular appeals. In the polemics of the day
they would often attack their opponents, the Federalists, as Aristocrats and British
sympathizers.14 Like Main’s localists, Republicans tended to be suspicious of federal
power, seeing in it the possibility of government tyranny.15
The other main party, the Federalists, was generally sympathetic to the
expansion of government’s role in society. More conservative politically and socially
than the Republicans, Federalists had tended to dominate the policies and the
membership of the second Washington administration.16 This had led to a growing
distrust o f the President among Republicans, especially following the publication of
the Jay Treaty, which was seen by Republicans and other radicals as being far too
sympathetic to the British, who were at the time at war with France, the Republicans’
ally.17 Since Republicans looked upon France as the natural ally of the Unites States,
given both its history of aid during the American Revolution and its own revolutionary
tradition, the treaty was taken to be a betrayal of fundamental principles and alliances,
and led to demonstrations on Philadelphia and other cities, in which John Jay was
burned in effigy.18
Other events helped further divide the two sides. A tax on whisky led to a
revolt in Western Pennsylvania, during which Washington was forced to send out
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militia troops to arrest and subdue the citizenry.19 A debate over the treatment of the
French envoy to America, Edmond Genet, led to more demonstrations among radicals,
both in Philadelphia and elsewhere.20 Finally, Washington and other more
conservative-minded politicians became alarmed at the growth of what were known as
Democratic-Republican societies, groups of ordinary citizens who met to discuss and
debate politics. The thought among many in the Washington administration was that
these societies were presumptuous and dangerous.21 In Philadelphia, the leadership of
the Democratic-Republican Societies tended to be men o f a more radical and thus
Republican stripe: Benjamin Franklin Bache, editor of one of the most famous of
Philadelphia’s Republican newspapers, The Aurora, and Dr. Michael Leib, a
Republican politician and a leader of the city’s German community.22
The direct involvement of a newspaperman like Bache in political affairs was
not unusual in Philadelphia of the Federalist age. Federalist-Republican divisions
touched upon most features of public life at that time, which led almost inevitably to a
polarization in the press. Philadelphia, as head of the government, was home to a
number of notable partisan polemicists: men like Bache, John Fenno, editor of the
Gazette o f the United States, Philip Freneau, William Cobbett, and Thomas
Callender.23 The partisan character of the Federalist press is so impressive, in fact, that
most histories of both the press and of politics during this period tend to see the press
almost exclusively through a partisan lens.24 Not surprisingly, the rhetoric of this
journalistic culture was often at its fiercest in the weeks o f campaigning preceding
Election Day.
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The public performance o f American nationhood:
Partisanship in the Federalist era meant something more than opinions on
administration policy. As Gordon Wood and Joyce Appleby, among others, have
argued, the American Revolution’s radical nature came about through its effect on the
society as a whole, not simply its rearrangement of political authority.25 The ideals of
social equality and personal freedom, made explicit in the revolution, ended up
infecting all elements of social life in the new country. “[M]ost people of that very
different world could not as yet conceive of society apart from government;” hence
they saw their political revolution also as a social revolution.26 And indeed, Wood
argues, they were right about that: twenty years after the revolution had ended,
Americans were simply a different people than they had been before: less deferent in
their interpersonal relations, more willing to accept the notion that different groups in
society had different interests, more aggressive in their claims toward traditional
authority.27
The contemporary belief that the revolution had created a whole new world,
that it would affect every element of human existence, was evident in the public
celebrations and the public rhetoric that the Philadelphia’s residents undertook during
this period, which were self-consciously linked to the political and social experiment
of American democracy. The character of celebrations served to mark out the
character of the nation itself. For the celebrations of 1788, and in honor of the state’s
ratification of the federal constitution the year before, the city held an elaborate
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parade. All sectors o f society—from the social elite to various artisan groups and
mechanics—were represented in the march. A float with the name “Constitution” bore
the state’s Chief Justice, Thomas McKean, through the streets. McKean held in his
hand a banner with the words “The People.” At the head o f the ten major city streets
coming off the Delaware River, a soldier stood with the flag of every state that had
ratified the Constitution.28
The history of the Federalist celebrations is reminiscent of Richard Sennett’s
earlier argument concerning life in the eighteenth century European city, and the self
conscious manner in which residents linked their public lives to a dramatic
performance in the theatricum mundi.29 Sennett’s argument extends beyond the public
celebration, however, to the everyday interaction of strangers that took place on the
streets of London and Paris. Something like the same kind o f attitude may have been
operating in the streets o f Philadelphia. The idea of the self conscious presentation of a
public role might explain, for example, the dramatic insults and overwrought
expostulations traded between men like Cobbett, Callender, Fenno and Bache, in the
pages of the city’s newspapers.
Sennett’s argument extends to fashion as well. Citizens chose their style of
dress, he argues, in the manner of a costume: the forms o f fashion helped residents
understand the role that the wearer was attempting to put forth.30 Given this
understanding of public life, it is perhaps no surprise that Philadelphians believed their
revolution ought to affect even their fashion sense, as in a 1788 letter to the
Independent Gazetteer, wherein a writer argued that the new world which would come
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about would require a new form o f dress, one emphasising the simplicity and equality
of the American nation.31
It is not clear that anyone took the writer’s proposals to heart, but one
interesting change in fashion that did take place during the decade of the 1790s was
the wearing o f a feathered cockade. Republicans began the practice, putting red, white,
and blue cockades in their caps as a show of moral solidarity with the French
revolution.32 On the day after the 1796 election, the French Minister to the United
State, Pierre Adet, argued that the public display of the cockade was an obligation for
all French men living in the United States, and for all supporters of the revolution and
its ideals more generally: “Citizens, I am persuaded that at the call of the Minister of
the French Republic, you will hasten to put on a symbol of liberty, which is the fruit of
eight years’ toils and privations, and of five years’ victories.” By so doing, Adet
argued, wearers of the cockade would draw a public distinction between their own
loyalty and the lukewarm patriot.33
Several years later, Federalist sympathizers began a similar practice, only
using the black cockade. Although soldiers of the Continental Army had sometimes
put black feathers in their caps, the symbol gained a partisan meaning when young
Federalists began wearing it during a national “Day of Fasting” proposed by President
Adams on May 9, 1798. Cobbett called it the Federalist cockade the “American
Cockade.”34 As with the Republican practice, the wearing o f the black cockade served
to link the partisan to the larger ideological understanding embodied by his party, and
by declaring his allegiance publicly served to distinguish him from his opponents in
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the street. “The handwriting at the bottom of an address is seen by but few persons,”
wrote Peter Porcupine, “whereas a cockade will be seen by the whole city, by the
friends and the foes of the wearer; it will be the visible sign of the sentiments of his
hearts, and which prove, that he is not ashamed to show those sentiments.”35 The role
that a cockade could play as a public marker of allegiance would be significant for
Election Day, 1796, since it allowed voters to declare their political sympathies and
their choice for President despite the secrecy of the ballot.
It was not long before events like the Fourth of July celebrations became
segregated, partisan moments. Each side strove to present its own vision of what
American society should be, using a different tone and emphasis. Republicans,
Koschnik has argued, used the occasion to illustrate and celebrate the revolution as an
ongoing and necessarily unfinished process. Federalists, on the other hand, stressed
the idea o f the Fourth as a commemoration of the foundation of the country, a
completed event that had resulted in the creation of the American nation.36 On certain
occasions, the day’s events acted, in effect, as the start for the year’s election season.
Republican supporters would march on the celebration grounds, and prominent leaders
of the party would speak to the crowd, providing a distinctly Republican interpretation
of the day’s political significance.37
As with partisan politicking and electioneering, the press played an important
role in the transmission of these Federalist celebrations and in the interpretation of
them. Waldstreicher has argued that the two forms of communication—the celebration
and the press—worked together to form an image of the new nation: “Celebrations and
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printed accounts o f them embodied and mobilized a nationalist ideology, an ideology
that made consensus the basis o f patriotism.”38
Despite their clear recognition both o f the importance o f the public celebration
in Federalist politics and its ability to make manifest the divisions between the two
major factions, historians of these festivals and celebrations tend to ignore or pass over
the ritual of Election Day in their discussions. This is somewhat surprising, given the
evident importance that the act of voting played for Pennsylvanians themselves during
this period, as a public symbol. An oration following the 1788 Fourth of July
celebration, for example, contained this paean to the vote:
if the people, at their elections, take care to choose none but
representatives that are wise and good; their representatives will take
care, in their turn, to choose or appoint none but such as are wise and
good also...of what immense consequence is it, then, that this primary
duty should be faithfully and skillfully discharged? On it the public
happiness or infelicity, under this and every other constitution, must, in
a very great measure, depend...Let no one say that he is but a single
citizen; and that his ticket will be but one in the box. That one ticket
may turn the election. In battle, every soldier should consider the public
safety as depending on his single arm. At an election, every citizen
should consider the public happiness as depending on his single vote.39

The use of such language suggests the extent to which some Philadelphians
understood the vote as an essential act in defining this new world that was being
created. “[EJvery man who is guilty of neglect or omission of this essential duty,”
wrote one writer, “is a traitor to his freedom and his county.”40
The performance of the vote served to link the people with the ideals that
Americans first fully enunciated in the revolution. It served, as well, as a way for a
new public to see itself taking shape on the Election Grounds. A journalist for the
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Pennsylvania Evening Herald reported on one year’s crowd on the election ground as
being composed of a democratic, cosmopolitan “assemblage of various nations, ranks,
degrees, ages, sizes and complexions,” which had “proceeded to the state*house, to
exercise their sacred right o f investing with legislative and executive powers such of
their fellow citizens as a majority of them might deem most worthy of the important
trust: What a noble idea must we must have o f that constitution,” the writer added,
“which annually strips the garments of office from servants; awakes them from the
intoxicating delirium of power; and plunges them into the mass of the people! May
PENNSYLVANIA never cease to prize this inestimable privilege proportionably to its
value! May her sons, till time shall be no more, esteem life, when compared with it, as
beneath the smallest regard!”41

The voting public:
The radical 1776 Constitution removed most of the economic barriers to voting
that existed in the colonial era. Under the new conditions, a freeman was no longer
defined through ownership either of land or of capital. All male taxpayers over the age
of 21 were given the right to vote, provided that they had paid some tax to the state in
the previous year, and had resided in Pennsylvania for a period of one year.42 That
status changed only slightly with the more conservative 1790 constitution, which kept
the liberal economic criteria that were contained in the state’s original constitution, but
doubled the residency requirement, from one to two years.43 These changes signaled
an important evolution in the construction of the electorate, since the voter no longer
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needed to prove his autonomy and sobriety through the ownership of property.
Although Pennsylvanians at this point did not believe in universal suffrage or even
white male suffrage, they had nonetheless taken an important first step toward the idea
that democratic citizens had a natural right to vote, as both Chilton Williamson and
Alexander Keyssar note.44
Despite these liberalizations, however, not all of the changes in Pennsylvania’s
franchise were in the direction of inclusion. Most notorious were series of measures
passed

by

Pennsylvania’s

radical

state

legislature

demanding

a

public

acknowledgement of loyalty to the new regime before being granted the privileges of
voting, sitting on a jury, or serving in a public office. The measures were known
collectively as the test laws, or test oaths. An early version, passed in the fall of 1776,
announced that:
Every Elector, before his vote is received, shall take the following Oath
or Affirmation, instead of that heretofore required, viz— /-— do swear,
(or affirm) that I will be faithful and true to the Commonwealth o f
Pennsylvania and that I will not directly or indirectly, do any Act or
Thing prejudicial or injurious to the Constitution or Government
thereof, as established by the Convention,45
These moves served to keep the vote out of the hands of many of the state’s
citizens.46 Critics charged that the form of the oath served not simply to make the
loyalties of citizens known, but effectively barred criticism of the government of any
sort, and even historians generally sympathetic to the radical view tend to concede that
this was in fact part of their goal.47 Defenders of the test laws, however, argued in the
press and elsewhere that they were necessary to defend the country from internal
enemies at a time of great struggle. DEMOPHILUS wrote, for example that “the body
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politic can be preserved from the effects of corruption no other way than the body
natural, that is, by a total excision of the sphaceleted part.”48
In fact, the revolutionaries had some reason to be wary about what Tory
sympathizers could do with Election Day, since in the early stages of the revolution,
several communities near the city provided illustrations of how those opposed to the
revolution could use the day of the vote to attack it symbolically. In 1776, Tory
sympathizers in Nuetown, Bucks County, held a separate election for their own set of
representatives, under the auspices of the King’s authority, on the traditional October
General Election date. That same year, Loyalist citizens of Lewes, in southern New
Jersey, used the occasion of Election Day to attack several well-known supporters of
the revolution. After roughing up the revolutionists, the crowd cut down a “Liberty
Tree” that had been planted in the center o f the town, then paraded about shouting out
huzzahs for King George and General Howe. A revolutionary partisan also charged
the Loyalists with placing a guard at the polling station with a club, in order to prevent
supporters of the rebellion from voting.49
However, the laws did not bar only Tories from the polls. Because of religious
prohibitions, it was impossible for a great many Quakers and other dissenting sects in
the province to both keep the tenets of their faith and declare the oaths. Contemporary
estimates were that somewhere around 40 per cent of the otherwise eligible population
of voters were disfranchised by the laws.50 These estimates come from polemical
works written against the laws, so there may be some exaggeration for effect. Robert
Brunhouse has noted that the laws were often rather sporadically invoked,51 and
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several Philadelphia newspapers observed that they were not required in the city’s
1776 General Election, as had been required by the Convention.52 The principle of the
test oaths nonetheless continued to irk a great many people, and they formed a major
part of the republicans’ attack on the 1776 constitution during the 1780s.53 As the
revolution began to wind down, cries against the test laws became louder in the
popular press. In a series of articles HAMPDEN attacked the laws as unjust and
oppressive.54 Benjamin Rush called them “the invention of tyrants.”55 By the end of
the 1780s, even the opponents of the conservative republican faction in the state
assembly were writing their partisan appeals under the assumption that the laws had,
at best, outlived their usefulness.56
These writers generally did not attack the laws on behalf of some
Enlightenment belief in the universal rights of man. Theirs was a more conservative
argument; they were defending the rights not of all those excluded from the vote, but
only taxpayers, and their rhetoric relied on the traditional notion, generally accepted
throughout the colonies and Britain long before the revolution, that those who
contributed economically to the welfare of the state had a right to say something about
how it operated.57 The perceived injustice came from the fact that many of the
wealthiest men in Pennsylvania, who had contributed financially to the revolution
from the start, were to be denied their say in the way the government was run.58
Thus, the argument over who ought to constitute the electorate in Pennsylvania
mirrored the larger argument that was going on between the two sets of factions in the
city and the state during this period. It was a battle between the more conservative
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understanding of society o f the republicans and Federalists, in which political
reliability was linked to stability and a well-defined and understood place in the social
hierarchy, and the more radical social beliefs of the Jeffersonians and
Constitutionalists, who saw the willingness to declare oneself publicly for the cause,
or to prove one’s loyalty on the battlefield, as the mark of the good citizen and
trustworthy voter.59
Because the parties in early revolutionary Philadelphia were so closely
identified in the public mind with class, these political debates piggybacked on
economic divisions, which were in some cases also linked to religious divisions.60 The
writings of radical journalists in Philadelphia during the 1780s and 1790s sneered at
the “gentlemen,” the “Aristocrats,” the “lovers of rank” who used bribery and tricks to
steal the vote on Election Day.61 For the Federalist or conservative writer, on the other
hand, the glorification of radical democracy was nothing more than a step toward mob
rule and anarchy. On Election Day, 1800, The Philadelphia Gazette warned “REAL
AMERICAN REPUBLICANS” to beware “of the tricks of FOREIGN OUTCASTS,”
who wished to “establish A DESPOTISM!” and counseled voters to watch for a
“Jacobin” ticket nominated by “ANARCHISTS.”62
As a performance o f economic class and political ideology, the Election Day
ritual gave a distinctive set of contours to the public image of the electorate
represented on that day, as in this report of the 1785 Election Day in the city.
“My dear fellow, here’s the staunch supporters of the constitution—
your approved friends—men who have taken care of the mechanic’s
interest—huzza!—they are for the paper money—Damn the bank—
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down with the bank for ever!—We’ll have no nabobs—no great men—
no aristocrats—huzza boys!—Success to the constitution for ever!”—
“My dear friends!—Happy to see you!—How are you, Jack—How’s
all your family, Bill— What’s the matter with you, Ned—How do,
Harry?—Welcome to Philadelphia once more, Dick.—Are you going
to vote?—Here’s the ticket—friends of equal liberty—men who
understand trade and commerce—not the damned prospertan (?) crew,
who ride rough-shod over the people, like Oliver Cromwell—huzza!—
Three cheers!—Commerce and equal liberty for ever! Come on my
lads, come on!”63
Significantly, this manner of presenting the battle at the polls—as one between
Republican and Federalist, Mechanic and banker, democrat and conservative—meant
that other social divisions were almost entirely ignored in debates over membership in
the voting public. While blacks were not formally excluded at this time, for example,
there is no evidence that they ever voted in Federalist Philadelphia, despite the fact
that they did vote in several other Northern cities, including New York.64 This feature
of Philadelphia’s Election Day caused relatively little comment in the city’s political
debates over suffrage. Benjamin Rush, for example, while railing against the test
oaths, justified the exclusion o f blacks from the polls on the grounds that they did not
pay taxes.65
Likewise, although women were allowed to vote across the river, in New
Jersey, they were explicitly excluded from the polls in Pennsylvania, which specified
only freemen could vote.66 Because women voters tended to support the Federalist
cause in New Jersey, Federalist journalists did make an occasional pitch for including
them on Pennsylvania’s Election Days. “Were the ladies permitted to vote generally in
Pennsylvania, we should have on the federal side the suffrages of all the wives and
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children of every drunken jacobin in the state—and were the ladies permitted to
legislate, every beer house, every gin shop, would soon be deprived of its licence.—
These hot-beds of Jacobinism once eradicated, an attachment to order and to our
excellent government, would be the immediate consequence of returning sobriety.’'67
This suggestion seems to be intended to serve more as a way to score rhetorical points
than as a serious proposal, and there is no evidence that the idea o f women voting in
Pennsylvania at the time was ever considered seriously enough even to attack it.
Philadelphia’s Election Day, its electorate, and its public culture generally, was
defined by the division between the radical many, and the conservative few, among
adult white males living in the state. Such a division did not leave room for addressing
the political grievances o f those groups that found themselves in neither camp.

Election Day and the press:
In the work o f Thomas Leonard, the revolution marks a significant change in
the social role of the American journalist. Not only does the journalist take on a
greater responsibility for interpreting public life for his readership, but the very style
of that interpretation implies a different view o f politics in the post-revolutionary age.
That is to say, the art o f the expose in the popular press transformed social evil from a
work of the devil to the work of political corruption. The journalist became a revealer
of secrets.68 In the context of Election Day, as we will see, this meant uncovering and
detecting efforts at corrupting the ballot and the voting booth.
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Bamhurst and Nerone have recently expanded upon this argument, suggesting
that the new republican press self-consciously took upon itself the role of providing a
medium for public discussion, which is reflected in the form by which journalists
presented political news: “The Revolution transformed the political role o f the press
from the fitful public arguments and occasional controversial expressions o f the
colonial era into something new: a full theater of deliberation.”69 The greater role that
the press was now playing in the communication of Election Day—in the
interpretation of its results, in describing it elements, and in providing a script for the
performers through partisan polemics—can be taken as one element its creation of the
new body politic.
The arguments of writers like Leonard and Bamhurst and Nerone do not
contradict earlier claims of the importance of newspapers in partisan culture, but they
do place them in a different light. They suggest that party editors and correspondence
were not simply promoting factional interests, but were instilling a certain vision of
American public culture, more broadly defined. In their role as polemicists, journalists
were creating a distinct image of the public, implied as much by the form of the news
and the style of argument as by the actual content.70 By presenting Election Day in the
partisan style and form that they did, early American journalists helped readers
understand what the day meant, and how it could be used to give meaning to their
political world.
Take, for example, the newspaperman’s efforts, on the day of the vote itself, to
prod the reader into action. This was a common element in the Federalist press, much
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more so than in the city’s colonial era. On the day of the first vote for representatives
to the Federal Congress, the normally staid Pennsylvania Gazette hoped that “the
federalists will THIS DAY be active, and adhere firmly to their cause. It will be in
vain that they have discussed and defended the constitution, if they relinquish it at the
important crisis of the election. Let no man stay at home, but let each manfully do his
own duty, and exhort his neighbor to do the same... Let us take care we don’t rue to
morrow the inactivity of today.”71 Even writers who were not so explicitly partisan
nevertheless urged a healthy turnout at the polls. Although he would not “presume” to
dictate a ticket to readers, A VOTER, in a 1782 edition of the Independent Gazetteer,
nevertheless warned them that “unless some spirited and nervous measures are taken
at the ensuing election, our boasted rights as freemen, and that felicity which sprung
from this present, virtuous, struggle, will immediately expire.”72 Several years later, a
correspondent to the Aurora cautioned citizens on Election Day that the were
summoned “to choose between liberty or slavery—so critical, so alarming is your
situation, that upon the change of men in government depends your Republic,”73 and
further down the page, SLEEP ironically counseled, “let us sleep on but for a few
elections more and we never again shall have the trouble of appointing our rulers, they
themselves will relieve us of that disagreeable task, by performing the office for us.”74
This call to arms was only part of the newspaper’s organizational role.
Lists of party slates and tickets abounded in the pages of Philadelphia’s
newspapers and prior to an Election Day by the 1790s.75 Newspapers also
served to warn readers of tricks that the opposition was likely to play in order
99

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to steal the election from honest Americans, and sometimes urged readers to
stay on the grounds and keep an eye on the other side, an early and informal
practice that would become institutionalized in the nineteenth century through
“committees of surveillance.”76 Supporters of Thomas McKean in the 1799
gubernatorial election warned that the Federalist James Ross—described as a
Deist, a British partisan, and a monarchist—would be elected if Republicans
stayed at home, were negligent or timid on the election grounds, or failed to
detect and prevent frauds. “Look well to your tickets!” the writer commanded
Look well to your boxes!
Look well to your Tallies!
Look well to your Return!77
Similarly, on the day of the General Election of 1796, the republican Aurora contained
calls for faithful Republicans to get to the polls, and to keep watch on the “Tories,”
and the “British Faction,” who were plotting to steal the election.78
Yet despite the very public existence of political factionalism throughout the
period, partisanship was still a problem, as Philadelphians post-revolution were no
more disposed to think highly of party than they had been prior to it. Historians have
noted that a distrust of party generally is evident in American political rhetoric until at
least the 1820s, and continues in fits and starts even after that. For those who still
believed that politics should be a disinterested search for the common public good, the
existence of party was an affront.79 Washington’s farewell address contained an
explicit attack on party.80 Madison decried the existence of faction and party in the
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Federalist Papers, and argued that one advantage of a federal system was that it would
mitigate the evils of faction, although probably not reduce them entirely.81
The distrust was not simply limited to the political elite. Popular election
rhetoric tended to assume the evil of “the cloven hoof” of party and faction, arguing
that “The spirit of party is the Spirit of enmity,” and that “[t]he man of party is a man
of violence.”82 Annoyed voters like “A.B.,” writing for the Pennsylvania Packet,
worried about partisans closing off the “avenues” to the Election Grounds, and using
other tricks to keep men from giving their votes. “[B]ecause I am a peaceable, modest
man,” he asked, “and cannot kick constitutionalists and elbow republicans out of way,
must I be disfranchized?”83 Another voter counseled, “in short, let there be one
prevailing idea with electors, that all prejudice must be baneful,”84 and a report from
the city’s 1787 election ground, amid the “claps and huzzas” of the party men,
cheering on their champions, noted how supporters of the proposed new federal union
had argued that one of its advantages would be to dismantle party and faction. “[B]ut
mark the result—not a man was chosen without the pale o f the republican association,
and the name of a respectable citizen was lost in the echoes of no, no—because he has
hitherto been esteemed an advocate for the constitution of Pennsylvania.”85 When
people went from house to house cajoling, begging, even insisting on votes—even
extorting promises for them—then surely the sacred purity of the ballot, as a
measurement of the people’s will, could not be assured.86 Election Day, as not only the
moment when the public came together as a collection o f freemen but as a moment
that most dramatically highlighted party, was worrisome, to say the least.
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The solution to the evident existence of party alongside its clear injunction was
simple. One did not impute party to one’s own faction. The opposition was a party:
one’s friends were simply patriots. Hence, an attack on party and faction in the
Pennsylvania Evening Herald ended with the recommendation o f a ticket promoting
the “friends o f equal liberty,” the preferred self-description of the state’s early
0 7

republican faction.

A ticket promoting Constitutionalist candidates, on the other

hand, was described as THE FRIENDS OF HARMONY.88 Later, Republicans of the
Federalist would often eschew the party label in favor of calling their slate the “Ticket
to support the Rights of Man.”89 (One result of this attitude was that labels were often
undependable descriptions of political loyalties: “republican” not only meant a
conservative in 1785 and a radical in 1792, but it could also mean different things at
the same time. When Benjamin Bache attempted to claim a Congressional victory in
Boston for the Jeffersonian Republicans, Federalist John Fenno replied, “That Messrs.
SKINNER and SEWALL are Republicans, and Federal Republicans too, is a truth
well known to electors of both Districts. Mr. Williams [a third successful Boston
candidate] is a also a Federal Republican.”90)
The public sympathies of factions toward foreign powers in the Federalist era
helped the partisan writer further separate the opposition from loyal Americans and
from the sphere of honest and constructive debate. Republicans were not merely
friendly to the French state. In the articles of many Federalist polemicists, they were
assumed to be in the pay and under the total control of the French: in other words,
traitors. This was a favorite charge of William Cobbett, for example: “The leaders of
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the Frenchified party in the United States, do not despair o f final success, they expect
yet to accomplish their horrid view, by means of French intrigue.”91
It is now evident, that, in spite of all the “promises of “unanimity”; in
spite of all the pretended converts of federalism; in spite of all disguise,
excuses and palliations, it is now evident, that there is still a faction in
this country, and a numerous and powerful faction too, who are ready
and willing to acknowledge the right of France to govern these
unfortunate states.92
Likewise, Federalists were often identified as British agents, or the “British
party.” “Good master FENNO,” wrote one opponent of the Jay treaty just prior to the
1796 election period, “you and your noble patrons the knights of the funding and
banking systems, the old tories and the British emissaries, may say amen.'m Another
writer in the Aurora noted “the British faction” was composed of “apostate Whigs, old
tories, toad eaters of government, British riders and runners, speculators, stockjobbers,
bank directors, mushroom merchants,” and recommended “genteel clubbings” for all
such men.94
As the moment when the two groups met each other on the field of battle,
Election Day was often an especially effective element in the party’s rhetorical war of
words. Opponents could be identified on the Election grounds by their ignoble and
mean behavior, and defeat at the polls was often the result of chicanery on the part of
traitors in league with foreign agents, seeking to take control of the republic. Money
generally also played a role in the defeats of Republicans, according to their
journalists. Somewhat disappointed in results of the 179S election, the proJeffersonian Aurora blamed its losses in the city on “the influence of wealth and the
industry of religious secretaries.”95 What the election proved, wrote the editors, was
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“the dangerous monied influence that is every day gaining fresh strength among us; it
proves that the exertions of those merchants and others who brought gangs of sailors,
draymen and porters to the election ground and passed off their votes, had greater
success, than such a vile cause and such vile means merited.”96 A week later, the paper
compared the voters in the county, where the Jeffersonians had done well, with those
in Philadelphia itself. County voters were largely mechanics and farmers, men of an
independent cast o f mind and a love of freedom. City voters were full of British
agents, of those whose livelihood left them open to the dictates o f the bankers, and of
course, of lovers of wealth, who wished to re-establish rank in the new democratic
republic.97
By contrast, a Republican victory in Baltimore three years later was described
as follows in the pages of the Federalist Porcupine ’s Gazette:
This night will end our four days election, which SMITH, to the infamy
of our district, will be chosen by a large majority of a melancholy
record of jacobin triumph over the friends of government and its
administration. His being a Major General of the militia, and the lavish
distribution which has been made o f money, in every quarter, for the
use of the vulgar, has had an influence not to be controlled by reason or
justice. Great preparations are made for the celebration of SMITH’S
success, this night. Several pipes o f wine are taken to the commons for
the populace to regale with. A triumphal chair is made on purpose, and
great illuminations prepared by the democrats of our city. In short, the
election has been attended by bloodshed and mobs. The peaceable
voters have been driven from the hustings. The country parties, against
SMITH, were, as they came in, met by mobs, stoned, brick-batted, and
knocked off their horses. In a word, it has been a perfect Paris election,
and SMITH may be looked upon as the MARAT of our city.”98
Another Federalist writer, this time describing an election in South Amboy,
New Jersey, accused “Jacobins” from New York of bribing voters with brandy and
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cheese. “We have read of a Judas which betrayed his Lord for thirty pieces of silver
but we never before read of an hundred men who were prevailed upon to sell their
Saviour, and their country for a piece o f cheese and dram o f brandy”9*
Whether true or not, what these sorts of accusations did was to arouse
suspicion not only about the methods of the opposition, but the very character o f the
opposition. The mediated performance of Election Day became a way to undercut not
simply the policy claims of opponents but their moral legitimacy. Thus, the meaning
of the Federalist Election Day performance was always somewhat unstable. A moment
when the public illustrated the moral superiority of the new regime and the new
society that it had created, it could easily, in the hands of a partisan polemicist, be used
to indicate the very opposite.

Election Day, 1796:
Given the partisan context, the use of public celebration and ritual to create a
vision o f the culture that was both a national and a contested one, the changing role of
the press, and the use of Election Day to create an image o f the voting public, we can
now better understand how the Election Day of 1796 served as a moment for
Philadelphia's enfranchised citizens to perform an image of the public before
themselves.
The stage for the performance was set several months earlier. In the late
summer o f 1796, readers of Philadelphia’s Aurora newspaper were warned o f a
“detestable and nefarious conspiracy” now existing in the republic, whose aim was to
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lead, if possible, to monarchy. An as yet un-named and shadowy cabal was taking
advantage of the President Washington’s “exaggerated fame” to forward its designs.
“Let the people awake—let them no longer be, by their prejudice in favor of a
Washington, lulled into an insensibility to the danger which threatens them.”100
Republicans were anxious for Washington to declare that he would step down as soon
as possible, so that open electioneering could begin. Already by that spring, John
Beckley, an ardent Republican and a friend to several of the prominent faction leaders,
including Jefferson, had written to a correspondent that “Jefferson will certainly be run
for president, and certainly accept if elected.”101 In fact, Beckley saw in Washington’s
delay a partisan attempt to give the Republicans as short a time as possible to mount a
campaign.102
By early October, prior to the city’s General Election, the Aurora's
correspondent warned readers that the “[t]he Janus head of Aristocracy,” was
overpowering the “fair face of Republicanism,” and called on readers to come to the
aid of the Republic. “Would you beget slaves!!” FOLIO challenged his fellow
citizens, urging that they were the only ones who could prostate the monster of
tyranny and aristocracy.103 On October 11, the day of the General Election, writers in
the Aurora warned o f dark tricks that would be tried by the British faction. NO TORY
wrote of a group of carpenters and laborers from a frigate (echoing the distant events
of 1742) hired to vote en masse for Federalist congressional candidate Robert Wain.104
Another writer warned against fraud and noted that “[s]ome inspectors have been
guilty of slily inspecting the ballots when delivered, and according to their
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complection objected to the qualifications of the voters, or received them without
scrutiny. This violation of the right o f ballot should be prevented by the close attention
of every friend to fair election.”105
Despite these dastardly attempts, Republicans of the county and city did well
in the Congressional races, and several days following the vote, Bache interpreted the
results as favorable to enemies o f the Jay Treaty and supporters of the Republican
cause: “If an circumstance can speak the condemnation of the British Treaty more
unequivocally than the continuation of British piracies, it is the issue of the late
elections in Philadelphia City and County.”106 We can see here an important change in
the role o f the journalist vis-a-vis Election Day. Unlike the colonial newspaperman,
the editor o f the 1790s felt comfortable interpreting the meaning of the Election Day
for his readers. Bache’s returns and his discussions of them defined results as pro and
anti-republican, thus casting the event as an explicit partisan battle.107
At the same time, the Aurora was publishing constant attacks on Adams,
accusing him of being a monarchist and a British sympathizer, as in this letter from
Thomas Paine:
JOHN, it is known was always a speller after places and offices, and
never thought his services were highly enough paid...[he] is one of
those men who never contemplated the origin of government, or
comprehended any thing o f first principles. If he had, he must have
seen that the right to set up and establish hereditary government never
did, and never can, exist in any generation at any time whatever; that it
is the nature of Treason.108

For their part, Federalists, in a series o f articles written by PHOCION (a pseudonym
of William Cobbett), attacked Jefferson as a Deist, as a coward, as a slave-owner, as a
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wild-eyed anarchist and a lover of “Jacobinism,” and as a phony in his pretensions to
the title of philosopher.109
While this battle in the press was going on, John Beckley was busy flooding
the state with ballots listing Jefferson’s electors. After alerting his contacts with a
letter, Beckley would follow up with bags of Jeffersonian tickets delivered on
horseback. His friends were expected to supplement these by writing out tickets en
masse and passing them on to voters on Election Day. The strategy was to move from
the more republican rural and Western areas, toward the more urban Eastern parts of
the state, where the Federalist forces were much more powerful. The riders were timed
to return back to the Philadelphia itself only days before the election, so that Federalist
leaders would not be able to respond to Beckley’s stratagem.110
By the last week of the campaign, an Aurora writer was ready to declare that
the “present moment is a crisis—On its proper use depends the liberty and happiness
of our common country...The question is no less than whether monarchy or
republicanism shall obtain among us?...I will go further, People o f America, and
declare that MR. ADAMS is an enemy to all regular government. Nothing short of
actual despotism seems to accord with his wishes.”111 A handbill was distributed the
before the election accusing Adams of being a “professed champion of the British
constitution,” an “enthusiastic friend of hereditary power,” and a “declared enemy of
republicanism.” It further charged the “friends o f Mr. Adams” with having “framed a
ticket correspondent to their wishes, and this ticket they have denominated the
Jefferson ticket, and have palmed it upon the numbers of republicans under that
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treacherous garb.”112 Federalists made a counter-charge: that the Republicans were
trying to pass off their ticket as one friendly to the beliefs of President Washington.113
Four days before the Presidential vote, the Aurora's editor, Benjamin Franklin
Bache, printed a letter from the French Minister to the American government, Pierre
Adet, informing the reading public that the French government took a dim view of the
United States’ attitude toward both its former friend, and hinting that should current
policies continue, war between the two states was a very real possibility.114 Adet’s
letter threw the journalistic and political classes into an uproar. It was reprinted, and
condemned, by pro-Adams journals like the Federalist leaning Gazette o f the United
States. Federalist politicians were furious with the timing of the letter. They strongly
suspected that it was an attempt on the part of the radical republicans, in league with
their French foreign sympathizers, to throw the election to Jefferson. Some argued that
it amounted to foreign interference in American domestic affairs.115
On Thursday, the eve of the election, citizens fought each other in the streets of
Philadelphia. The immediate cause of the disturbance was the appearance of a group
of about 150 men, marching down Market Street to the beat of drums, wearing
tricolored ribbons in their hats. The marchers were ostensibly calling for higher wages,
but Samuel Coates, a prominent Quaker merchant, did not believe it. Philadelphians
understood the political meaning of the red, white and blue cockades. Coates, a
Federalist who favored John Adams for chief executive of the nation, wrote to a friend
the next day that the crowd had been the result of schemes by “some violent Jacobins
or foreign Incendiaries, to overcome the moderate Citizens and prevent their votes at
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the Election.” After a time, the paraders began preparing a flag proclaiming Thomas
Jefferson a “man of the people.” Soon afterward, however, they were set upon by city
notables—including Robert Wharton and several “spirited Aldermen.” Clubs and
knives were brought out, and about 40 rioters landed in jail—“much hurt,” Coates
added with evident satisfaction, “and I hope while they are employed in
Contemplating the fruits of their folly...we shall hold a quick Election and choose
good Federal men.”116 The mayor forbade display of the flag. That same day, Fenno’s
Gazette published a letter from three prominent city lawyers—William Lewis,
William Rawle, and Jared Ingersoll—that the state’s constitution excluded non
nationalized voters from the polls.117 The pro-Federalist Coates saw this as a victory
for the supporters o f the administration, assuming that many of the city’s radicals
came from its foreign elements.118
One thing that all of this partisan activity seems to have done was create a
great deal of interest in the Election Day. Four years earlier, one city paper had noted
that the “importance of an approaching election of a President and Vice President of
the United States did not appear to draw forth the activity of our citizens, on monday
last, to vote for electors—The choice o f an intermediate body appeared to remove
from their attention the ultimate and important result of the election.”119 In contrast,
Elizabeth Drinker, the wife of a wealthy Philadelphia Quaker merchant, noted in her
journal for Nov. 5, 1796: “This is the day of Election for a President—a matter of
great moment.”120 The excitement in turn produced a fairly impressive turnout. Walter
Dean Burnham has estimated the national turnout for the 1796 Presidential Elections
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was around 20 per cent of eligible voters.121 In Philadelphia, the number was well over
50 per cent.122
In addition, if the grumblings of disaffected Federalist politicians are to be
believed, there was also a great deal of partisan performance on the day. William
Smith noted that, due accusations of Adams’s monarchical sympathies, voters had
been on the election grounds yelling, “Jefferson and no King.”123 Federalists such as
John Fenno took a dim view o f such extravagant behavior.
The shoutings of “liberty and equality,” the mercenary cries of “no
king,” which disgraced a last election, are so closely copied from the
proceedings in France which first prepared and afterward established
the arbitrary power o f ROBESPIERRE, that there is no little reason to
apprehend a similar tyranny in this country, if those succeed, who are
now so closely copying and have always vindicated the preparatory
steps which led to the despotism of that monster and man-slayer—
When popular tyranny shall trample on the necks of the wealthy and
industrious, then they will begin to wrythe, and struggle to life, but it
will be too late\ a guillotine will silence them, and their property
become, by confiscations, the prey of plundering demagogues. 4
William Smith railed against the “French flags, French cockades were displayed by
the Jefferson party and there is no doubt that French money was not spared. Public
houses were kept open. At Kensington the mob would suffer no person to vote who
had not a French cockade in his hat,” evidence enough, Smith was sure, of French
money and French influence.125 Chauncey Goodrich noted reports of “supporters of
the Jefferson ticket as ‘tis named, went to the polls with French cockades in their hats
at Philadelphia.” Goodrich added that “the mob of that city, led on by their knavish
purse-proud democrats, are ripe for any outrage upon decency and a government of
laws. It is probably that nothing but some calamity from the hands of Sans Culottism
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can thoroughly reform them.”126 The scandal of the Philadelphia election reached as
far as the State Gazette o f North Carolina, in which a writer from Philadelphia
described the day as exhibiting “considerable symptoms o f riot...evidently cherished
and promoted by the French Minster’s intrigues and money.” The writer also noted
that, “Today a flag is to be paraded, representing the union o f the two Republics, with
this motto, “JEFFERSON AND NO KING,” concluding, “Great God, if this is the
fruit of French fraternity, deliver us from such a cause.”127
Federalist belief in French intrigue grew louder as the returns came in and the
victory of the Republicans in the city seemed certain. “We are unfortunate in the
Election in this State: we carried only two of our Ticket. The most unwearied
Exertions, accompanied by some Bribery, and not a little chicane, have been practiced
on this occasion by the anti-federal Party.”128 Presaging attacks by later generation on
the effect o f media effects upon voter behavior, many Federalists seemed certain that
not only French money but also the foreign interference o f Adet’s letter had caused
Quakers, in particular, to change their votes. “If Mr. Jefferson is elected it will be
owing entirely to the influence of that paper.”129
Calls of trickery from both sides grew as the returns began to trickle in from
other parts o f the state, or rather, failed to. At a certain point, the status of the returns
themselves became part of the ongoing story. Commonwealth law required that the
official returns be sent to the Governors office by November 18 in order to be counted.
On that date, the returns from several far western counties had still not been received.
These counties were expected to go strongly for the Republicans, and with the
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Federalist ticket now narrowly ahead, they could very possibly make the decisive
difference.130 Federalists argued the governor had to obey the constitution and ignore
the uncounted ballots, Republicans urged that he wait several more days. Governor
Thomas Mifflin in the end decided to suspend the counting of the votes until the
Western counties were in. Mifflin was generally considered above party divisions, but
his secretary, Alexander Dallas, was a known Republican sympathizer, and Federalists
charged the governor’s office had been driven by partisanship. Republicans hinted, in
turn, that Federalist post office managers had deliberately held up the returns. 131
When the western returns finally did come in, they were overwhelmingly in favor of
the Republicans, resulting in a state electoral ticket that largely voted for Jefferson.132

Conclusion:
The 1796 vote for president was a method o f communicating a national
political identity to the citizens of Philadelphia, a national ritual, in an era when few
other forms of communication existed that could have performed this function, or at
least performed it so well. Through casting his vote, the citizen tied himself to a set of
men and of principles, and to a particular symbol in which man and principle met, the
Presidential candidate. The ritual’s ability to link the individual citizen to a partisan
worldview, through the concrete symbol of the candidate, meant among things that
Philadelphians had turned the Electoral College into an anachronism only seven years
after its creation. Voters on Nov. 4, 1796 did not go to the state house expecting to
choose some group of wise men. They were picking a President. Before Washington
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ever announced his farewell, the Aurora had informed its readers that it “requires no
divination to decide who will be the candidates for the chair. THOMAS JEFFERSON
& JOHN ADAMS will be the men.”133 This understanding is evident enough in the
reaction to Federalist Samuel Miles, one of the earliest “faithless electors.” When
Miles decided to vote for Jefferson, he provoked the following letter of outrage to the
Gazette o f the U.S. “What, do I chuse Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John
Adams or Thomas Jefferson shall be President? No! I chuse him to act, not to
think!”134
The vote tied the voter to the nation, as he enacted that declaration of political
power and identity in concert with others throughout the new country. What the
Election Day march, or the cockade, or the public declaration at the state house did
that the vote did not, was to signal this status to the observing crowd. In other words,
the cockade was the public method of communicating the message the vote had sent to
the voter alone. Federalists and Republicans thus were able to distinguish themselves
not through their private decisions merely—which had no use as markers separating
friend from foe—but their public conduct on the Election Grounds.
But the celebration and the vote could not have communicated these messages
without the help of the mass media. It was not just that the press gave voters a set of
partisan symbols and arguments through which to understand the contest, and with
which to interpret the event itself. It was that the press allowed this local action to be
understood as part of a national clash of forces: stability and anarchy, aristocracy and
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democracy. The growth of the press, both in its size and social role, was essential for
the ritual to communicate an American identity to the performers.
Presidential Election Day 1796 was different from other Election Days in
Philadelphia o f the early republic, not only in the office that was being contested but
in the forms that were used to mark it. Other election days do not seem to have
featured marches and cockades. Because the election of 1796 fell in the midst of a
larger set of cultural practices in use at the time, it took on something of their
character. Nevertheless, it was not the only Election Day that served, both in its actual
performance and its mediated representation, to provide an image of the public to
itself, whether that was the sight o f militia men marching lock step to the polls to
deposit their ballots, or Tory sympathizers ripping up liberty trees, or partisan
electioneers bothering other citizens on their way to the polls. At some level, the
performers and the audience seemed to be aware that Election Day was becoming
something of a democratic spectacle. On the event of the 1799 General Election, a
journalist noted that the street in front of the state house had been crowded with
carriages, as observers from as far way as Trenton, NJ, had ridden in for the day to
observe the scene.135
Like the colonial Election Day, however, as a symbol o f the public, Election
Day did not always provide a comfortable image. In the hands o f a talented journalist
like William Cobbett, who didn’t think much of the American experiment in any case,
it could be used to illustrate the baseness and the dangerous mob tendencies of
democratic government. Alternatively, a radical like Benjamin Bache could twist the
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losses of the Republicans into a message about the inherent corruption o f the
Federalist faction.
There were other, uncomfortable features o f Philadelphia’s Election Day
during this period, which had carried over from the colonial era. The practice of
forming a partisan ticket, even more common after the revolution than before it,
continued to grate. One writer, announcing a public meeting to form a slate, rather
apologetically noted that, “It is, perhaps, to be regretted, that the practice of framing
tickets, before an election, so generally prevails, but it must be obvious to every
reflecting person, that whole the practice does obtain, he must make a choice of the
tickets proposed, or throw away his vote.”136 Newspapers always made certain that
they did not present their own side’s ticket as having been decided by a group of
politicians, but the result of a public meeting of ordinary citizens, “suggesting” or
“proposing” the slate to their fellow patriots.137 These devices were easily seen
through, and one Federalist poetaster had some fun in the 1796 campaign mocking the
egalitarian pretensions of Republican leaders, who felt “the people” should rule, but
only under their direction.138 (However, by the turn of the century, many of the qualms
about distributing tickets had disappeared in the pages of the newspapers. William
Duane, who took over the Aurora following the 1798 death of Bache from yellow
fever, had no problem on the General Election of 1800 informing his readers which
bar they were to go to in order to pick up their reliable Republican tickets.139)
The early Election Day’s of the republic, in other words, seemed to be at once
altogether too democratic, and too aristocratic. This should not be surprising. The
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public culture of Philadelphia itself was attempting to understand what the
implications o f the revolution might be, during this time, for the public life of the city.
It is only to be expected that something like Election Day, which so prominently
displayed the public to itself, would end up as confused and contested as the rest of
society: populist and elitist at the same time, a moment of integration and of division,
a practice that drew on an ideology o f universal ism but managed to keep a great many
of the city’s residents from the polls. In struggling with what this performance meant,
Philadelphians in the next century would begin to change not only the day itself, but
the wider culture of which it was a part.
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Chapter Five:
Philadelphia’s antebellum Election Day
This chapter will treat Election Day in Philadelphia from the period of the
early 1800s to 1860. During this time, three elements critical to the Election Day
performance underwent evolutions, which were both influenced by, and influenced,
that event. First, at the national level, political parties began to assume a greater degree
of legitimacy than they held at the turn of the nineteenth century. Related to this, they
also began to develop a far more complex set of institutional practices—ward
committees, a system of party officials, nominating conventions, mass media
networks—that served to integrate local groups o f voters and citizens into a national
system of partisan politics.1
Second, in Philadelphia itself, the dramatic increase the city’s population
resulted in, among other things, a shift in the way that Philadelphians from different
classes, religions, and races reacted to one another. One historian of this period has
called this the “Turbulent Era” in American city life, and Philadelphia produced some
of the most severe examples of both inter-racial and inter-religious violence.2 That
atmosphere of distrust and aggression meant that the exercise of violence, or at least
the threat thereof, was often an element in the Election Day performance.
Finally, there was a change in the mass media. Newspapers were no longer
merely sympathetic to one party or another, but often had institutional links to
different political parties (as seen in titles like The Democratic Press)? During the
campaign period and on Election Day, they were explicit tools for party organization
and mobilization. In other words, many of Philadelphia’s journalists no longer
124

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

addressed themselves to “the public,” but to that specific portion of the public
affiliated with their party.4 Party insiders, including the newspaper editors who
provided the heated partisan rhetoric designed to stir the complacent voter, were given
an added personal incentive by the growth of political patronage. For the good party
man, political victory meant something other than the advancement of the common
weal. It meant the prospect of a contract, or a good government job.5 The exceptions
here were papers in the new, penny press mold, like the Public Ledger, or a journal
like the Evening Bulletin, which defined itself through a new technology, rather than
party loyalty. Although these papers had their own political sympathies, they tended,
especially in the case of the Public Ledger, to wage an ongoing war against party, and
against the often violent, irrational, and corrupt Election Days which, they felt, party
competition produced.
These changes gave the antebellum Election Day in Philadelphia a style that
distinguished it both from what had came before and what would come after,
providing celebrants with a set of vivid symbols and practices to make sense of the
political identity they were enacting.6 More elaborate and involved than the Federalist
Election Day, with a developing set of traditional practices, it was also a more
informal event, more open to improvisations on the part of the performers, than the
Election Day of the Gilded Age. A number of the distinctive practices and symbols of
the antebellum Election Day were the direct or indirect result o f the party’s increased
role in the political culture. Among other things, this meant that debate over Election
Day, and criticisms over its practice, were at the same time reflections on the growing
125

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

importance of party in the political culture. The role of party also meant that groups
who found themselves irrelevant to the party battle—for the purposes o f this chapter I
focus on Philadelphia’s black residents—found themselves, in the end, excluded from
the performance.

Political and social context: setting the stage
Sanford Higginbotham has argued that the decline of Federalist conservatism
happened earlier, and even more dramatically, in Pennsylvania than in most other
states.7 The 1799 gubernatorial election of Thomas McKean marked the beginning of
Republican dominance in the state, and in the early 1800s, Pennsylvania was known as
the “key stone in the democratic arch,” because of its unwavering support, on the
national level, of Republican candidates. Until the realignment that occurred with the
presidential campaigns o f Andrew Jackson, the state never wavered in this support,
and all of its Governors during that period were associated with the Republican Party.8
That does not mean that the city of Philadelphia lacked partisan conflict in its
elections. Due to its relatively large commercial middle class, the city was one of the
few locations in the state where Federalists could still count on some support at the
polls;9 until the late 1810s, when realignment and the evident hopelessness of the
Federalist cause scattered the party, there seems to have been a constant Federalist
presence on Philadelphia’s Election grounds.10 Moreover, by McKean’s second
administration, Republicans in the state had begun to argue amongst themselves, so
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that during elections, Republicans often spent as much time attacking opponents
within their own party as they did the Federalists.11
Because of the unique nature of Pennsylvania politics—the near hegemony of
the Republicans combined with their constant factional infighting—the state was
somewhat later than most, as Richard McCormick has noted, in composing its politics
along the lines of the Whig-Democracy division that began to take hold in the 1830s,
although it eventually did so.12 Like many other Northern states in this period, the
party system also managed to accommodate several significant minor parties. In the
case of Pennsylvania, these included the Anti-masons, the Native American Party, and
the Know Nothings.13
At the same time that this political evolution was taking place, the city of
Philadelphia was also undergoing a great deal of other changes in terms of
demographics and its economy. A fairly dramatic increase in population radically
changed the social make-up of the city.14 Philadelphia’s black community, for
example, was the largest of any northern city during the latter part of this era, and it
was consequently considered the center of urban black cultural life in the North.15
Immigrants, both internal and foreign, continued to come to the city to find work.16 At
the same time that these demographic shifts were going on, Philadelphia’s economy
moved from a dependence on trade and commerce to manufacturing.17
These changes had important implications for the city’s public life. The
dramatic increase in large numbers of poor residents who differed along religious,
racial, cultural and class lines from the native population increased the potential for
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social conflict, especially since many of the new groups were forced to live side by
side with one another in some o f city’s worst areas.18 Ethnic grievances were in turn
often grafted onto class ones, as the new economy brought great wealth to a few
citizens and barely sustainable livelihoods to a great many more; by the end of the
1820s, Philadelphia was home to a short-lived working class party, the Workingman’s
Party, which had its own newspaper and ran its own candidates in elections.19 In 1828,
the paper dismissed the major factions as irrelevant to the city’s mechanics and other
men who worked with their hands. “What are now Democracy and Federalism but
names?” it asked its readers.20 Philadelphia’s city’s working class, the editors wrote,
“know and feel that we have an interest of our own to maintain, and we will no longer
bow the knee to a political dagon who has no eye to our wants.”21
Although the Workingman’s party was not long for this world, the social
cleavages wrought by the new urban life, both economic and cultural, survived and
even thrived in the new political culture. It is not surprising that social resentments
would have spilled over into party politics. The strong relationship between cultural
identity and political activity in American politics of this period has been made by,
among others, Lee Benson, Richard Jensen, Joel H. Silbey, and Ronald Formisano.22
However, as these writers have also pointed out, the link between ethnic and political
conflict should not be simplified. Different social divisions might be more relevant
than others, depending on the context.

Jensen’s argument dividing modems and anti

modems also makes a clear distinction between ethno-cultural difference and policy
agendas problematic. To take one example: urban Catholics did not support the
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Democratic party simply out of cultural or religious loyalty, but because of its general
political philosophy of limited government. These groups were suspicious of
government activism in a country still largely Protestant.24
D.I. Greenstein has made a slightly different argument, in relation to
Philadelphia specifically, that goes even closer to my subject and my point. Greenstein
notes that simple “ecological” changes in the city cannot explain the dynamics of
ethnic, racial, and class battles that were being fought out at the time.2S An “industrial
working class,” he points out, is not made overnight. As for the role o f Irish Catholics
and Blacks in provoking resentment among the rest of the city’s population, he notes
that in both cases, the extent of the violent resentment occasioned by their presences
seems all out of proportion to their actual numbers.26 The rise o f a class consciousness
among the city’s mechanics, the increased resentment toward Catholic immigrants, the
growth of racist attacks in the 1830s and 40s—all of these phenomena were cultivated,
if not created, for political purposes: the founders of the Workingman’s Party were
actually middle-class businessmen, on the outs of another political group (the Liberty
Party), and racial and ethnic resentments in the city were stoked, by Democrats and
Whigs, respectively, in order to create a solid base of support.

“The argument,”

Greenstein adds, “is not that the urban political (sic) was a motive force in the
development of an industrial or capitalist urban form, but that it shaped the experience
of such developments, and perhaps even hindered or accelerated their advance in
particular cities.”28
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The argument that I wish to make about Election Day in this period is
somewhat similar: that the day gave Philadelphians a cultural form through which to
express various sets of grievances and cultural prejudices. This very public contest
over political power landed in the midst of a community in which various sorts o f
social struggles were already being carried out. The political contestants needed a way
to mobilize voters, and calling upon class and racial biases was useful in getting
bodies to the polls. Hence, the performance of Election Day often became an exercise
in the display of social difference and a battle for social power, at the voting booth and
beyond it.

Party and Election Day: the script
It was parties who wrote the script for the day: parties who produced the
tickets and distributed them, parties who cajoled the voters to get out and support the
vote, parties who provided an organization and a set of symbols by which the private
citizen could connect himself to a national political community. Various means were
used to do this—public meetings, parades, rallies—but an increasingly important tool
was the mass media.29 With the growing sophistication and elaboration of the party’s
role, the use of the party journal to link various members of the partisan public
together and to inform them of the party’s intents and activities became
indispensable.30 The paper served as a primary method o f publicizing the party ticket,
of providing readers to the times and places of ward meetings, of announcing the
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results of those meetings, and of informing readers where and when to find tickets on
the day of the vote.31
The party’s preparation for Election Day began well in advance of the
campaign. Before anything else, a ticket needed to be set. In this early 1800s, this was
often accomplished through the use of a caucus meeting, made up either of party
notables, or the party members who sat in the state or national legislature. Once the
caucus decided on a slate, partisans would hold “public” meetings in the city itself to
declare their support for the ticket and plan for the Election Day.32 This system lasted
through most of the 1810s, but attacks on “King Caucus” as an un-democratic form
and contrary to the spirit of the revolution became more strident late in that decade and
in the early 1820s, and by the 1824 Presidential Election, the caucus system was
essentially finished as a method for choosing a Presidential or indeed any other sort of
candidate33 In its place, parties turned to a more elaborate system o f nominating
meetings. Ward meetings would lead to city or county meetings, leading into state
conventions, and, in turn, for national office, to the national convention. This allowed,
at least in theory, for more popular input into the nomination process than the caucus
system, but at the same time gave the party a way to channel that input into acceptable
candidates.34
Nomination styles were reflected in the content of newspapers. During the age
o f the caucus system, Philadelphia’s partisan papers just prior to Election Day were
full of the reports of meetings from various committees throughout the city. In
ideology at least, these meetings were not instruments of party but of patriots, and
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their rhetoric was republican. Members did not dictate a ticket but suggested or
encouraged a set of candidates. Good and loyal citizens had met to discuss the
upcoming election at a public meeting, had come to a decision on a slate, and thought
it only right and proper to recommend it to their compatriots.
FELLOW CITIZENS—A great election is near at hand. We have all
much at stake in its issue. Shall we not then commune together. Shall
we not hear the arguments that are offered, examine the facts and
inquire into the qualifications and principles o f the candidates who are
presented for our suffrages.35
Reports of these meetings contained a great deal more than tickets. Secretaries
of the meeting often also wrote up a statement from the meeting, concerning the
members’ support of party principles and current policies, and perhaps their positive
opinions o f the general good character of the men on the ticket. They listed the names
of those men responsible for keeping watch on the opposition at the polls, and those
whose responsibility was to gather up voters from their neighborhood: committees o f
surveillance and superintendence.36
The development of the convention system, and the growing acceptance o f
party, meant that such meetings grew increasingly unnecessary for the purposes o f
publicizing the vote.37 The nominating system itself, trickling up from the ward level
to the national convention, served as the justification for the party’s claim that the
candidate was the people’s own. It was a result of the people’s choice, made not
through the ratification of the local citizenry but through the machinery of the party,
which channeled the people’s voices through various levels of the nomination process.
Newspapers in the city increasingly presented the party’s ticket as a fait accompli. 38
132

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

By 1836, some Philadelphia newspapers had begun to carry the name o f the candidate
at the top of their first inside page, months before the campaign even started, to which,
in time, the state ticket would be added.39 The presidential candidate thus became the
party's champion, its standard bearer. To fill this role, and again following the
tradition set down by Jackson, parties tried to convince ex-military men to serve as
their candidates. Figures like Zachary Taylor were the most prominent and
recognizable national celebrities of the era, and their selfless role in the defense of the
nation gave them an image of republican disinterest, standing above factional claims.40
The climax o f the party’s organizational efforts came on the day o f the vote.
Ward leaders needed to arrange for the distribution of printed tickets on the campaign
grounds, for the transportation of old or infirm voters, and for committees of
surveillance to travel throughout neighborhoods, knocking on doors, making certain
that dependable supporters had made it to the polls.41 The paper was a useful tool in
enlisting the general readership to support the effort, and in instructing them on what
to do once they got to the State House. On the day o f the election, and perhaps for the
several days leading up to that point, the most important organizational role of the
party journal was to mobilize the voting public. “YE PIOUS, PRUDENT, AND
DISPASSIONATE CITIZENS OF PHILADELPHIA,” read one Election Day call to
arms, “NOW TURN OUT AND SAVE YOUR COUNTRY.” 42 Another declared:
THIS DAY DETERMINES
Whether the Union and the State shall regard the Democrats of
Philadelphia as men of Principle or Factionists!
In Union, there is Character!
In Union, there is safety!
In Union, there is Victory!
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Be ye therefore United!
THE VALUE OF A VOTE. He who does not vote the whole ticket
abridges himself in the exercise of his most sacred right, his most
precious inheritance...Be you sure to vote and to remind your neighbor
of his duty. This you own to your ancestors and to your posterity—you
owe it to yourself and your county.43

Partisans could also be alerted to the presence o f a rogue party slate that wouldappear
on the

Election grounds along

with the regular slate, the manner of tellingthe

difference between the two (ie., the name o f the candidate causing the division
between party leaders), and the importance of voting the regular slate: all, perhaps,
framed in terms of a “plot” on the part of opposition schemers and factionalists to trick
the loyal voter.44
A partisan’s duty was first to vote, second to get his neighbors to the polls. “If
there is a doubtful man in the block or district, the work is not quite done,” the U.S.
Gazette lectured to Philadelphia’s Whigs in 1840.45 “Are each and all of you busy?”
the North American asked four years later. “Have you warmed your lukewarm
neighbor?—have you reasoned with him who is doubting?”46 And there were other
claims on the partisan. “[SJhould any attempt be made to crowd out the aged and
infirm, we trust that those who have more muscle and nerve will take legal measures
to correct so wicked and cowardly an abuse.”47
Often, the Election Day call to arms would be pitched as a series of binary
oppositions between the preferred candidate and his major opponent. For example, on
the eve of the 1812 Presidential vote, the Commercial and Political Register presented
readers with a number of options. Those who wanted an end to a disastrous war, a
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healthy economy, a democratic political system, could vote for DeWitt Clinton and the
“Peace” ticket. Those who wanted the opposite—war, economic disaster, political
tyranny—could support James Madison and the “War” ticket.48 In a similar manner,
on the day of the 1817 vote for governor, the Democratic Press compared the two
candidates, William Findlay and Joseph Hiester, based on various criteria, such as
manner of nomination, firmness of character, talent, political principles, and
deportment in public life. In every category the paper’s choice, Findlay, demonstrated
his clear superiority over the corrupt and aristocratic Hiester.49
The logic of the Election Day mobilization process encouraged this method o f
dividing the voting public into the rhetoric of those for and against the party. That
process in turn promoted a style o f rhetoric in which the opposition was presented as
not simply mistaken, but morally reprehensible. On the day of the 1832 General
Election in the city, the pro-Democracy Pennsylvanian advised its readers to the watch
the Whig voters “doing their master’s bidding at the polls. You can recognize them by
the total want of manliness in their bearing, by that abject character of countenance
that marks the willing slave.”50 In 1812, the Gazette called on loyal Federalists to
brave the drums and banners and fisticuffs of the Democratic Cordwainers and the
accusations of tory, from the “foreign bom.”51 The North American, a supporter of
both the Whig and Nativist causes in the 1844 election, was especially pleased to point
out any kind of perfidy, real or imagined, committed by Irish Catholics. A Polk banner
flown outside a Boston Catholic church was evidence of the “foreign alliances” of
locofocism.52 “Sectarianism at the Polls!” screamed an editorial several days later,
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“Foreign fanaticism against American virtue.”33 The day of the vote, the paper
mentioned that an Irishman—unspecified as to time and place—had been seen cutting
down an American flag.54
Immigrant Irish were a favorite target of Federalist and anti-Democracy sheets.
The other side preferred to attack the “aristocracy,” and “tones.” The Democratic
Press, the day before the 1812 election, presented an imaginary burlesque of a family
of wealthy Quakers strutting to the polls, the father, “swelling with spiritual pride and
high mindedness,” his belly hanging over as if “fed with fat things,” followed by a son
brandishing an “ELECTION DAGGER, and “a band of Brawlers for prostituted
rights, and Quibblers upon counsul.” This baroque company was concluded by yet
another Quaker hypocrite, “silver teapot on his head, lips labeled, “By God!!! If any
man attempts to hinder me from voting I’ll shoot him dead.”55 On the day of the 1836
Presidential vote, the American Sentinel addressed itself particularly to “Young men,”
and “Democrats! Who have not the fortune to be rich.”56 Class was not the only tool
the Democratic papers used, however. In the election of 1844, the Pennsylvanian
occasionally referred to the Whigs as “coons,” presumably in order to play up that
party’s supposed sympathy for abolitionism.57
Any deaths that could be charged to the opposition were useful. On the day of
the 1812 General Election, R elfs Philadelphia Gazette published a “memoriam” in
honor of revolutionary war veteran James Lingan, a victim of Republican mob
violence during the Baltimore newspaper riots earlier that year.58 The day before the
1848 vote, The North American used the death of a young man in a Whig parade the
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weekend before to rally the troops, comparing the Loco Focos to the bloody
revolutionaries then at work in Europe.59 The next day, the paper reported on another
outrage committed on honest Whigs by Democratic supporters, announced to readers
that the “Red Republic” was imminent, and declared that a “reign of terror” had
commenced in the city. It ended by calling upon good Whig voters to keep their peace
at the polls.60
Continuing a tradition that dated back to the colonial period, newspapers also
used “discoveries” of opposition efforts at Election Day “tricks” to both demonize
opponents and fire up supporters. Such tricks were of three general sorts. First, there
was the spreading of malicious tickets, ie., tickets promoted or even identified as
Whig, but containing largely Democratic names, or vice versa.61 Second, there were
frauds associated with illegal voting—“colonization,” or the importing of voters from
other cities, “personation,” in which a voter might vote twice by using another’s name,
or illegal voting by un-naturalized citizens 62 In a particularly ingenious example, the
U.S. Gazette managed to cram a number of accusations into a single passage. “We
leave these matters of collateral enormity, and many others, and put this plain
question, Whether a man who is created a freeman for temporary purposes, can be cut
into three or four parts like a polypus, and every part preserve its vitality, and exercise
all the rights of a free citizen?”63 The final sorts o f accusations were about corruption
in the counting or taking of the vote itself. Noting that far more Federalist voters had
showed up for a ward election for Inspectors than were actually counted, the Gazette
remarked, “How this is to be accounted we know not, but we do know that as soon as
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the poll was closed, the window was shut and no person except the constable, the
judges, and their clerks, was admitted to be present.”64 In each case, the known moral
corruption of the opposition required diligence and due care among loyal Americans at
the election grounds on the day of the vote.
As a set o f institutional practices, the political party was indispensable for
creating what Election Day in Philadelphia became during this period. It provided
voters with a set o f symbols and practices by which he could enact his political
identity on Election Day and relate the abstractions of nation and ideology to own life.
Despite their essential role in promoting the Election Day ritual and determining its
meaning as a national event, however, parties continued to come under attack in
popular rhetoric. Federal and Republican papers alike in the pre-Jacksonian era
decried “factionalists” and the “malignity of party spirit.” Election propaganda in the
city generally refused to dignify opponents with the label they themselves used. In
discussions of the opposition and in the printed results of the vote, mainstream
Republicans became known as “violents,” or the “War” party (in the 1812 election), or
the “Democratick” party, or the “caucus” party.65 Republicans responded by using
names like “tories,” “Hartford Conventionalists,” and “Blue Light men” for the
Federalists.66 In their own, intra-party battles, they threw around terms like “Patent
Democrats,” “Quids,” “Democrats of the Revolution,” “Old School democrats,” and
“Independent Republicans,” to distinguish friend from foe.67 Although the use of such
epithets declined as the century wore on, Whig newspapers like the U.S. Gazette or the
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North American continued to refer to Democrats in their returns as “Loco Focos,” and
the Democratic program as “locofocism,” throughout the 1840s.68
Party was distrusted in the Philadelphia papers of the nineteenth century for
much the same reasons as it had been in the eighteenth: it promoted irrational passions
and unthinking devotion among the voter, it often presented violent and immoderate
policies, and it rewarded the selfish pursuits of the professional politician and office
seeker.69 As a rhetorical tool, party continued to serve as a useful method of attack on
those one disagreed with. That these attacks were generally made for partisan purposes
only adds another twist to the paradox of the party’s role in Election Day.

The style of the antebellum Election Day: the performance
John Lewis Krimmel’s 1815 painting o f Election Day in Philadelphia is a
portrayal of a civic festival or public holiday. Almost everything in the frame suggests
activity and color: a few happy, drunken souls sitting on Chestnut Street’s
cobblestones; boys racing a hoop; large crowds o f men—some well-dressed, some not,
some serious, some not—scattered throughout; fist fights on the steps of a bar;
carriages depositing ancient voters from their cabs; street vendors hawking their
wares; party workers accosting a voter with their tickets; flags flying out of windows;
a large, wooden, tub-like vehicle, carrying men and an American flag, being hauled
past the State House; and in the background, a mass o f bodies thronged around the
polling windows, pushing and shoving, a few voters thrown to the ground.70
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Krimmel’s painting captures the mood of excitement and frenzied movement
that comes through as well in contemporary and historical accounts o f Philadelphia’s
antebellum Election Day.

71

Election Day was a moment when the city was kept in a

“continual uproar,” from the moment the polls opened until they were counted.72 Isaac
Mickle, a resident o f nearby Cambden, noted on the eve of the 1840 election that even
“women and young children partake of the general feeling.”73 The color of the day
managed to provoke a grudging admiration from even Sidney George Fisher, no friend
of nineteenth American politics as generally practiced, or of the loutish democratic
mob that practiced it, on an Election Day in which he served as Inspector:
The two large rooms of the State House, with the officers of the wards
at the windows, receiving votes & discussing claims o f the applicants,
the shouts & hurrahs of the crowd outside, and the variety of character
& demeanor of those in the house, gave the affair enough of excitement
to me, who had never witnessed anything of the kind, to compensate
for the labor, confinement and the vulgarity of my associates. It was a
new page o f life opened, and to see the mode in which the great main
spring of democratic government is managed was worth the trouble that
I had. 4
Commentaries on the election almost never failed to mention to the flags that hung
from the windows of party headquarters, offices, and private homes.75 (One report
estimated 5,000 flags flying in the city on the day of the 1844 General Election.76)
Most decorative were the headquarters, often located in bars like Carel’s Bolivar
House, home o f the Jacksonian Whigs, and the Democrat’s stronghold at Amos
Holahan’s Bar.77 Holahan’s, advantageously located near the State House, even used
the day of the election as the moment to “tap” the first beer o f the season.78 Besides
the flags and the bunting, the headquarters often featured huge transparencies of
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American symbols or the images of the party’s candidate. In 1828, the American
Sentinel claimed the Jackson transparency in front of Holahan’s was SO feet high.79
Placards abounded on the street comers leading up to the State House, or sometimes
carried aloft by partisans, publicizing the party slate, or urging supporters to get to the
polls, or helpfully informing voters of a scandal or charge of corruption recently
leveled at some member o f the opposition. Cabs and omnibuses moved back and forth
through Chestnut Street all day long, ferrying the sick and infirm to the polls. Not
everyone would get home directly after voting; there was a great deal to discuss.
Rumor abounded. On the day of the 1840 Presidential Election, a man walked about
the election grounds with a sign declaring that a city policeman had been arrested for
illegal voting.80 In 1808, a letter arrived in the city falsely stating that one of the
gubernatorial candidates had been murdered by desperadoes.8'Street vendors sold
oyster stew, cheese, and roasted chestnuts to waiting voters and observers.82
Part of the lively atmosphere was due to the city’s decision to continue holding
its poll at a single spot—the old State House on Chestnut Street. Until the legislature
moved the polls to voting districts in 1851, almost every voter in the city needed to
troop down to the State House to cast his vote at one of the several ward windows.83
After a hotly contested campaign, thousands of voters might be waiting on the
Election grounds by the time the State House bell began to ring at nine o’clock,
announcing the opening o f the polls (the bell would continue to ring, at five minute
intervals, throughout the day, until the voting was over, a function it continued to
perform even after the State House had ceased to serve as a polling place).84 Voters
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would vote by giving their several ballots—Pennsylvania still required a separate
ballot for each office—to the ticket Inspectors behind the windows, who would then
place them in the ballot boxes. A clerk would check off the voter’s name on the list of
registered voters, so that he could not vote again.85
Voting was not an easy or comfortable business in antebellum Philadelphia. A
window could generally process only about 90 voters an hour, which, combined with
the large numbers at the polls, meant that men would sometimes have to wait four or
five hours to cast their vote.86 Patience was not the only virtue required—physical
strength, determination, and a certain amount of courage came in helpful. Oftentimes,
a crowd of men would surround a polling window, sometimes linked to tire
“committees of vigilance.” Their purpose was ostensibly to keep watch on illegal or
multiple voters, but in the event, they often simply tried to block access to the polls of
men who they either suspected or knew to be members of the opposition party.87 In the
history of nineteenth century Philadelphia writer Thomas Westcott, the working class
ward of North Mulberry was particularly notorious for this sort of behavior. Attempts
to fool the gatekeepers of the vote were not taken gracefully, according to Westcott. A
man who tried to sneak by an opposition vote might get his hat mashed over his eyes,
then find himself hustled, pulled, kicked, or even thrown to the ground.88 Another way
to keep opposition votes from getting into the polling booth was through the use o f tax
receipts or naturalization papers. If an Inspector was suspicious of a voter’s
citizenship, or if the voter was not on the list of taxables, he could require papers
documenting his residency or naturalization, or a tax receipt from the previous year.89
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If the voter did not have the papers, a public oath as to payment of taxes, or the
personal testimony from a legal voter as to his neighbor’s citizenship, could suffice.90
Because the law allowed the Inspector such leeway in the methods of allowing
dubious voters the right to cast a ballot, the votes for the Inspectors, taken the weekend
before the vote itself, were considered extremely important. “I was astonished to
witness the anxiety felt by leading men, that their party should elect inspectors. The
eventual choice at the general election seemed, in fact, in their estimation, actually to
rest upon the having “Inspectors” of their party,” wrote Englishmen Henry Fearon o f
his visit to Philadelphia’s election in 1817. Fearon naively suggested that it could be o f
no consequence of what party the Inspectors were, as they were protected from
partiality by the secret ballot. The response was that, on the contrary, “the fact of the
inspectors being on one side or the other had been calculated to make a difference o f
upwards of 200 votes in a particular election!—arising from the reception of improper,
and the rejection of good votes. The means by which an inspector can effect this, are
said to be remarkably exact.”91
Presumably one means of determining the vote was through the voter himself.
A known partisan of either side could be counted upon to support or oppose one’s
preferred ticket, and treated accordingly. Moreover, since the relationship between
ethnicity and class was so strongly assumed in this culture, the style of a man’s dress
or his accent might also be enough to put an Inspector on guard. Ballots offered
another way of determining a vote. During one election, a Federalist paper charged,
Democrats had underlined the names of every member on their printed ticket with
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dark lines. Since the line’s showed through the white ballot paper, Democratic
Inspectors were able to see whether a voter had cast his vote for their side or not, and
could easily dispose of an opposition ballot before they placed it in the box.92 Several
decades later, The Democratic Pennsylvanian charged Whigs with placing at the head
of their Presidential Electors tickets a large and elaborate, heavily italicized, font. The
editors o f the Pennsylvanian did not object to a title at the head of the ticket—a man
had to know what party he was voting, after all—but they charged that the purpose o f
the elaborate font was, again, to show through the ballot paper and alert other voters
and Inspectors as to the voter’s choice. “It is perfectly evident that the “marked
tickets” o f Friday defeated one of the main objects of the existing laws of this
commonwealth.” 93 The response of the Whig U.S. Gazette was that “Every man has a
right to vote, or print his vote, in what text he choses.” The Gazette editors then added
a counter charge for good measure, namely, that some Democrats on the election
grounds had tried to trick voters by placing the Whig font at the head of their
Democratic tickets.94
Given the atmosphere surrounding the casting of the vote, it is not surprising
that reports o f fisticuffs and brawls at polling windows and on the election grounds
were common.95 The day of Presidential Election of 1840, coming at the end of the
Harrison’s famous Log Cabin and Cider campaign, seems, on the basis of press
reports, to have been one large riot from late morning to early evening. In Southwark,
a Democratic poll inspector on the run from an angry Whig mob found refuge into a
nearby building and was forced to lock himself in a cellar until another gang, this one
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Democratic, arrived to help him out. A battle ensued; The Pennsylvanian claimed that
the Democrats routed the opposition and that one miserable Whig was later found
quivering under a bed in a nearby building.96 Many residents blamed Election Day
fights on the fact of a single poll, which brought together men o f various classes,
ethnicities, religions, and political persuasions at a time of much heated passion.
“Much has been said of late, and with great justice too, of the inconveniences and
dangers o f having masses of people collated about the polls of the time of a warm and
exciting contest.”97
Even without fights at the polls, a Philadelphia Election often had something of
a martial air. Political conflicts were often taken to be milder versions of the one
between the Americans and the British 30 years earlier, so that what happened at the
polls was essentially a peaceful revolution on a yearly basis, the people’s re-enactment
of the founding the nation. Prior to the General Election of 1820, The Aurora lauded
the suffrage as a remedy and antidote to actual war.98 In 1824, it bemoaned the lack of
success o f its presidential candidate, Henry Clay. Clay’s defeat, the paper argued, had
been due to the fact that the crypto-Federalists supporting John Quincy Adams were
“well-drilled.” Election Day required a party presence—committees of vigilance,
“recruiting sergeants” at the polls—in a word, d is c ip lin e In the early part of the
century, when membership in militias was still popular, voters might even see groups
like the Democratic Cordwainers or the Republican Blacksmiths marching on the
election grounds.100 In 1812, John Binns was accused of leading a group of
militiamen—under colors, drums, and a pipe—directly up to the poll. A furious report
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on the event by the U.S. Gazette noted that when challenged by the mayor to act
peaceably, the group threatened to beat him, then essentially held him captive for the
next few hours.101 The state militia had also marched on the day, the paper noted, in
express contravention of Pennsylvania law.102 Although the marching of the militias
seems to have disappeared by the 1830s, Isaac Mickle was still complaining of hot
headed voters parading about with drum and fife on the 1840 Election Day, and a
Whig reporter mocked a group o f young boys who paraded past voters the same year
with drums and music, carrying Van Buren and Jackson transparencies and a United
States flag.103
Betting and drinking also contributed to the day’s atmosphere. The two often
went together, as Fearon noted on a tour of the numerous bars surrounding the State
House on Election Day, 1817.104 Plying the voters with liquor was a time-honored
practice at this point and often cheerfully carried out by party electioneers.105 Despite
the state legislature’s banning o f the practice,106 by the time of Fearon’s visit, betting
too seemed to be an accepted feature of Election Day, as suggested by his reprisal of a
scene on election eve among a group of party organizers: “What will you give Finlay
in Lower Deleware Ward?” “One hundred.” “And what to Hiester?” “Three hundred.”
“Give Bill three and a half, and I’ll take you for five hundred.” “No: I’ll give him three
and a half for a pair of boots.” “Guess I’ll take you for a pair and a hat.—What for
Dock Ward?” “I won’t bet on Dock: they’re all a set of d— d Tories.”107 Like the men
in this passage, bettors often wagered not on victory but on the difference in votes,
much in the same way as modem sports betting generally revolves around the spread
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(and probably for the same reason, namely, that one candidate or another was by this
point considered a strong favorite, and the only real question was how much the vote
difference would be).108 The sums involved in many of these bets are impressive,
given the times—up to $3,500 in one report.109 Men could find themselves ruined by
an unlucky Election Day.110
As the activities of the militia and the betting men suggest, a great deal more
than voting occurred on Election Day. Like the Republicans of the 1796 Election,
Philadelphians used the day as a sort of popular political theater. In 1828, John Binns
noted supporters of Andrew Jackson moving about the city with hickory sticks in the
air, driving about with busts of Jackson on their carriages, and a man dressed in
“American colors,” riding a white horse and waving the hickory poll, who went up to
a picture of the general and bowed three times.111 Four years later, the production was
even more elaborate, as a mock corvette, dubbed the Good Ship “United States,” rode
about the streets surrounding the election grounds, stopping occasionally in front of
Democratic bars, and eventually ending up in front of the Bank of the United States.
“What is your cargo?” yelled the partisan audience. “Sound currency!” the crew
replied in unison. Then, the captain pointed to an imaginary ship some distance away.
“What ship is that?” he cried out. “The braggart,” the crowd cried back. “Who
commands that ship?” “Henry Clay!”112
At night, men and boys would march about with tubs of tar or wagon wheels
set afire. These night parades often came after the local vote had been counted, and
one or other of the sides could declare victory over the city’s vote.113 It was generally
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during these evening parades when the Election Day violence, simmering for much of
the day, exploded into an actual riot. On at least two occasions, in 1832 and 1840, riots
broke out when a parade o f Democrats marched past Carers. The second time the
Democrats rushed into the bar, broke windows, and the interior of the bar itself. The
fight that resulted sent dozens of men to a nearby hospital.114 Gangs of Jackson
supporters attacked the house of John Binns the nights of the 1828 General and
Presidential elections, and, according to him, threw bricks or stones at his house, and
attempted to break down the door.115
Actual homicide was not frequent, but not unheard of, either. In 1834, a battle
between Whigs and Democrats in the city’s Moymensing neighborhood resulted in a
death.116 Several men died during perhaps the city’s most famous Election Day riots of
the period, the California House riots. On that occasion, the state militia was actually
called out and brought forth a cannon to control the crowd."7 By 1840, Sidney Fisher
noted, “a resort to brute force has now become expected,”118 and the city’s reputation
for Election Day hooliganism was such that Isaac Mickle wrote in his diary that in
Philadelphia, “party spirit usually rages with more violence than any other section of
the Union.”" 9
And yet, given the degree of violence in the urban culture as a whole, given the
tensions which the social changes to the city had wrought, and given the impetus to
conflict provided by the political contest, the fact that Philadelphian’s frequently took
to fighting each other in the streets on Election Day may be less impressive than that
they did not do so even more frequently, and with even greater violence. Writing of an
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Election Day in 1817, Fearon noted: “The excitement o f party and pecuniary feeling,
by the universality of gambling upon the occasion, was very great; yet there was no
confusion, no disturbance.”120 Relieved to see less violence at the polls than he had
expected one Election Day, Isaac Mickle noted “that every thing was conducted with
great order and decorum. There were no fights, no clamorous debates...fanaticism was
evinced by the words and actions of no man. Each exercised the rights of a freeman,
and left his fellow freeman unmolested to enjoy theirs. So may it ever be!”

The media’s role: the interpretation
As was the case in American culture generally, the role of the mass media at
this time became more visible in the Election Day performance and, in a sense, more
central to that performance.121 The discussion of the party’s role in Election Day has
already demonstrated how party leaders came to use the paper as an organizing tool
and as mobilizing device. But the news media, both partisan and non-partisan alike,
also served a role as interpreters of what the Election Day meant, and as critics of the
performance.
For the partisan editor, victories were easy enough to explain: they
demonstrated the good sense of the public, the rightness of the cause, and the
excellence of democracy generally as a form of government. “The result of the late
election is such as might be expected from the people o f Pennsylvania. Corruption,
cabal, foreign influence, degenerate coalitions and degenerate politics have been
discomfited.”

17 7

“The fact is, that the People are beginning to awake from their
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lethargy, as those who have been in the habit of abusing their good natural confidence
will ere long discover to their shame and confusion.”123 “The result of the late election
demonstrates that the PEOPLE condemn and reprobate the system of cabal by which
the ruling party has so long retained and hoped to continue the government by their
own hands...We hail, and all good men will unite with us in hailing the happy omen
of future good.” 124 Often, and especially in the 1830s and after, when larger and
bolder types came more into use, the headline alone could serve as interpretation.
Celebrating positive returns from Delaware, the Gazette announced the state,
“Redeemed! Regenerated!! AND DISENTHRALLED!!!” 125 Victories in Maryland
and Ohio were headed with an imprint of a flag and the American Eagle, and the
announcement: “ALL HAIL!! O.K.K.K.” “GLORIOUS TRIUMPH”126 A victory was
always a victory, but a loss was not necessarily a loss. If the vote total could be
compared to one of a year before, and if the margin of the opposition victory was
smaller this year than last, then this was evidence of the trend toward eventual success
in November.127
Sometimes, of course, defeat would have to be acknowledged, but here certain
tried and true strategies were at hand. Defeat at the polls could be explained away by
reference to opposition corruption and misbehavior. It was the responsibility of
partisan and corrupt Inspectors who failed to enforce the laws, of corrupt and secret
deals, of alliance between factionalists and tories.128 As always, class and ethnic
prejudice could be depended upon to support the argument. The Gazette blamed the
gross frauds of illegal voting on foreign elements attempting to take control of the
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political system. “It is a fact not to be disguised that under this [voting] law when
enforced in all its integrity, foreigners rule the city o f Philadelphia. They creep into
every official vacancy; they poison the minds o f native Americans by their foreign
partialities and antipathies, and pollute the fountains of private confidence and
intercourse.” It warned its readers to look well to the next (ie., the Presidential)
election. “We have a stronger security than a legislative act, that this imposition will
not be pronounced legal and that is the mistrust they have of one another.”129 There
was little doubt about which “foreigners” the editor o f the Gazette had in mind. In a
recap o f an ward election during the period, he noted that a leader of the opposition
party (probably Binns), “in a dialect so broad it would have excited laughter even in
Dery, rallied his host of foreigners by calling out, “This is the American side.”130
The newspaper provided interpretation through its form as well as its content.
The integration of party propaganda and the development of the mass media’s ability
to place Philadelphia’s Election Day in the context of the national event was quickly
evolving from the Federalist period. Even by the 1810s, the returns of elections in
other states are notably more numerous than they had been twenty years before. By the
1830s and 1840s, a fall in which a Presidential campaign was held was really a
succession of Election Days, starting with some New England states at the beginning
of September, then spreading out to the rest o f the country. Philadelphia’s own
election season began with the ward elections for Inspectors, then the General
Election, and then the climatic event in November. By the end of the era, reporters
admitted of the October Election Day that, “[i]n fact the contest of Tuesday was but a
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preliminary action, in which the two parties, as it were, measured their strength a little,
preparatory to the final and decisive struggle in November next.”131 At roughly the
same time that this structure appeared, the turnouts for Presidential and General
elections changed places in the state of Pennsylvania. Prior to the Jacksonian period,
General Elections were usually better attended than Presidential ones. After 1840, the
reverse was the case.132
Perhaps because of the different roles that the General Election day and the
Presidential Election Day played in the campaign drama, the style of interpretation
was often different. Corruption in the General Election could be used as a partisan
tool, to rally the troops. But losses in November were taken more philosophically.
After a entire fall of attacking the Democrats as, essentially, violent foreign agents in
the pay of the Pope, The North American, in declaring Pierce’s victory, announced
that “the day is lost, and the field is left to the victors...We have reason, just reason, to
complain of the stratagems which have been practiced against us,” the paper noted,
then added sadly, “But after all, it would seem that fate is more at war with us.”133
Such feelings were echoed by at least some within the voting public itself. The loyal
Democrat Isaac Mickle was forced to listen to three nights o f cannon fire as the Whigs
celebrated Harrison’s 1840 victory (the mayor had outlawed parades in this case to
avoid violence).134 By the third day, however, he wrote in his diary that the “poor
devils have the chance to rejoice so seldom that I cannot find it in me to envy them.”
Defeat, Mickle thought, would in the end be the salvation o f his own party, making it
purer, and its union firmer.135 The fact that the contest would continue, some time in
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the future, allowed the loser to accept the result with more grace than he might
otherwise have done.136

Philadelphia’s Public Ledeer and the anti-partv voices: an alternative interpretation
Given the style of the Jacksonian Election Day, it is not surprising that the day
had its critics, many of whom came from atop the economic and social strata of
Philadelphia society. These were men who might have expected, in an earlier, more
deferential age, to have dominated the politics of the city. That they did not, that they
increasingly found themselves on the outside looking in, did not go un-remarked. The
failure of democracy to allow these men their due, created in many of them a marked
distaste for electoral politics and for the sort of boorish behavior that even at its best
marked a nineteenth century election in Philadelphia. In 1806, Thomas Cope, serving
as a judge for a special election, noted with dismay that some men would swear to
anything to vote. A Federalist of the early nineteenth century, Cope well understood
that his party was increasingly unable to compete, a fact he charged to the
“Democrats’” willingness to draw on the support of immigrant Irish and French
voters, many o f whom, he suspected, were ineligible.137 A harsher verdict was
delivered by diarist Sidney Fisher, who rarely had a good word to say about the
democracy or elections generally, and who claimed to always vote against the mob, on
principle. “These elections are a curse,” Fisher railed in his diary. “Every four years
this system of agitation and excitement is gone thro’ with.”138 As a Whig, and
therefore in some sense the political and philosophical descendant of Cope’s
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Federalists, Fisher also distrusted the populism of the opposition Democrats, and
assumed that they would stoop to personation and bribery with the minimum of
provocation. “The frauds developed recently in New York show a system of
corruption & baseness, so extensive, so low, so degrading, so utterly shameless that
they fill the mind with disgust, indignation, & alarm.”139
But not all o f the criticism of Election Day came from the disappointed
arrogance of the would-be ruling class. Perhaps the most prominent of populist critics
of Election Day were on the editorial staff of the Philadelphia Public Ledger, one of
the first and most successful of the city’s penny presses. The editors, William Swain,
Arcenah S. Abell, and Azariah H. Simmons, were from New York City, and based
their paper’s economics and journalistic style on early New York prototypes like
James Bennett’s New York Herald.140 Like Bennett’s paper, the Public Ledger was
dramatically and self-consciously different from other newspapers at the time. Copy
tended to focus on crime and human interest, generally to the exception of politics.
Because the penny paper aimed to present its readers with hard-eyed, empirical
“truth,” the editors of such presses, men like Bennett and the owners o f the Public
Ledger looked upon politics with suspicion and often a kind of contempt. This was
part and parcel of a wider worldview of the penny paper, the attempt to free
journalism from the dictates of prejudice, including political prejudice, and to rely on
the observable fact, the datum.141
Eventually, this belief would become generalized throughout American
journalism and lead to a valorization of “objectivity” in journalistic style. In 1836,
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however, Messrs. Swain, Abell and Simmons were well aware that they were
presenting something new and unfamiliar to Philadelphia readers. Much o f their
writing emphasized the difference between their penny papers and the partisan sheets
which mostly made up the opposition, and the editors, acting a prophets of a new age
in mass media, made the most of the difference, by highlighting their distaste for the
sort of prejudicial copy found in Whig or Democratic papers and for the ridiculous,
often corrupt behavior displayed on Election Day and throughout the campaign.
So that during the election o f 1836, for example, the paper generally eschewed
political coverage and focused instead on hounding out of the city an “oculist” named
Smith (the paper claimed he was an unconscionable quack).142 When it did deign to
address political stories, the Public Ledger's editorial policy was ostentatiously and
consistently “independent.” While the paper seems to have favored Democratic
candidates far more than Whig or opposition candidates during this period, it was
mostly just contemptuous o f political parties and o f partisan papers generally.143 The
disavowal o f partisan affiliation was likely part of a more general strategy among the
penny press to reach as wide an audience as possible, but it also fit into a longstanding
and rather widespread distrust of political factions. The pages of the Public Ledger
caricatured partisans as “these poor moles who grope in the dark in pursuit o f one
idea,” their heads being not large enough to contain two.
What gentlemen! cannot you conceive such a thing as independence of
mind? Cannot you imagine that one can take counsel of his own
understanding and give utterance to some other than borrowed
sentiments?
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The actual campaigns o f Van Buren and Harrison were nothing to the editors of the
Public Ledger. What interested them were political ideals and principles.144 A reader
foolish enough to ask the editors whether it was true that Van Buren rode about in a
coach and four and wore kid gloves, received this cold reply:
We consider it o f very little consequence what Mr. Van Buren or any
other man wears, or how he rides...Suppose any public man should
wear white gloves or go bear (sic) handed, does that make him less a
statesman, less a patriot or less a republican?143
The Public Ledger referred to political life in order to criticize it, and to
contrast it with an idealized model of what the editor’s argued was the proper politics
for a true republic. Not surprisingly, the behavior of citizens on Election Day generally
exasperated the Public Ledger. It compared, for example, the actions o f teenage boys
hauling a small boat filled with lit tar barrels to “children of larger sort, who were
spending their time and ruining their health in electioneering for Tom, Dick and Harry,
who the next day would spurn them beneath their feet.”146 Instead of editorials
encouraging the partisan faithful to get out and vote, readers of the Public Ledger saw
pleas for Election Day calm. The actual result was of no concern to the editors, but
they found the disturbances and murders to be an outrage. “Let us have no vain
glorious boasting, no Bombastes Furioso declamations; no vaunting over a
success.”147
It was Election Day betting, however, that worked up the most righteous
indignation on the part o f the Public Ledger. The paper kept up an ongoing campaign
against the “vile, profligate, wicked, law-breaking, law-defying system of gaming.”148
Bets on the election were placed everywhere: on the floor of the Exchange, on street
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comers, in insurance offices, on shop floors. Many citizens, doubtless, did not even
know that it was illegal. Election Day betting was harmful in part because it allowed
heartless black-legs to fleece honest members of the public, but more importantly, it
threatened the whole democratic structure of the country. Fitness for office should be
the sole motive of the vote, the editors argued. Betting made the voter overlook the
public consideration in favor o f private gain. The effect was to make men act against
their better convictions, and to encourage others to do so. The paper even went so far
as to equate betting on the election with treason.149
The Public Ledger, then, hated the partisan Election Day for its violence, for
its unthinking and often base displays of irrationality, for the way it promoted private
interest over public good. The distrust of party was a strong a tradition in American
political rhetoric, as was its continued existence in political practice. We have already
run across an example o f it in the pages of Federalist era journalism, and much o f the
Public Ledger's anti-party rhetoric echoed the sentiments of earlier commentators.
There was, for example, the comparisons of the vote to a sacred rite:
From what motive should a citizen enter a place of public worship? To
return thanks for the past, and to pray for the good of himself and his
fellow creatures. Any other motive to the performance of a religious
duty is profane and criminal.
To make sure readers got the point, editors argued that the elective franchise had a
direct and especial reference to “the will of God, the happiness of mankind, and is
therefore a religious duty.” Because of this, the paper argued that not only should
voters convince themselves that their motives were “pure and holy,” but that all

157

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

violence and attempts to obstruct the vote were sins against God as well as the
people.150
At times, the paper’s anti-party feeling during the election was so strong that it
led to a denigration of politics altogether. Following the Presidential election of 1836,
the paper argued that the success of one candidate or the other was irrelevant to the
welfare of the nation. Although it predicted an economic slide should Harrison be
elected, the lead editorial argued that by and large the health of America depended
more on the efforts of businessmen than politicians.151 After Franklin Pierce’s election
in 18S2, the paper ridiculed the notion that Pierce had been elected for any policies he
may have promoted. In fact, the candidate had studiously avoided any talk of policies,
the editors wrote. Moreover, they argued, it was the exactly this hollow core at the
center of Pierce’s political personality that recommended him for the job, since he
would not feel bound to any one group once he took office.152
It was not only penny papers or the social elite in Philadelphia that were
attacking the violence and misbehavior on Election Day. A popular polemicist such as
John Binns scorned the irrationalism of the Election Day democratic crowds
worshipping at the feet of the Great General Jackson, “the savage shoots of victory,
the war-whoops of exhaltation,” as much as any high-minded aristocrat, and even
partisan editors during the Jacksonian era often breathed a sigh of relief once the
election was over.153 An avowed party paper like The Pennsylvanian criticized the
way that many citizens celebrated the day, arguing that it had a “baneful effect on the
elective franchise.”154 The Pro-Whig United States Gazette promoted its preferred
1S8
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slate of candidates for the 1838 constitutional convention by the fact that they were
unpledged to any political group, and therefore free to vote their consciences. It railed
against “Men who are indebted for their notoriety to the extravagance of their
doctrines, whose watchword is Party, and whose hope is Spoils—political wreckers
who watch the tide of party strife less to preserve than to destroy.153
Alexander Cummings, editor and publisher o f the Evening Bulletin, was
somewhat calmer in his opinions. Cummings was willing to grant the Jacksonian
Election Day a certain color and vitality, especially writing in the nostalgic mode, as
in the early 1850s, when he thought that the decision to split the election grounds up
into a ward system had effectively destroyed the Election Day celebration (he would
be wrong about that).156 Nevertheless, the Bulletin's discussion of Election Day
implied a sort of progress away from that sort of event. As voters became more
rational, as the changes in laws relating to voting and elections took effect, Election
Day would become calmer, less open to corruption. Some of the extravagances of the
moment would be lost, of course, but these were necessary sacrifices.157 Not
surprisingly, given that his paper was originally called the Telegraph Evening Bulletin,
much o f this improvement would be the result of modem improvements in
communication technologies. The telegraph could eliminate corruption in the vote
count, for example, because it presented returns all at once, and made changing the
vote in response to earlier returns impossible. Thus the Machine destroyed the
deceptions of Party. “It sends the contradictions of a falsehood close upon its heels and
prevents any mischief or injustice being done by any party.”158 More than that, it
159

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

delivered the results in an incredibly short time. In 1840, the news of Harrison’s
victory did not reach the city of Philadelphia until five days after its own vote.159 In
18S2, the Bulletin was able to announce Pierce and King victors the day after the
Election.160
The attacks on the Election Day celebration came from two directions, then, in
the pages of the city’s newspapers. On the one hand, a journal like the Public Ledger
drew on a by-now long tradition o f attacking the nature of partisanship and
factionalism. Despite its popular audience, this argument was essentially a
conservative one. In attacking the populist style of contemporary Election Day, the
Public Ledger essentially echoed the criticisms of men like Isaac Norris and John
Fenno. In the writings of these earlier critics, and especially in Norris’s private letters
about the rude behavior of the city’s popular classes on Election Day, this critique of
style also carried the implication of a class critique. Certain people—“butchers,”
“tanners,” working class “Jacobins”—could generally be found engaging in these
untoward celebrations. Since the Public Ledger was democratic in its political
sympathies, its attack on the style in which Philadelphians conducted themselves on
Election Day did not extend, at least explicitly, to a class critique. Instead, it simply
shaded into an attack on electoral politics generally. The other dismissal of the
Election Day celebration came from the pages of the Bulletin, in which the triumph of
technology would lead to a more sober and rational ritual o f the vote. That argument
was not linked with the sort of argument that the Public Ledger was making. In the
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future, however, reformers o f Election Day would increasingly turn to technology in
order to help them solve the problem of the Election Day celebration.

Black Americans and Philadelphia’s Election Dav:
The battle over political identity on Philadelphia’s Election Day, the battle
among the public over what it ought to look like, did not include all members o f the
city. Notably, it did not include the black residents of Philadelphia. In fact, their
absence was striking enough that Alexis de Tocqueville noted it on his visit to the city
in the early 1830s. When he asked his guide whether Negroes were forbidden from
voting, the response was that there was no law forbidding them to vote, but that they
stayed away from the polls for reasons of personal safety. A black man presenting
himself at a Philadelphia poll on Election Day, de Tocqueville’s interlocutor said,
would have been severely beaten.161
Almost from the beginning of the republic, any public presence o f black
Americans in the city of Philadelphia during moments of community or national
celebration was a vexed business. Their appearance in a Fourth of July parade
provoked a riot in 1803, and they were generally not welcome to the day’s festivities
after that.162 Eventually, they created their own civic celebration on New Year’s Day.
A group of Negro masons held an annual march every June, but it was often the
subject of arch commentary, even outright mockery, by whites.163 Similarly, on
Election Day, black Philadelphians were seen at the edges of the celebration, as
observers only, or were forced to operate behind the scenes. When African Americans
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wanted to exercise their democratic rights, they did so out o f sight of white people, as
in the case of Joseph Forten. Forten was a wealthy sail-maker, a veteran of the
Revolutionary War, and one of the African American community’s most respected
citizens. In 1826, a newly elected congressman from the city met Forten in the street.
Forten expressed a great deal o f admiration for the congressman’s politics, and
added—much to the astonishment o f the other man—that on Election Day he had
taken about 14 or IS white men who worked in his shop to the polls and ordered them
to vote for the man. Forten’s wealth gave him some power in the political realm, but it
had to be exercised quietly, that is, in the private realm o f economics.164
This public invisibility would begin to change in the decade of the 1830s. By
the late 1820s, the absence of black Philadelphians at the polls had become something
of a scandal for the community. Black journalists and reformers from New York and
elsewhere chastised Philadelphia’s black leaders for failing to be more assertive on the
matter.163 At the same time, black Philadelphians were becoming more aggressive in
claims on their rights as citizens o f a democracy. They created a national abolitionist
society, headquartered in the city, and constructed a building to house it. They began
to press politicians to provide them with the practical support to exercise their civil
rights.166 The informal ban against black voters also seemed to be breaking down. In
the western counties, where land was easier to get—and voting criteria easier to
meet—and where blacks formed a smaller percentage of the population than they did
in Philadelphia, blacks did vote. This state of affairs confused even the state’s
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governor, John Schulze, who noted at one point that the word “freeman” apparently
referred to blacks in some parts of the commonwealth but not to others.167
The debate over the black vote came to a head in early 1837, when a statewide
convention met to consider changes to the 1790 constitution. The legal argument
centered over the question of what the framers o f the 1790 constitution had meant
when they declared that all “freemen” in the state who met the residency and tax
criteria had the right o f franchise. Defenders o f black enfranchisement argued that,
absent any further definition, the term had to refer to all adult males of any color.
Their opponents argued that “freeman” was a technical term that could not, by
definition, refer to black men.168 Democrats began to press the issue almost as soon as
the convention met. Philadelphia’s relative closeness to the South was part of the
problem. Some Democrats argued that, should blacks be allowed to vote, it would
encourage internal immigration to the city among free blacks living in the southern
states.169
Election Day in the fall of 1837 brought debate to a boil, when Democrats in
Bucks County decided that they had lost several races due to black votes. There is
little doubt that several black farmers showed up at a poll in Bucks county that year to
vote, much less evidence that it had any substantial effect on the outcome. Democratic
opponents made much of the fact that some of these men had been carrying guns, but
this was a practice that seems to have been a common among the state’s rural
populations at the time, both white and black. 170 In any case, the angry Democrats
decided to take the case to court. Several months later, the state’s supreme court sided
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with the more restrictive view o f the constitution, and decided that the constitution
forbade blacks from voting.171
In fact, though, the court’s decision had been made moot by events during the
spring of 1838. Democratic members o f the convention, riding a tide of indignation
prompted, in part, by the Bucks county controversy, pushed through a resolution
explicitly limiting the franchise to white adult males.172 In doing so, Pennsylvania
lawmakers were following the lead o f other Northern states—New Jersey, Rhode
Island, New York, and Connecticut—that had disenfranchised African Americans in
the first half of the 19th century (in most southern states blacks had never had the right
to vote).173 Black civil rights groups in both Philadelphia and Pittsburgh protested the
move, but their efforts were useless. Since there was no clear political gain to be made
from defending black enfranchisement, most of the opposition to the Democrats at the
constitutional convention was timid at best.174 Blacks were caught in an electoral
catch-22. They could not punish or reward their political supporters or opponents at
the polls by voting, in the way that other groups could, and because they lacked this
fundamental political power, their right to vote was an easy sacrifice. “Thus it is
necessary for the people of color to keep up an incessant begging o f their rulers to
legislate in their behalf,” angrily wrote Joseph Willson, a respected member of the
city’s black community, “and with what effect is well known to all.”175
By denying blacks the right to vote along with the rest o f the nation on
Election Day, white Pennsylvanians were essentially denying them the status of full
moral agents. John Joseph Gumey, a British Quaker, quoted a story that made the
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rounds in Philadelphia in the period following the disfranchisement. “I was told that a
white boy was observed taking seizing the marbles o f a coloured boy in one of the
streets, with the words, ‘You have no rights.'”176 Whether the story is true or not, it
reflects a belief among the city’s population that in losing the legal right to vote,
blacks had lost their claim to count in American society.
Yet while the law legally barred black Philadelphians from Election Day, this
did not settle the matter. In fact, black citizens arguably were more publicly visible
following the change than before it. In the late afternoon of the Presidential Election
Day of 1840, a group of young boys and men hauling a small rolling ship containing
burning hogshead barrels passed the Mother Bethel AME church on sixth street.
There, they received some “strange indignity, which passion could not brook,” coming
from some men inside. A fight between blacks and whites ensued. The white party
then left, only to return later and begin pelting the church with rocks.177 More dramatic
were the infamous California House riots of 1849. On the General Election of that
year, a street gang known as the “Killers,” hired to protect Democratic voters at some
of the polls, moved on from their Election Day duties to the California House Hotel on
South Street, which was owned and operated by a mixed race couple. At the bar, they
met up with some revelers from the Moymensing neighbor and other parts of the city,
then proceeded to attack the mulatto owner and some of the bar’s clientele. They also
lit a fire to the building, which spread to the surrounding houses (a fire company
attempting to put out the fire was beaten off by a mob.) After this, the gang began to
move through the neighborhood and began “hunting nigs”—that is, looking for any
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black body they could find to beat. More fires were lit and more riots occurred the
next day, and eventually the militia were called in, and a cannon brought forth to clear
the streets. Estimates ranged from three to four men killed, and 25 wounded seriously
enough to go to the hospital.178
The celebration of Election Day was a performance o f the nation: it declared
who was to qualify as an American, and who was not. It helped give shape to a
communal identity. But in order for it to do this, Americans needed to make the lines
of membership clear, and that in turn required a certain level o f violence to hold them
fast. Fights between blacks and whites in the streets of Philadelphia on Election Day,
or fights between Nativist and immigrant voters, were not simply the momentary
eruptions arising from the tensions that came from living in a crowded, overextended
urban environment of the 1830s. They were physical struggles over who would be
included in the performance of the nation, and who would be left out.
In the 18th century, a citizen could be defined through his economic status.
This rationale was gradually disappearing in the 19th century however, as economic
barriers to voting fell. A new form o f exclusion was hit upon: the racial difference.
Given both their ambiguous relationship to the nation and their general lack of
economic or political power, it was inevitable that Election Day would end up
defining Negroes as being outside the boundaries of the nation.179 If the right to vote
was no longer a way to distinguish the dependable landowner from the servant or the
transient, it at least served as a way to distinguish the true member of the nation—the
white man—from his black counterpart. The reason the black farmers of Bucks county
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created such an uproar in the fall o f 1837 is that they threatened the lines o f the nation
that white America’s Election Day was working so hard to define.

Conclusion:
The movement of Philadelphia’s population on a Presidential Election Day
mirrored the movement of the country as a whole; it enacted at the physical, civic
level what was happening at the imaginative, national level. As the large bell in the
State House pealed, the voter made his way to the polls, from the various parts o f the
city into the center of the polity, congregating there with the rest of his fellow citizens,
many o f whom differed from him in terms of class, religion, ethnic background, or
political belief. What the presidential vote did to the city, it was doing to the nation;
pulling together disparate geographic and tribal groups and binding them up into a
whole. Journalists helped to link this city-wide celebration to a national one through a
central mediated space, bringing voting results, reports of the day, and political
rhetoric together on the pages o f the newspapers.
In the city center, the Election Day participant could literally see the nation
parade before him. He could watch the good ship United States as it rolled past him on
its wheels. He could see the hickory sticks waving in the air, watch boys pulling tubs
covered with flags. He could follow the transparencies of national leaders move past
him with the marching bands. The arguments over national banks, currency, political
manipulations would have been difficult for many to follow. Easier to understand
would have been the cajoling and disputes between neighbors on the election grounds.
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The fight over paper money or the development of a national infrastructure,
transformed into a drunken brawl between two men in front of the polling window, is
a fight made solid and concrete. It is the political body given an actual, as opposed to a
metaphorical, existence.
On Election Day, a man could see what sort of people supported the
Democracy, or the Whigs, or the Anti-Masons, could see with whom he fit. Partisans
from both sides gave elaborate explanations as to why the victory of the one party
would lead to general wealth and prosperity, the victory of their opponents to national
ruination. These sorts of predictions would take time to come to an affect, if they ever
did. For the men who bet on Jackson or Harrison in the Stock Exchange or in the
taverns or in the insurance brokerages, on the other hand, Election Day brought
immediate knowledge. They knew precisely how the victory or loss affected their
immediate financial condition. They could see the money change hands. The
celebrations of teenagers dragging boats and blazing tar barrels through the street or
dancing around a bonfire, or bands blaring, or men cheering as they heard the first
returns—these were likewise an embodied celebration of democracy, much different
from the sober, reverent descriptions o f the vote that appeared in the popular press.
What is especially important to understand is that this performance was not simply a
“symbolic” reflection of the “actual” politics that were going on at the time. The
politics that took place on Election Day was as real as at any other time or place: a
black eye from a fight, a lost bet, a scar from a fire, were all real events, real effects o f
the election battle. Election Day in Philadelphia during the first half of the 19th century
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allowed citizens to see what American democracy was, on the ground, in front of their
very eyes.
This ability to marie the public, to express through the actions o f the citizens
themselves, and to integrate that public into a larger national public, was not what
distinguished the antebellum Election Day from the Federalist one. Nor was its
paradoxical character, its ability to celebrate contrasting ideological concepts, such as
party and nation. Where the two events differed was, first of all, in terms of
elaboration. Philadelphians of the 1800s simply had more symbolic forms and a
greater number of conventional practices at their disposal in order to create an image
of politics and the nation on that day—betting, the use o f fire, political theater, the
development of the militia parade, the transparencies. The development of
communication technologies, especially the telegraph, brought the acts of
Philadelphians and other Americans into closer contact.
The key to this elaborate performance of the nation was the party. It was the
party that provided the rationale and the provocation and pretty often the means for
everything else that took place on Election Day. It was the institution of the party that
provided the voter with the political identity that he enacted through voting, and
through celebrating the vote, the party that created a common identity for celebrants in
Philadelphia and those throughout the country. Through use o f the party organization,
party leaders were able to draw the individual partisan into a larger web of likeminded men, which spanned not simply a ward or city but the entire nation.180
Through voting and through the other forms of partisan practice that took place on
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Election Day like political theater, the display of political symbols like log cabins and
hickory sticks, and the Election night parade, the Philadelphia voter was able to link
the abstract notions of state and political program to his own world and his own
efforts. It was the party that controlled the newspaper, and the partisan rhetoric that
emanated from it. It was also the party that worked on the prejudices and differences
within the civic body for its own purposes, and thus provided Election Day with much
of the bitterness and violence that it engendered. Election Day was not simply a
performance of national identity but a battle over national identity: it expressed the
disagreements over who ought and ought not to be included in that public. It provoked
debate over what that public was and how it ought to behave, and the standards that
should define it, especially in the pages of non-partisan papers like the Public Ledger
and the Bulletin.
This gets us to another difference between the Federalist and the Jacksonian
Election Day, which was a difference in size, and hence in manageability. There were
simply a lot more bodies on the Election grounds in 1840 than there had been in 1796.
This made it more difficult for their political managers to control them. The party
organization helped in this: it tried to steer the voters in the right place and have them
make the right choices. But that same organization sometimes got away from its
handlers. The committees of surveillance, whose responsibility it was to serve as the
party’s eyes and voice on the Election ground, were often directly responsible for
getting involved in fights. Moreover, in drawing on the civic strains among class and
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ethnicity to call the voters to arms, partisan rhetoric risked stirring them up too much,
and causing a riot.
The image of the public that was thus communicated on the day was a
resolutely democratic one, so much so, in fact, that it alarmed men like Sidney Fisher,
and made even the editors the popular press a little nervous. At the same time, this was
an image of paradoxical democracy. Certain groups were excluded from even the
pretence of participating. Although women had a place in the Electoral politics of the
age, the violent character of the day itself, combined with contemporary beliefs about
feminine fragility, ensured that they would be excluded from voting on the State
House grounds. Black Philadelphians were excluded more directly, through the use of
Constitutional changes. Election Day was not simply the celebration of the common
man; it was the celebration o f his superiority to other members of the public, as well.
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Chapter Six:
Election Day in the Gilded Age
Election Day in the so-called Gilded Age of America was a strange, gaudy, and
passionate affair. Although it shared in some of the general tendencies of the age—a
wonderment o f technology, a strutting self-promotion, a seedy corruption caked over
with ostentatious display—Election Day was also a distinctive moment in the life of a
northern city like Philadelphia. One might say that it was the antebellum Election Day
grown up—a more complicated event than the tribal clashes of the Jacksonian era. The
problem of managing Election Day and its message was, if anything, more acute now
than it had been in the earlier part of the century. In addition to an ever-increasing
population, and the tensions brought upon by the war, two new groups began to
publicly dispute the definition o f the public that Election Day had created. The first
challenge came from the black residents of the city, who gained the vote in 1870. The
second came from the growing number of women who began to use the Election Day
performance as a public stage for suffragette demands. There was also the continuing
problem of violence, the growing outrage over voting corruption, and the role of
patronage in the political system.
In a recent paper, Peter Simonson and Carolyn Marvin argue that the attempt
to transform the election rituals o f nineteenth century into more literate forms, and the
creation of a more textualized notion of the voter and the citizen, was due to the desire
among reformers to wrest control o f these rituals messages from the popular crowds
that celebrated them.1 What I wish to highlight in this argument is the need for the
political elite to control or manage the popular electoral message, since in this chapter,
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I frame the question as one about how two different groups attempted to come up with
strategies for doing that. The first, the city and the state’s political leadership,
attempted to control the Election Day performance through building upon the efforts
o f the antebellum party. These men began to develop a sophisticated set of political
tools and a large network—a political machine—in order to get the individual voter to
behave as they wanted him too. This meant using patronage and other forms of
economic or social coercion, and the development of earlier practices and techniques,
that enlisted the citizen in a series of events designed to create a partisan loyalty on the
day of the vote. But a great deal of the machine’s work was carried out on Election
Day itself: part of this was simply organization, distributing tickets and keeping a
partisan presence at polls, part of it also consisted o f what the opponents of party
considered rank corruption. Cries of Election Day bribery and illegal voting grew ever
louder as the century wore on, not all of it coming from partisan opponents but from a
group of reform-minded intellectuals, academics, and journalists.
This latter group also attempted to control the Election Day crowd, only for
different purposes and with different means. The reformist mugwump looked with
horror upon Election Day that the party boss had created, and decided to go after what
he saw was one of the root causes of a corrupt American political system, which was a
corrupt system of voting. Reformers tried using the mass media to spread their gospel
of political reform, although this generally proved unsuccessful. However, the
movement did manage to introduce a major change in the Election Day performance
that would have a significant effect: the Australian ballot. This state-printed, secret
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ballot did not do away with the urban machine, but it did change the social
construction of what the vote meant, and shifted the balance of political power.
The city newspaper was where discourse o f party and reform met. Although
the city’s newspapers were still generally tied to party, they also promoted reformist
attacks on the machine, and tried to put forward the model of the independent voter
that mugwumps wished to see on the election grounds. And, as the newspapers grew
larger, and their role as commercial enterprises became more central to their identities,
they increasingly began to develop a series of practices devoted not so much to the
partisan audience but to a larger public. This meant that on Election night,
Philadelphia’s newspapers competed with one another to present the most impressive
returns possible. This Election night spectacular worked to soften the lines of
partisanship that the campaign had drawn, as did other practices, like the Election Day
bet. By the turn of the century, the city’s Election Day was a composite of a set of
traditions that helped to publicly mark it off from the rest o f the year. Already in place,
however, were changes that would make future Election Days much less of a
spectacular civic holiday, much more what the reformist mugwumps envisioned it
should look like.

Election Day and the machine:
The “bossism” that marked politics in the Gilded Age was nowhere more
evident than in the state o f Pennsylvania, and especially in its largest city, which
gained a certain national notoriety when Lincoln Steffens called it the “most corrupt
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and most contented” city in the countiy, a city that even other cities could point to as,
“the worst-governed city in the country.”2 In his examination of American politics,
James Bryce used the Philadelphia “Gas Ring” as an exemplary instance of urban
political fraudulence in the United States, and portrayed its lead member, James
McManes, as a typical boss in both style and personality.3 McManes, who controlled a
great deal o f civic patronage from an unelected position on the city’s gas company,
was also the model for a well-known satire of the period, Rufus Shapley’s Solid fo r
Mulhooly.4
And yet it would be a mistake to think that the prevalence o f bossism in
Philadelphia during the Gilded Age meant that any one man was able to control the
city’s politics. The image of one single, over-arching political machine that controlled
the whole o f city politics was a 20th century phenomenon in Philadelphia, not a 19th
century one. Republicans not only had to deal with powerful Democrats like Squire
McMullen, virtually untouchable in his home Fourth Ward, or reformers like
Alexander McClure. Like the early century Jeffersonians, they were constantly
fighting among themselves. Sometimes, city leaders like Stokely or McManes would
team up with the state machine to fight one another, or they might join forces with the
Democrats. Alliances constantly shifted as various leaders battled each other in order
to keep any one man from obtaining hegemony over the city’s government and
patronage machine.5 The Election Day contest did not disappear with the rise of the
combine.
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Election Day in the Gilded Age o f the boss did have a distinctive style, a style
that was both the result of machine politics, and helped produce the machine. To see
how it worked, we can turn to the investigation of an 1872 election held to fill George
Connell’s seat in the state senate after Connell’s death. The main contestants were the
regular Republican nominee, Henry W. Gray, and McClure, a journalist and long-time
Republican stalwart turned reformer. McClure was against the re-election of President
Grant (whose administration was widely perceived to be a den o f corruption) and
favored a systematic restructuring of the state government. For the purposes of
defeating Gray, he had entered into an alliance with the city’s Democratic party. When
he lost the election to Gray, McClure and several of his legislative allies called for an
investigation into its voting procedures.6
It will come as no surprise to find out that the committee did indeed find
widespread corruption in the taking of the vote. Debates over voting fraud in 19th
century politics rarely extend to arguments over whether corruption existed, only
about its extent, and whether or not bribery and other fraudulent practices can, in and
of themselves, explain the relatively high rates of voter participation.7 In the case of
the McClure-Gray by-election, strong evidence was presented o f fraudulent voting—
both in terms of men voting multiple times, and so-called “personation,” or voting in
another man’s name. The committee also heard evidence that tended to support the
charge of ballot tampering by Election officials.8
This was not the only matter on which the performance described failed to
meet the quasi-religious behavior outlined by, say, the Public Ledger's editors of the
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1830s. A number of the witnesses, for example, could not recall for whom it was that
they voted. This was sometimes, but not always, because they were drunk; a few
simply did not seem to think the actual name o f the candidate was all that important.
The difficulty here cannot be explained away by the numerous offices on a printed
ticket. These men were voting for only a single man to fill Connell’s seat. Rather, it
suggests that these voters were voting either on blind party faith, or that they were
voting the way someone had told (and perhaps paid) them to vote.9
For the purposes o f the senate inquiry, however, voter recall was not essential
to tracking the number o f votes cast for each candidate. The committee also had on
hand party workers, who were well able to testify the extent of their party’s support at
the poll.10 This indicates another feature of the era’s vote, the near total lack of privacy
about the voter’s choice. Election Day practices made it relatively easy for observers
to know how a citizen had voted. Prior to the state-printed Australian style ballot,
political parties had printed their own slates. Each ballot would have the names o f a
single set of candidates: the party’s nominees. In order to vote, a voter had to find a
ticket captain or hawker, usually identified by a badge or sign on his body. The tickets
themselves would also generally have some sort o f identification, either by color,
symbol—an eagle or a flag, for example—or simply the party’s name.11 The common
practice was for the voter to walk up to the captain in the area immediately in front of
the polling booth, obtain a ticket, and then walk to the window to vote.12 Since the
ward committee might have two or three representatives at the booth—a ticket
hawker, a window observer, and perhaps also a person behind the window to keep
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watch on the voting process—the voter could easily be tracked from the moment he
picked up the ticket until he deposited it. This method of identification helped party
workers track the votes up to the moment when they were deposited in the ballot box.
It also greatly aided fraudulent practices such as bribery, since the party captain could
be almost certain that any voter paid for his vote had in fact voted the correct way.
Registration books at the polling booth were marked when each man voted, so the
choice of slate could be further matched with a specific name. The vote, in short, was
a public declaration of a voter’s loyalties. Papers would even occasionally announce
the choices of individual voters in their pages.13
At the same time, this method of ticket distribution allowed for the other party
to play tricks on the unwary voter. On Election Day, newspapers often warned their
partisan readers to carefully examine their tickets, since the opposition was about the
town passing off Democratic tickets marked as Republican, or vice versa. Republican
circulars landing on people’s doorsteps the night before the vote actually contained a
largely Democratic slate, the Inquirer warned.14 Other rumors floated by the press had
it that certain tickets contained only some of the party’s candidates, usually those at
the top of the ticket, with candidates from the other side listed below that.15 One 1880
story described ballots with oiled paper covering the true slate o f names with a
different slate. Wet, a Republican slate would show on the ballot, and so be delivered
unsuspectingly into the ballot box by loyal Republican voters. Dry, the oil paper
would fall off the ballot, to reveal a different, opposition slate, which would be the one
counted.16
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Granted that the story may be more colorful than plausible, it was nevertheless
the case generally that these sorts of tricks were just one of a number of scheduling
puzzles that the organization needed to solve on Election Day. Whatever one might
think of the political implications of the late nineteenth century Election Day, its
technical achievement is impressive. Getting the right ballot to the right voters, and
making certain that they put that ballot in the box, required a great deal of hard work
and intellectual acumen.17 The local Philadelphia politician needed to keep track of
how and where tickets were being distributed, keep an ear to the ground about rumors
of deals that ward or division leaders might have cut with another faction or a member
of the opposition, worry about a candidate on the regular slate being “knifed” (ie.,
keeping the name o f a regularly nominated candidate out of the ticket), or of the
opposition efforts to keep one’s own partisan away from the polls.18 The party ticket
placed a great deal o f responsibility on the shoulders of the political workers. What it
demanded of the voter was something different—loyalty and acknowledgement of the
political hierarchy’s general reliability in terms o f guidance on such matters. This was
not at all the message that the Machine’s opponents wished Election Day to send to
the public.

The alternative model: the mugwump’s independent voter
An alternative performance to the loyal machine voter was provided by the socalled “vest-pocket” or “independent” voters. These were men who brought their own
tickets to the election ground, or took party tickets back to their homes and offices and
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examined them carefully before bringing them back out to the grounds and voting.
Sometimes they would even alter the names on the ticket, in order to vote for someone
other than the party candidate, by “scratching” a name off the ballot and writing-in one
of their own choosing, or by “splitting” their ticket, that is, combining tickets, and
names, from two different parties in order to form their own slate.19
In terms of numbers, the independent voter was probably not very important
for most of this period; he almost certainly was not as much of a concern for the ward
captain as, say, getting the tickets printed and out to the polling booths the morning o f
Election Day.20 All the same, he had a high public profile, since he was a hero to the
reforming journalists and the “mugwumps” who wanted to overthrow the rings and
party bosses: the defender of liberty, reason, and democracy. “The independent voters
are composed of those who do their own thinking, who read the newspapers
thoughtfully,” wrote The Philadelphia Inquirer.2I Independent voters did the most
effective work of the campaign by appreciating the full value of citizenship, by
attending to issues rather than carrying torches and attending mass meetings. They
could always be depended upon to head to the polls early and then go about their
business calmly. They had the courage of their convictions. (The Inquirer also added
that of course, in 1880, all independent voters were Republicans, because they knew
that the policies of the Democratic party would lead Pennsylvania and the country into
ruin.)22
The independent voter was, in short, very much o f the class that the reforming
editors and writers of the urban press probably imagined themselves to be. This group
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o f men was led by East Coast intellectuals like E.L. Godkin, Carl Shurz, and Horace
Greeley. Although many, like Greeley, had been instrumental in the founding of the
Republican party in the 1850s, they became increasingly disenchanted with that party
as the Grant administration dropped even deeper into corruption, and dismayed at the
prominent role played by political pragmatists like James G. Blaine and Chester
Arthur.24 In 1872, many of these “mugwumps” supported Greeley’s presidential run
under the Independent Republican banner. Their Republican loyalties in general were
suspect; they tended to favor reformist Democrats like Samuel Tilden over their
party’s own candidates. Reform candidates often came from the same backgrounds as
the mugwumps themselves, upper or upper-middle class families, Ivy League colleges
or other prestigious colleges and universities. They were men educated to be leaders,
socialized in the assumption that they had both the right and the duty to guide the
country.25 It was a right and duty that the urban machines had largely taken away from
them. Prior to the 1840s, nearly all of Philadelphia’s mayors had come from the
economic and social elite of the city; after that time, almost none of them did. Men
like Stokely, Fox, and McManes were fighters up from the street. They had little time
for the aristocratic ideals of the reformers.26
Like earlier critics o f Election Day, the mugwumps were often dismayed over
democracy as it actually fell out on the day of the vote. They decried the pervasive
corruption and voting fraud.27 They were suspicious o f the more spectacular forms of
party activity like parades or marching bands.28 They also felt that the quality of the
performers themselves was highly unsatisfactory, arguing that many voters were
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simply too ignorant or too morally debased to be relied upon to treat the vote with the
respect it deserved.29 Immigrants in particular were suspect. “This country never
committed a more fatal mistake than in making its naturalization laws so that the
immense immigration horn foreign countries could, after a brief sojourn, exercise the
right of suffrage,” wrote author J.T. Headley:
To ask men, the greater part of whom could neither read nor write, who
were ignorant of the first principles o f true civil liberty, who could be
bought and could like sheep in the shambles, to assist us in founding a
model republic, was a folly without parallel in the history of the world,
and one of which we have not yet begun to pay the full penalty.30
As a solution to the problem of uneducated or unprepared voters, reformers suggested
a whole host of new restrictions to keep these men from the polls, including longer
residency requirements (some suggested a residency in the United States o f 20 years)
and literacy tests. The latter were one o f the main tools by which Southern Democrats
kept Negro voters from the polls. In Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, however, the
more important source of disenfranchisement o f voters was residency requirements.31
The issue was, in part, a continuation o f a problem that had dogged Election
Day almost from the birth of Republic. Americans continually struggled among
themselves over how voters ought to behave at the polls—whether they should vote on
the basis of partisan passions, or act independently of outside influences. If the
mugwumps’ independent voter—sober, intelligent, civic-minded, disinterested—was
the ancestor of the 20th century’s rational, informed citizen, he was also a descendent
of the antiparty man of the federalist era, or the responsible democrat lauded by the
Public Ledger in the 1830s. There had always been a tension in the popular political
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culture about what exactly the voter owed to the group—the party, or the tribe that he
belonged to—and what he owed his own conscience. The independent voter was yet
another instance of this, and the confusion surrounding him in the pages o f a partisan
paper like the Inquirer or the North American—independent voters did not listen to
the siren call of party, yet were all Republicans—was symptomatic o f that larger
struggle.
What is perhaps most instructive about the confusion over the independent
voter, the confusion over party, was that even the rings and the bosses used anti-party
rhetoric at times. Because of the resonance the image of the independent voter had in
the political culture, if was helpful for any and everyone to put themselves forward as
the party of the independent man. So that readers of the Election Day edition of the
Republican-dominated Inquirer in 1896 would have seen a large cartoon of an
anguished-looking William Penn, pointing to the liberty and swearing to voters that
“No Boss shall rule this town!” Front page stories surrounding the cartoon attacked
David Martin, a well-known Republican politician and wire-puller, and trumpeted a
reformist movement within the Republican party that was running slate opposed to
Martin’s candidate for sheriff.32 On an inside page, the paper printed a full-scale
replica of the ticket that city voters would see that day, and instructions on how to vote
the “Citizen’s For McKinley” ticket, rather than the regular Republican ticket.
Although the paper contained some attacks on its traditional enemies, the Democrats,
the fight, at least as waged in the media, was largely overshadowed by the assault on
rings and bosses.33
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It is not surprising that reformers would be running a candidate against
someone like Martin, a long-time party hack. This they did regularly during the late
1800s and early 1900s, generally with little or no success.34 The strange piece of the
whole affair is that the leader of the movement in this case would have been someone
like Israel Durham, a classic machine boss in the William Plunkett mode who once
cracked, when asked about the outcome of a Presidential election, “what do I care, as
long as I carry my ward?”35 Durham’s efforts in this instance were taken less on behalf
of reform than at the request of Matthew Quay, the powerful boss of the state party
who had obtained the nickname “kingmaker” for his role in electing presidents in the
late 19th century. Quay had become suspicious of Martin’s growing independence
from state party control. When Martin decided to run his own candidates through in
the 1896 primaries, the Boss had ordered loyal lieutenants like Durham to mount an
opposing campaign. Durham’s efforts were successful, Martin was crushed, and Quay
would no longer have to fear revolts in the city ranks. The near-complete control of
the city by the Republican machine in fact probably started from this “reformist”
victory.36
Something more than simple hypocrisy was going on in the Inquirer's call for
reform. Whatever the motivation may have been, its attacks on party and political
hierarchy had an evident resonance in the culture. Political reform was in the air—the
machine’s decision to use the reformer’s rhetoric for its purpose was evidence that it
understood that. In the case of Philadelphia city politics, the Durham organization was
able to use the image of the honest, independent electorate overturning the boss to
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establish its control. But in so doing, it simply continued an ongoing process, begun
by the mugwumps, of reconfiguring Election Day. These two groups, machine
politicians and reformers, would continue to battle for control over the meaning o f the
Election Day performance. The question is, why exactly was the control of the
population such an important issue? The answer to that lies not in the behavior or
motivations o f the political elite, but in the performance of the public itself.

The Election Day performers: the battle for the public
On October 10, 1871, the date of Philadelphia's General Election, in the late
afternoon, prominent city merchant Samuel P. Wanamaker saw a man he later
identified as Octavius V. Catto step off the sidewalk and begin running down the 800
block of South Street, as another man ran after him, firing a pistol at his back.37 That
Wanamaker would have recognized the 33-year-old black educator is not surprising.
The two probably knew each other through their mutual political interests—both were
prominent members of the Republican Party. Or Wanamaker may have recognized the
younger man simply by notoriety alone. Catto had already made a name for himself in
the city as politician, civil rights activist, and athlete. He was the prime mover behind
a city- wide boycott in the late 1860s protesting the treatment of colored citizens in
Philadelphia’s public transportation system, and the first black man to become a
member of the Franklin Institute, a group of eminent scientists and other intellectuals
in Philadelphia.38
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This afternoon, however, Catto was in the sort of trouble for which his civic
reputation was o f not much use. The assailant’s first shot missed; he fired twice more.
Catto whirled around, mortally wounded, and threw up his hands. Wanamaker,
watching the whole scene from a cable car, jumped to the street and yelled out for
someone to stop the shooter, who ran back into the crowd, up South, onto Ninth
Street, and then went into a tavern at Ninth and Bainbridge. Tavern patrons noted the
murderer running out through the bar and disappearing into a back yard. Later it would
be reported that two city policemen conveniently left the tavern at about the same time
that the shooter ran into it, failing to arrest or even stop the man.39
Octavius Catto was the most prestigious victim of Election Day, 1871, but not
the only one. Earlier in the day, another Negro, Isaac Chase, was knocked down
during a melee and his head crushed with a hatchet. A third died from injuries
sustained during a police beating, the result o f a political dispute, the Sunday before.
Another may have been killed during a huge riot in the Fifth Ward between whites and
blacks that took place, on and off, for most of the day.40 There were other incidents.
Daniel Redding, a First Ward voter who objected to some irregularities in that ward,
was set upon by a gang of ruffians, beaten with a blackjack and cut with a knife. A
reporter for the Philadelphia Press was badly beaten and left in the street, and at least
two young boys suffered serious injuries. James Nixon, 14, was shot in the back on
Election evening. Frank Cannon, 10, was shot in the neck. Both boys were hurt while
making bonfires in the street.41 The day after the election, a Democratic election
inspector was killed, purportedly for his work at the polls. Even by the standards of
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nineteenth century political culture, the 1871 Election was a remarkably dangerous

Tensions between black and white mobs had been stoked that morning when
black voters accused the police and election officials o f forcing them to give up their
places in the voting lines to whites.43 An appearance by the mayor and an influx of
police calmed things for a time, but almost immediately after the mayor left the scene
beatings started. Stories began to circulate among the black community about police
clubbing Negro voters; an Election Day judge issued a warrant for the arrest o f one
officer, Lieutenant Haggerty. By late morning, the mixture of liquor, excited crowds,
rumors of black men being shot at the polls, and imported white toughs from other city
wards, ignited a full-scale riot.44 A report from The Inquirer gives a flavor o f the
scene:
The policemen, in their efforts to make arrests, fell out of line and
became mixed up with the populace, while white and black were
jammed in together pell-mell and a free fight raged fiercely for the
distance of a square. The house tops were crowded and from many of
these on St. Mary street brickbats came crushing down on the heads of
the multitude. In the streets paving stones and brickbats were flying in
all directions and from some of the houses occasionally a stray bullet
would come...A gloomy sullen spirit of hatred seemed to animate the
participants, and each echoing pistol shot only increased the Nemesis
like fury that animated the vast throng.
By the time police had settled the crowd down several hours later, the reporter wrote,
“men might be seen in all directions with bandaged heads and bullet-tom clothing,
seeking refuge in homes and narrow alleys.” About forty men were admitted to nearby
Pennsylvania Hospital as a result of the riot.43
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Philadelphia’s politicians had been expecting some level of violence. This was
only the second time in the city’s history that large numbers o f Negros had gone to the
polls. The year before, in 1870, black voters had caught white citizens somewhat off
guard, lining up at the polls at four in the morning and voting early, thereby mostly
avoiding flying bricks, or so-called “Irish Confetti,” and escaping largely without
injury.46 But the 1871 election was a more important occasion, as both mayor and city
council would be re-elected. Democratic forces, led by Mayor Daniel Fox, had been
gearing up for the battle for some time. Black voters could be expected to
overwhelmingly support Fox’s Republican opposition, and the mayor set in motion
everything at his disposal, including the city’s police force, to limit the effectiveness
of blacks, and Republicans generally, at the polls.47
As in the antebellum era, the literary vitriol, the accusations o f manipulation,
bribery, physical intimidation, and outright theft of the election fit easily with the
physical violence and brutality found in many Philadelphia elections. Some examples:
in the state elections of 1864, a group of celebrating soldiers and Republican partisans
passed by a saloon, singing “Honest old Abe.” A shot from the bar wounded two
children; in response the crowd proceeded to tear apart the building.48 In 1872, a fight
between whites and blacks in the Seventh Ward required the calling in of troops. The
October Election Day of 1868 alone saw the deaths of six men. By 1899, Israel Loat
attempted to defend himself from a charge of stabbing by claiming that “it was only an
election fight.” It was a reasonable (but ultimately unsuccessful) defense.49
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The dividing line between street-level gangs and political groups was often
difficult to discern in 19th century Philadelphia. Gangs, fire companies—the city’s fire
fighting efforts were privatized for much o f the century—religious groups and
political parties, often linked through informal or semi-formal channels, met and
fought in the street on Election Days. James McManes, boss of the infamous “Gas
Ring,” had been in a gang as a young man. Two other important politicians in
Philadelphia’s post-war scene, Mayor William Stokely and William “Squire”
McMullen, the Democratic dictator of the city’s working-class Fourth Ward, had been
members of fire-hose companies, which were often affiliated to gangs or essentially
gangs themselves. McMullen’s political reputation in fact grew out of the respect he
had garnered as a young thug, and he was implicated in several murders o f Nativist
partisans prior to achieving fame as a war hero.50 Men like these used their ties to
these local groups to develop a base of political support that they then transferred into
broader political power, but that power depended on the a willingness to use violence,
and a skilled knowledge of when and where to apply it.
A great deal o f what drove the street battles, as always, was the whole raft of
social divisions that were part and parcel o f American society in the nineteenth
century, and which politicians played upon for pragmatic electoral ends. The Civil
War, while fought for the union of the country, did not in the slightest change this
aspect of Election Day. If anything, fights over who got included and who got left out
of the political equation were more serious now, and more complicated. In 1870, the
United States Congress adopted the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution. The
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amendment, which was primarily directed toward black American voters, had a
greater effect on voting in the northern states, many o f whom continued to restrict the
franchise to white males, than the southern states. The latter had already been
required, under the terms of the surrender, to give black males the right to vote.
Pennsylvania was thus one of the last states in the union to allow blacks to legally go
to the polls on Election Day. This change added one more participant in the Election
Day battle over identity.51
The Age, one of the main Democratic newspapers in the city, called the ballot
the freeman’s “distinctive badge of citizenship,” adding that it was “political
cowardice not to vote. It is a crime against the state, the nation.”52 Election Day battles
were battles about who would count. Religion, class, political affiliation, and now
race: all o f these elements of public identity were used as markers for Election Day
performers. The Republican Party, the party of abolitionism and equal rights, would be
the party o f black America for the rest of the 19th century and the first decades of the
20th, just as the Democracy was the party of the white working man.53 Throughout this
period, Republican papers like the Inquirer would use Democrats’ racism to drum up
support for Republicans at the polls.54 But blacks, like the rest of the political body,
looked to the Republicans for more than moral reaffirmation. In an age in which
partisan politics, even more than today, were the key to jobs and business contracts,
blacks voters expected to receive some tangible benefit from their loyalty.55
In fact, like the rest of the northern Negro population, black Philadelphia—
with the possible exception of the ward leaders of black districts—generally received
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little to show for its loyalty on Election Day.56 Black Philadelphians could not even
depend on city hall to protect the right o f black suffrage. They had to fight in the
streets of the city on Election Day to protect their status of citizenship, since by and
large they could not expect help from the police or the sheriff when white voters
attempted to keep them from the polls. Tensions were especially high in and around
poorer white districts like McMullen’s Fourth Ward, often known as the “bloody
Fourth,” and the neighboring, largely black, Seventh Ward. Competing for jobs and
living space, working class whites and blacks needed very little to set them off on
Election Day.57
The United States was then, as it is now, a country in which race—increasingly
defined as skin color—constituted a major social fault line. The celebration of politics
in that society consequently highlighted the division. But blacks were not the only
group whose role on Election Day was problematic during this period. In Republican
Philadelphia, Democrats often found their citizenship questioned by popular
newspapers like The North American or The Inquirer. The Democracy’s prewar
sympathy toward slavery and the South generally led to constant accusations of
treason on and about Election Day. In its 1864 call for Republicans to come out to the
polls, The Inquirer urged them to “VINDICATE THE WAR DEAD.” The blood of
brothers and sons now in their graves would cry out in anguish if the Republicans
were to fail. “This is the great battle day between the adherents of liberty and the
apologizers and sympathizers with treason,” the paper charged.58 The North American
compared voters to knights, called upon voters to “do something for the cause.”59 The
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day after the election,

newspapers trumpeted “VICTORY!

THE

UNION

TRIUMPHANT!! The Northern Rebels Sent Whirling.” The Election was one in a list
of, by now, constant Union successes on the battlefields of the nation.60
Lincoln’s assassination gave even more ideological fuel for the Democrats’
opponents. Republicans would continue to wave the “bloody shirt” on Election Day
for the next 25 years. Democratic politicians consisted of rebel generals, Republicans
argued, and loyal Americans would make certain that the “great Republican party
which saved the country in war is to control it in peace.”61 In 1888, a GOP party
chairman was quoted on Election Day saying that what Lincoln, Grant, Hayes,
Garfield, Arthur, and Harrison fought for, “we contest and struggle for today.”62 That
same year, a poem on “New York City’s Elect” (ie., Tammany Hall) stressed the
racism o f northern Democrats and alluded to the time when “darkies from lamp posts
were strung by a halter.”63 Especially damning to Republicans was the constant
support o f the rebel “solid south” on Election Day. The perverse refusal o f southerners
to accept defeat, and to continue in their wicked, racist, and treasonous attitudes, was
simply more evidence of Democratic perfidy and its essential anti-Americanism. The
truth was confirmed every four years for Philadelphians when returns recreated the
map of the political nation, with the South, again and again, solid for the Democrats.64
References to rebellion and treason only fell away with Bryan’s campaigns, when
Republicans began to harp on Democrats’ appeal to class hatreds and the presidential
candidate’s anarchism for their rhetorical appeals.65
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Of course, attacks on the opposition did not only come from one side. Battle
imagery, always an element of Election Day rhetoric, was especially popular in
electoral politics after the bitterness engendered by the Civil War. Mass media from
both major parties hyped political contests. If Democrats were rebels, then
Republicans, in the words of a Democratic paper like The Age, were despots, cheaters,
and Know Nothing bigots. On Election Day, 1868, The Age called on all white
freeman to come to the aid of the country. It headlined the attempted arrest of a city
Democrat the day before the election as an “attempted kidnapping.”66 Following
Republican successes at the polls, the same paper announced the “TRIUMPH OF
FRAUD,” the victory o f bribery and federal patronage.67 At least around Election Day,
the word “republican” was rarely found in the pages of The Age. Instead, the other side
was referred to as the “Radicals,” no doubt to align Philadelphia’s professional,
conservative political class with the ideological puritanism o f the Radical
Republicans.68
Often, the best way to channel partisan vitriol was through the use of ethnic
parody and stereotype. Generally, the targets o f these attacks were those whose
membership in the nation was somehow in question. One of the favorite rhetorical
devices of the Republican press, as it had been for Whigs 30 years earlier, was the
stupid, drunken, dirty, mean-spirited and brutal Irishman, eager to sell his vote for a
glass o f beer or whiskey.69 Democrats went after blacks. On the Presidential Election
Day, 1860, Democratic partisans paraded a young man on a pole dressed to look like
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an ape in a suit, according to newspaper accounts. Some observers laughed, some
threw mud and other missiles. Eventually a fight erupted over the burlesque.70
At that same time that these racial, class, and sectional battles were being
fought, both on the streets and in print, a new challenge to the identity o f the Election
Day public was being raised. On the same day that Octavius Catto died, Carrie S.
Burnham and her lawyer, Damon Killgore, appeared at a Broad Street polling both. As
the vehicle drew up to the curb, the crowd of men gathered around the window parted
in order to allow Burnham access to the polls.
“Here is my vote, sir,” the suffragette said, and then handed a ticket (“pretty
well scratched,” according to the reporter) to the election judge, who refused to take it.
“Why not, sir?” snapped Burnham. “I am a citizen. I pay taxes. I am governed,
and I have a right to vote.” After a few more words, and a sheaf of papers produced by
Killgore which went quite ignored, the two reformers headed off to the election court.
There the lawyer and the suffragette continued to argue the case. The court refused to
overturn the poll judge’s decision, adding that the proper recourse in the case of a
legal vote being refused was to launch a prosecution against the election officers.71
The suffragettes’ Election Day performances relied on rhetoric and a confident
manner. Not all were able to pull it off with the aplomb of Burnham. For example, an
Inquirer story on the 1888 Election Day told of a neatly attired middle-aged women
who had wandered up to one of the polls in the city, intending to vote for the suffrage
candidate, Belva Lockwood.
She started bravely enough, but when she approached the window her modesty
got the better of her intentions. While the window book men had no intention
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of allowing the vote to go in they were gallant enough to inquire her name,
residence, and age. She started to answer, then paused, then blushed, and the
next moment turned on her heel and walked away as fast as she had come
without casting her vote for Mrs. Lockwood.72
The rough and ready Election Day of the post-Civil War era, like politics of the
age generally, was taken to be a man’s world. When the suffragette demand’s for the
vote could not be ignored, they were patronized. Writers in The Inquirer argued that
the fairer sex’s natural inclinations were enough to insure that the debate over
women’s role in Election Day would never be raised in earnest.73 By the turn of the
century, however, women were increasingly appearing in Election Day celebrations.
Once the new century started, stories appeared the members of the political party’s
women’s auxiliary preparing meals for the poll watchers and Election Day workers.74
Unlike the revolution of black America’s presence at the polls, women’s claim on
Election Day was an evolving state. First came an increased public appearance, and
then, only gradually, greater participation. By the 1910s, women were advocating
more directly for a greater political voice, handing out “suffragette” tickets to voters
on their way to polling stations.75
Blacks, women, the Irish, the emigrants, southerners: the picture of the nation
that was celebrated quadrennially on the first Tuesday in November was far more
inchoate than political organizers or reformers probably would have hoped. Images of
cohesion and consensus symbolized in the person of the successful candidate were
constantly being undercut by fights among various groups of malcontents. Election
Day was a struggle to somehow fit those pieces of the nation into a clear and
satisfying picture, coherent and harmonious. That some o f the groups did not
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necessarily want coherence and harmony, at least not on the terms o f the managers o f
the Election Day celebration, was a continual source of tension.

Election Day traditions:
Battles at the polls and on the street were one way that Philadelphians fought
out the image of the public that the Gilded Age election presented before them. That
was not a feature unique to Election Day. Riots were a part of nineteenth century life
generally. The day did have a number o f more distinctive traditions, however, through
which the city’s residents understood the tensions inherent in the day. Two of the most
important were the Election night bonfire, and the outlandish bet.
Although the Election night fire had a history going back to the late 1790s or
early 1800s, the specific practice of boys creating bonfires at street intersections
throughout the city, however, was somewhat more recent. Alexander Cummings first
noted the practice on the night of the 1852 Presidential Election, that is, the first
Election Day held away from the State House.76 From that moment on, the building o f
bonfires seems to have been taken as both a sort of duty and a right on the part o f the
younger residents o f the city.77 The fires were obviously dangerous: almost every
Election Day round-up would include a story o f some child being seriously wounded
in a fire, and the city outlawed the practice in the 1880s.78 They were also destructive.
For weeks before Election Day, city merchants needed to keep a watchful eye on any
piece of property that could possibly be taken as kindling. The brazenness of these
young pyromaniacs was impressive; on Election Day itself they were not above
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stealing wood openly from merchants if their stores o f fuel fell too low.79 However the
bonfires were rarely the subject of approbation among the adults. Newspapers rather
spoke of the majestic sight of the city lit up on the night of election, stoked by young
“patriots.” The bonfires seemed to have been taken as a sort of training ground for
future voters and democratic citizens.80
The activity o f the bonfire could take on an almost tribal feel, and injuries
came about as a result not only of accidents but deliberate intent. One year, a seven
year-old boy was stabbed and a 13 year-old shot following two separate fights around
bonfires in different parts o f the city (amazingly enough, both fights were reported to
have sprung from political arguments, which suggests just how deep political feeling
extended into the population at the time.)81
Bonfires were not the only instance where younger Philadelphians played
provocateur. It was boys who generally passed out the Salt Water Tickets the day after
the vote, or had a joke at the loser’s expense. In 1888, a group of young girls
sashsayed down the streets of Frankfort mocking Democrats in song: “Cleveland’s
dead/Thurman’s dying/Harrison’s elected/And there’s no use crying.”82 Following
Blaine’s defeat four years earlier, boys had hung out the windows of the Democratic
Americus club tearing up strips o f paper and yelling “bum this letter,” in reference to
an embarrassing instance of corruption that helped doom the Republican’s chances.
This in turn provoked a fight between bitter Republicans and gleeful Democrats, and
in fact younger men and teenage boys were often involved in instigating Election Day
rows. 83 Betwixt and between—not quite citizen, not quite non-citizen—teenagers
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were the Election Day tricksters. As they danced around the bonfire, celebrating the
day but not fully in it, barely under control, teenage boys reminded their elders of the
strange space they occupied on Election Day.
Betting on the outcome of the race was another custom that had a long history,
and contributed to the Election Day spectacle (or rather, the day-after spectacle).
Much of the horse-race style of reporting and manufactured polling, in fact, was
produced for bettors on the Presidential and other races. Despite its popularity, or
rather, because of it, the practice had always been a scourge in the eyes o f independent
journalists and other reformers. The main criticism raised against betting was that it
encouraged an interest in individual welfare over the common good. More scandalous
yet, it made this celebration public.M
And yet, once dependably an anathema, Election Day betting saw its public
stature improve dramatically after the Civil War. Attitudes toward election betting
grew increasingly lax in the age of civic graft and Wall Street scandals. Bets often
appeared on the front pages o f newspapers, especially in party papers like the Inquirer,
in which proof the party’s strength was supported by claims that the opposition was
afraid to bet on their candidates.85 The day before the 1880 Presidential poll, the paper
printed that in New York bets of up to $1,000 were being placed for Garfield;
Philadelphia was seeing bets of $100 to $200. Throughout the 1880s, although the
Inquirer was still printing an occasional anti-betting editorial, the pieces often focused
on the foolishness of the bettors rather than any threat that betting presented to
democracy itself.86
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In an editorial about betting in 1892, the paper’s editors wrote that the wagers
were in many respects a compliment to the people, since they were a clear indication
of the passion that Americans brought to their politics, and were a manful and public
display of confidence in the candidate o f one’s choice. The editorial did admit,
however, that sometimes the betting got out of hand, such as when men bet their
family’s house or their farm on the outcome of the race.87 That year, featuring a close
contest between President Cleveland and Republican challenger Harrison, was perhaps
the watershed year for betting. One story reported that Israel Durham had challenged
Democrat John Fow with a wager as high as $20,000 on the race.88 Another story
reported that prominent Republican Judge Ahem of the city had placed two separate
bets of $10,000 each on the race.89 In New York, the Inquirer reported, thousand
dollar bills were as plentiful as pennies at the center of the betting, the Hoffman House
hotel, and anything lower than a thousand was “sneered at.” The reported claimed that
$175,000 had been bet in a single night at the hotel, and that representatives of
Tammany had brought $150,000 to the hotel to bet. Wagers became so widespread at
the hotel that the manager closed it down to gamblers the next day.90 One item on the
election betting craze, which included a rumored $100,000 bet, hinted that many of the
public wagers were not true bets but made only for the purpose of creating public
sentiment in favor of the bettor’s champion. These bets were expressly for the media’s
consumption; neither side actually intended to pay the money off in the case of a
loss.91
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Monetary bets were only part of the betting culture that surrounded Election
Day in the post-Civil War years. A more distinctive practice was that of making
“novel,” “amusing,” or “outlandish” bets. These bets were paid off on the day after the
election, and nearly always subjected the loser to public humiliation. A man who had
bet on Bryan in 1900 was required to discourse on the ills of fusion politics from the
roof of his house, dressed in flesh tights, for several hours. Another losing Democrat
in the same year wrote the winning candidate’s name on all four comers of every
intersection along Chestnut Street, from Broad to Front Streets in the middle o f the
city. Another was required to sit in a donkey-cart as the winner drew him through the
street, preceded by a marching band and flag, and followed by four Democratic pall
bearers.92 In 1892, a bet made at the Colonnade Hotel required the loser to ride down
Broad Street on a white horse, head turned toward the rear end, wearing a red, white
and blue costume.93 Many of the bets were variants on popular categories that
reappeared year after year: the loser required to shave off half of his beard or all o f his
beard; the loser required to push a peanut down the street or around city with a
ridiculous tool—a crowbar, a toothpick; the loser required to dress up as organ-grinder
or the grinder’s monkey; the loser required to pull the winner along in a cart.94 Yet
another tradition seems to have been the buying of silk hats. Following the 1888
election, The North American reported a hatters shop on Chestnut street being
inundated with orders.95
Outlandish betting allowed the Everyman, the member of the public not
otherwise in the public eye, to figure as a notable member of the Election Day
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celebration. In 1892, two employees of the Continental Hotel, a Turk named Gallagher
in charge o f the wine room, and a colored bathroom attendant named Anderson, made
an Election Day bet; the loser would have to carry the winner around on his back.96
These ridiculous bets overturned the world o f American politics, the world that had
heretofore dominated the election. One report noted the unusual site of a white man,
who had supported the losing Democrat, carrying a winning black Republican ward
boss around city streets.97 Rich men—generally in the pages o f the Inquirer, rich
Democrats—were forced to parade down the street in ridiculous attire as the
democratic public jeered and asked them, “how do you like it?”98 The night before the
1888 Presidential vote, a Democrat named Francis Barker met a Republican
acquaintance in the street and wagered his moustache and three front teeth that
Cleveland would take the race. When he did not, the partisan North American
gleefully recounted Barker’s trip first to the dentist, where he exited with blood
streaming from his mouth, and then the visit to the barber.99
Election Day bets confounded instead of enunciating social categories. They
were a popular cultural form in which the members of the city tried to come to grips
with the event of the election ritual. The outlandish bet mocked the passions that the
election contest had stirred, made it easier for Republicans and Democrats to go back
to their normal lives. Similarly, the election night fires were a popular metaphor of the
state of the public mind on Election night. These popular forms o f the Election Day
ritual signaled the extent to which Philadelphian’s had become agitated by the social
contest in their midst. Once the popular excitement in the campaign disappeared, as it
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would, these forms would disappear as well. There was no longer anything for them to
do.

The Election night spectacular:
Another Election Day tradition, much newer than the bet or the bonfire, but
like them a partial response to the tensions embodied on Election Day, was the
creation of a spectacle o f the Election night return. Crowds of thousands would block
the major thoroughfares o f the city—Market Street, Broad, Chestnut Street—as they
waited for returns from the city and the rest o f the country. Afier the Civil War, the
important political clubs like the Union Republican club or the Democratic Amicus
club entertained the political faithful with fireworks and marching bands in between
the returns. Large white sheets would be tacked up on a neighboring wall, and a magic
lantern or “stereopticon” would throw up returns on to the wall.100
Eventually, responsibility for the returns became increasingly identified with
the city’s major newspapers, which would compete with one another for the fastest
results, and the largest crowds. The role of the newspaper in providing the Election
night spectacle is related to other changes that were occurring in the culture of the late
nineteenth century press. Three important arguments, raised by earlier historians of the
nineteenth century press, are relevant here. The first is the shift in function of the
newspaper, from a political to a commercial orientation.101 In Philadelphia most
papers were still nominally partisan. However, that partisan loyalty became,
increasingly simply one aspect of the newspaper’s character. The more central
208

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

function, now, was simply to make a profit through advertising.102 Populist forms of
communication—the illustrated magazine, the cartoon, made journalism more
immediately appealing and more widely available. In addition, the growing
importance of commercial concerns entailed a style of self-promotion. In order to
gamer advertising revenue, and readers, newspapers lit on a whole host o f public
events to raise their profile.103 One of these events seems to have been the Election
night spectacular. The greater the crowds, the more elaborate the show, the more
effective Election night served as a public demonstration o f the newspaper’s
popularity among the city’s public. Thus, reports of Election Day in this period often
feature extensive coverage of the crowds in front of the newspaper’s own building,
and claims of tens of thousands of spectators crowding the streets. The day after one
election the Inquirer claimed that 30,000 people had waited in front of the paper’s
building to wait for returns, and that Market Street had been almost completely shut
down to traffic for two city blocks.104
The crowd would groan or cheer with each new set of numbers, depending on
whether they exceeded or fell short of the expected result. Political knowledge of
issues and even candidates may not have been excessive among the Election night
crowds of the Gilded Age, but they knew their strategy as well as any 20th century
audience knows its football lore or celebrity gossip. That Democrats would take New
York City was to be expected; the important point was by how much the majority
would be, and whether it could withstand the likely Republican strength upstate.
Republican strongholds in New England and the results of the Democratic south could
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be largely ignored: they were a forgone conclusion. It was the so-called battleground
states, places like Indiana, New York, and Ohio, that would make the day or lose it.
Often, a Republican victory in New York was enough for the Republicans to
pronounce a national victory, at which point the Union Club would traditionally erupt
in roman candles and fireworks and fire its cannons from the atop its headquarters.
The year of Garfield’s Presidential win, the club lit up the word “Victory” on gas jets
above the crowd. Once the election of its champion could be assured, Republican
Philadelphia would explode in cheers and enact a general revelry.105
As with all other public events in the 1890s, newspapers used the occasion of
Election Day for self-promotion. By the 1896 campaign, the Inquirer was printing
front-page stories the day o f the election, trumpeting the special features of its
Election night presentation, describing how it would send up balloon signals once the
success of candidates were known.106 Its competitor, The Press, used its 1896 Election
Day edition to announce fireworks above City Hall; Golden lights would mean a
McKinley victory, red lights a Bryan win. Other colors would let the observer know
how the local race for sheriff was going.107
The center of political life, at least as the media presented it, was moving from
the political organization to the news outlet. The Union Club still gave the crowds
returns, and its members still made the traditional march down Broad Street once a
Republican victory was assured, but more and more it began to give way, as the site of
public celebration, to the newspapers. The clubs generally appealed to partisans, but
the daily journals made their shows appealing to all citizens.
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Although partisan sheets, papers like The Inquirer and The Press harped on the
non-ideological aspects of their superiority. Even Democrats and reformers knew that
the Inquirer was the first and best with information, and had the most elaborate
shows.108 Papers outlined a national network of operators and reporters sending
information from all comers of the country to the central office on Market street,
which were then relayed to the crowds waiting outside, either via the stereopticon or
extra editions.109 Its public celebrations played on national symbols, a general national
image o f welfare and prosperity, free from class and sectional divisions. The day after
McKinley’s first presidential victory, the paper released fifty red, white and blue
balloons in the air. No distinction was made among the states. Alabama and Arkansas,
solid for Bryant, came directly after loyally Republican Pennsylvania and New York,
Mississippi and Montana after Massachusetts: miraculously, and notwithstanding “that
the wind was blowing a gale on the top o f the Inquirer Building, not a single balloon
was damaged as it shot up in the air.”110
What allowed the Election night spectacle to occur at all was a change in the
length of the vote count. Increasingly, the results of the vote were crowded into a
single night. By mid-century, news o f the election of President often came only hours
after the polls had closed or within several days of the vote. There was still the
occasional exception to this—notably the 1876 race, in which Hayes was not declared
victor until almost a month after Election Day. As a general rule, however, the time
between the taking of the vote and the announcement of the victor dramatically shrank
during the course of the century. Voters in 1800 did not know that Thomas Jefferson
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would be the country’s next President until well in the New Year. By the 1830s or
1840s, the country’s choice for Chief Executive Officer was generally pretty firmly
established within days o f the poll. In the late 1890s, announcement of the winner
came by 10 or 11 o’clock in the evening.111 No longer a local celebration o f the vote,
Election night increasingly became a celebration o f the national results.
Notably, the centers that drew the largest crowds—political headquarters and
newspapers—were those with access to a telegraph machine. On Election Day, the
telegraph changed the way that voters in cities like Philadelphia experienced the
Presidential vote. A major first step in changing the Election Day experience, as I have
already noted, happened with the development of a national system o f print
journalism, which rearranged the symbolic space in which the vote took place. The
telegraph returns made results from Indianapolis, Cincinnati, and St. Louis almost as
near as Reading or Wilmington. Rather than a narrative of the nation, which unrolled
over time and told a story of the city’s relationship with the rest of the country, the
new Election Day gave the crowds in the street a kind of national snap-shot. Readers
were also given scorecards so that they call follow the returns on Election night and
keep track of who was ahead. Newspapers ran contests that gave out cash prizes for
the closest estimate of the national vote. By the 1890s, they would run electoral maps
of the country, showing states strong for Bryan, those strong for McKinley, and the
ones too close to call, allowing readers to take in at a glance the whole political
identity of the United States—the solid Democratic south, the Republican Northeast,
the Populist West.112
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But the telescoping of Election Day—the growing ability of the date o f the first
Tuesday in November to encompass both the vote and its result—was a product of
institutional changes as well as the changes in communication technology. Just as
important as the introduction o f the telegraph in telescoping the vote was the political
decision, in 1848, to move the Presidential vote to a single day. The decision to create
a single, national Election Day was based not on technological abilities, but political
and social concerns. Its adoption originally was driven by a Cincinnati Congressman,
Alexander “Bully” Duncan, who thought he lost the 1840 election to his Whig
opponent because o f the importation o f voters from other Ohio cities and from across
the border in Kentucky. Duncan imagined that by requiring all national offices to be
voted for on the same day, this sort of corruption could be avoided.113
In a similar vein, although the telegraph undoubtedly allowed for a faster
movement of polling returns across the country, its introduction would not in itself
have led to the Election night pronouncements of victory that were customary at the
end o f the century. The development of specialized polling techniques meant that by
the end of the Civil War, journalists had developed a system of focusing on bell
weather precincts that tended to reflect the trends o f larger relevant groups—rural
voters, or urban Catholic voters, or working class voters. These were generally the
returns that the journalists focused on to analyze who would take a city or state.
Without the journalistic craft necessary to weed out important from unimportant
returns, the announcements of victory would have taken far longer, modem
technology or no.1,4
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Once victory was decided, city crowds did not simply go home to celebrate.
They stayed in the streets for hours, watching the spectacles put on for them by clubs
and newspapers, making their own amusement—tin horns and toy drums were in easy
supply on Election night, and reports made occasional note of the ill-sounding
orchestras that were created—and marching.115 As was the case before the revolution,
political clubs from outlying districts and Wards would descend upon center of the
city once the polls closed. Although they often bore a simple party name—the 22nd
Ward Republicans, the Young Democrats—other sources of identification were also
used. The Republican Invincibles were linked to the memory o f the Civil War, clubs
like the Garfield and Hartranft clubs to national or state politicians. Sometimes these
groups would be accompanied by a band, by red fire, or by flags and torches. Nearly
always they carried some sort of transparency with the name o f the Presidential
candidate—in 1900, an Election night sign with McKinley’s name on it was so large
partisans had trouble carrying it down broad street—or a sign celebrating victory—
“Ohio-25,000 Republican majority.”116
Parades also led to fights between poor winners and poor losers. As always, the
former were keen to goad the latter once victory could be assured, marching about
with brooms in their hands or singing songs poking fun at the losing candidates. In
1896, police and supporters of the successful reform candidate for city sheriff got into
an early morning, post-election battle after celebrating reformers started to mock the
police, supposed tools of the Combine leaders.117 In 1888, merchants closed their
stores on the day after the election to avoid damage from battling crowds. Sometimes,
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reform newspapers would refuse to hand out returns to Election night celebrants, for
fear of stirring up violence, and at least one year, the mayor was forced to issue an
order forbidding organizations from further marching in order to keep the peace.118
By the end o f the period, however, Election night violence was becoming less
central to the celebration of Election night returns. In its place, newspapers
increasingly sought to provide the population with non-stop entertainment. While
waiting for returns, crowds were offered cartoons and pictures of political figures on
the screens. At mid-century, joyous partisans would sometimes walk up to a victorious
candidate’s house and serenade him; by the end of the century, it was the people who
were being serenaded, as paid brass bands sat on a wooden stage in front of
newspapers and played tunes for the assembled throng.119
The Election night spectacular provided a central space for the Election Day
public to congregate, much like the polling booths at the State House had some years
earlier. The decision to split up the voting experience into the ward system can be seen
as a kind of attack on the Election Day celebration. Indeed, this is exactly how
Alexander Cummings saw it. In 1852, he declared that an intelligent foreigner would
not have been able to tell that an Election Day was taking place in the city.120
Ironically, the very technologies that Cummings championed—the telegraph and the
modem newspaper—were what helped keep the Election Day celebration from
disappearing. The newspaper now provided not only the national narrative that linked
Philadelphia’s Election Day to the rest o f the country, but it now provided as well the
physical means by which the city’s residents could assemble as a public. It took on
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this role not out of any concern with public life, but because of commercial needs, and
in response to a niche that needed to be filled—the desire for information about the
result. The festive atmosphere was simply a by-product of the Election night’s purpose
as advertising.
Thus, from an instrument used for partisan purposes, to divide the Election
Day public, the newspaper’s role on Election Day was becoming one that served,
increasingly, to bring the public together. Its returns brought the city itself together,
and brought that public in touch with the wider national public that was performing
Election Day. The partisan role o f the newspaper did not entirely disappear. The Press
and the Inquirer continued to attack their opponents on Election Day, to stress the
need to vote, and to vote the straight ticket.121 But they no longer played the central
organizational role they once had. Gone from their pages were the locations where a
voter would find a correct ballot, or the names to be written on the one’s own ticket.
The organization had taken over these duties. The newspaper’s Election Day role, in
other words, came to be increasingly involved in what happened after the vote, and in
providing to the public an image of unity and entertainment, rather than division and
battle. This changed the nature of the public that performed on Election Day, both in
print and on the street, but even more dramatic changes were in the works.

Progressive reform and the Australian Ballot:
In the late 1800s, a number of reforms had been introduced in the civil service
and in campaign practice that would radically change the context in which Election
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Day took place. The main governmental reforms that are relevant to the changing
context of Election Day were measures directed toward the professionalization of the
civil service and the increasing centralization of government functions. With the
growth of a large, professionally run administrative state, many government jobs were
no longer tied directly to the outcome at the polls. This changed the stakes of Election
Day, since it became more and more difficult for voters to directly influence their
everyday lives via their voting behavior. To the extent that these reforms succeeded in
their aims, voting, and Election Day more generally, became less a matter of
concretely affecting one’s own life, more a question of abstractly affecting the public
good and the welfare of the county. It became a more theoretical, less immediately
practical, activity.122
At the same time, political parties began to move away from what Michael
McGerr has called the “spectacular” mode of electioneering—that is, campaigns that
relied upon torch-light parades, marching bands, fireworks, and mass rallies—and
toward a style o f campaign that used mass print materials to persuade voters to support
one or another candidate. 123 Simonson and Marvin argue that this resulted in a
politics that discounted the role of the democratic crowd and bodily forms of
communication, in favor of textual forms of communication—the newspaper,
campaign propaganda. Electoral politics, and politics in general, became less a matter
of popular participation and more a question o f citizens being addressed by politicians
and journalists. The citizen as participant was replaced with citizen as audience
member. This had effects throughout the political sphere, including Election Day. It
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made for a less popular Election Day, both in terms o f style and in terms of the actual
number of people participating.124
The progressive reform that probably most directly influenced Philadelphia’s
Election Day was the Australian ballot, so-called because it first made its appearance
in the province of Tasmania in the 1860s.125 This type of ballot was printed by the
state and provided to voters at the polls. All eligible candidates are listed on a single
ticket, and voters were required to fill the ballot out in secret—for example, behind a
screen or canopy. In the United States, the Australian ballot was understood as a direct
attack on political corruption and party machines. Bribery would become more
difficult, for example, because the politician could no longer be certain that the voter
would vote in the way that he had agreed to vote. Other forms of coercion—physical
intimidation at the polls, as well as opportunities for religious leaders or employers to
exert their own kinds o f influence on voters—became similarly more difficult to enact
on Election Day, it was argued.126
More than just a practical change, however, the Australian ballot also sent a
moral message. It was a more “democratic” form of voting, a defense of the wisdom
and opinions of the individual every man against the intrusions of social, economic
and political hierarchies.127 The Australian ballot did not, unlike pervious forms of
voting, either encourage or allow secrecy. It enforced the secret vote, whether the
voter wished it to be secret or not. If the original form of the ballot in colonial
Pennsylvania had some affinities with Dissenting attitudes toward the divine, then the
Australian ballot was Protestant politics in even stricter form: a completely secret
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relationship between the individual and the state, concerning the most important
things, conducted in a space separated from the rest of the world.
Not everyone agreed that the Australian ballot was an advance in democratic
politics. The liberal political theorist John Stuart Mill Mill argued against the ballot
because he thought it would lead to a degeneration of the electorate:
[T]he spirit o f an institution, the impression it makes on the mind of the
citizen, is one of the most important parts o f its operation. The spirit of
vote by ballot—the interpretation likely to be put on it in the mind of
the elector—is that suffrage is given to him for himself; for his
particular use and benefit, and not as a bust for the public.128
Thus voters would begin to see the vote as a way to advance their own private
interests, rather than understanding themselves to be acting on behalf of the common
good. In fact, pursued to its logical conclusion, the idea o f the vote as a private right
implied that it was perfectly valid for the voter to sell the vote to the highest bidder.129
The problem that critics had was that a secret declaration o f the voter’s allegiance was
an ignoble act. Since the citizen had obligations to other members of the community, it
was correct that the members of this community should have some knowledge of how
he acted. As for the idea that public pressure would unduly influence the voter,
defenders o f the public vote either discounted the problem or declared that any person
who could be influenced by outside pressures ought not to be voting in the first
place.130
Despite these objections, however, the appeal to political independence
embodied by the secret ballot was simply too powerful for conservatives to stop it.
The Australian ballot was first introduced into the United States in 1889, when
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Kentucky—at the time the only state in the union still relying on the old viva voce
method o f voting—began using it for municipal elections in Louisville.131 The same
year, an act was passed in the Massachusetts State Assembly “to provide for printing
and distributing ballots at the public expense.”132 Most other states, including
Pennsylvania, quickly followed suit. By 1910, only two states were not using some
form o f state-printed and distributed ballots.133
The ballot did seem to have some of the effects that reformers had intended.
Bribery at the polls dropped dramatically, or at least, reports of bribery did.134 The
Australian ballot made any sort o f quid pro quo much more difficult, although it did
not erase it entirely. Occasionally, reports surface of a maneuver sometimes known as
the “Tasmanian Dodge.” In this practice, the ward captain would pay a series of voters
for their vote. The first voter would go into the booth, put the ticket under his coat, and
then leave without voting. He would return to the captain, who would then fill out the
ticket and give it to the second voter. This man would then take a ballot, take both the
blank ballot and the filled-out ballot into the booth with him, deposit the latter paper,
and give the blank ticket to the captain. The process would be repeated on down the
line.135 Although ingenious, there is little hard evidence that the Tasmanian Dodge
was ever widely practiced, if it was practiced at all. The stories nonetheless provoked
legislators into declaring it a crime to leave a voting booth with a blank ticket, in order
to combat the possibility of it occurring.136
Nonetheless, many of the changes hoped for or feared about the new style of
voting did not happen. It did not immediately provoke large numbers of Americans
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into becoming independent voters. Less than three percent of the voters in the 1896
split their tickets. This number rose in the first years of the 20th century, but not by
much.137 Independent voters had always been able to make up their own tickets, long
before the introduction of the ballot, through ticket scratching and other practices.
Philadelphians, like other Americans, did not vote the straight ticket only out of fear of
party bosses. They also did so out of habit and even out o f conviction and conscious
solidarity with the party cause. At the same time, the fears of critics like Mill and
others also were unrealistic. In particular, the idea that the practice o f voting the secret
ballot would induce voters to think of the franchise as a right, rather than a duty,
ignores the extent to which the right of franchise was already a mainstream idea in
American politics.138
The Australian ballot was a significant change to the celebration of Election
Day nonetheless. First, from the viewpoint o f promoting democratic options for the
voter, the introduction of the Australian form probably helped speed the decline of
viable third parties and so-called fusion tickets. Prior to ballot reform, it was possible
for any group of citizens to print out a slate and publicize it at the polls.139 Certainly,
this equality among parties was more theoretical than real. Printing costs for ballots
were often prohibitive, and third parties were also at a disadvantage when it came to
distributing their slates. Once of the arguments put forward for the Australian ballot
was that political groups would no longer need to pay out huge expenses on Election
Day to put their names in front of the public.140 However, by formally limiting the
number of names to appear on a ticket, a government ballot also placed a theoretical
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limit on the number o f parties presented to the voter. Fusion tickets allowed the
cooperation between groups like the Greenbacks or Populists and the Democrats. By
manipulating ballot laws, northern Republicans were able to eliminate fusion slates or
to make them far more difficult to maintain.141
The ballot also formalized a wholly different model of, and for, the democratic
voter. The new system created a new space for the voter to act; in so doing it cut him
off from all possible social influences. The modem voter would be separated from the
world by a curtain drawn around him, left to his own resources. If the vote was still a
public act, it was a strange one, in which the most important element o f the drama was
acted out in private. The secret vote reconstructed the voter as a social atom, acting on
his own private thoughts, and not relying on institutions or the wisdom of the tribe.
Not the boss, or the priest, or the employer, or even one’s cronies, could intrade on the
secrecy of the vote. Whether he wanted it or not, the voter was in the position of
Bunyan’s pilgrim, driving off worldly entanglements in the passage to righteousness.
In the words of Michael Schudson:
Twentieth-century voting was thus free to become a performance of
individualism oriented to the nation, not a performance of community
directed to the locale. A nineteenth-century voter demonstrated his
citizenship through loyalty to party and the local fraternity that was its
most palpable manifestation. A twentieth-century voter was obliged to
act out something new and untested in the political universe—
citizenship by virtue of informed competence. Voting by party ticket
and voting by state-supplied ballot are both acts that determine who
gets elected to office. But in the former case its tends to be a matter of
parties mobilizing their membership; in the latter case it is more nearly
an aggregation of individual preferences. The Australian ballot
indicated that a new political day and a new understanding of politics
had dawned.142
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Keeping this in mind, one of the most dramatic effects of the Australian ballot
was how it changed the interaction of the voting population at the polls. From Victoria
province to British parliamentary elections to American Election Days, reformers
noted that riotous and violent behavior declined noticeably after the introduction of the
new system.143 With the kind o f public secrecy enforced by the Australian ballot, the
rationale for much of the traditional bustle and crowds surrounding the voting window
disappeared. Ticket-mongers no longer were not longer present, vying with one
another to press their slates o f candidates onto the approaching voter. Rough and
rowdy street toughs no longer presumed to keep the opposition away from the polls.
They hadn't improved their manners; they simply were less certain who was friend or
foe.
The Australian ballot did not eliminate the ability of the political elite to
control the voter at the polls, but it switched the location for this control. In the heyday
of the gilded age, control was exercised on the street, through the use of ticket
distribution, monetary persuasion, claims on group solidarity, and physical
intimidation. The voter’s body could be immediately affected, through either
enticement or dissuasion. The secret ballot removed that ability. If the new voter were
to be affected, then it would have to be before he ever reached the election grounds, so
that one could be reasonably certain of his intentions before he got to the voting booth.
Hence, there was a greater need for persuasion and education, a need to sway the
mind, to affect reason and desire, rather than using force directly on the body. The
dispersed efforts at controlling ward polls were centralized into a single campaign
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effort that could be coordinated from one office. Mass media, first the print media and
later electronic media, became central to the effort. Part of the reason for this was that,
without party control over the ballot, the politician needed to influence, as much as
possible, what the voter saw when he picked up the ballot. Candidates with a media
presence would be recognized easily. Those without such resources were fighting a
lost battle, hi the twentieth century the battle of the election ground became a mass
mediated battle, fought over by political managers, not citizens themselves, in the
pages of the daily newspapers and on television screens, and not on the Election
grounds.

The increasing role o f the state on Election Nieht:
The Australian ballot was a direct attack on the corruption o f the vote. Other
measures were taken to attack another aspect o f the Election Day, the atmosphere of
intimidation and violence than ran throughout the period. Catto’s death can be taken as
a sort of watershed event in Philadelphia. The extent of the violence provoked
immediate responses among politicians. In Philadelphia, as was the case throughout
the country at the time, the urban upper and middle classes were increasingly
dissatisfied with the role o f violence in public life, and demanded that politicians do
something to keep the populace in order. Stokely had run his campaign on a “law and
order” platform. He used the events of Election Day 1871 as part o f the justification
for stricter and more brutal police enforcement and a dramatic increase in the number
of officers on the force.144 “We object in this department,” Mayor William Bums
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Smith told reporters on the day after the tense 1884 Presidential race, “to amateur
fighting. If there is to be any fighting we have a large body of men constantly in the
pay o f the city to attend to it professionally. We claim a monopoly on that branch of
business, and if any of it is to be done we propose to do it ourselves.”145
Along with the more aggressive enforcement o f the constabulary came a more
explicit rendering in the law about the behavior of voters at the polls and on Election
Day. When the violence seemed to be at its heights, that is, in the late 1860s and early
1870s, Pennsylvania lawmakers began to pass a series of legislative acts aimed at
controlling the behavior o f the Election Day public. Two different supplements to the
election laws, one in 1868 and one in 1869, explicitly laid out the qualifications or
voters, and provided legal sanction for challenges. They also provided for citizens who
suspected an attempt at fraud to request that a pair of assessors be present on Election
Day to watch over the judge and inspectors.146 A measure passed in 1867 had
outlawed parades after dark, in the city of Philadelphia expressly, ten days before the
holding o f the election, presumably to keep tempers was becoming any more excited
than they were already.147 In 1870, the same act that formally allowed black men to
vote in the state also contained an explicit bar on assaulting electors near the polls, and
outlined punishments for the offence.148
Finally, in March o f 1872, just months after the South Street Election Day
riots, Harrisburg banned the sale o f liquor on Election Day.149 The law did not have an
immediate effect; economics served as a goad to break it, since Election Day was one
of the major opportunities in the year for sales. Given the large number of bars and
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taverns in the city at the time, it was nearly impossible for police constables to enforce
the rule.130 Gradually, however, the practice became less popular, or at any rate, less
publicly acceptable. Reports of Election Days in the 1890s and the early 1900s contain
notably fewer descriptions of drunken riots than those o f twenty or thirty years
earlier.151
The use of the police to keep the peace on Election Day was not without its
controversies. Philadelphia’s voters and their media representatives were under no
illusion that the government or its representatives were ever interested in playing the
role of the honest, disinterested broker between competing parties. It was an operating
assumption among Philadelphians that, on Election Day, police officers had political
interests as much as any other group o f citizens.152 (This was not an unreasonable
attitude, given that the election would generally determine the hiring practices of the
police department for the next several years.) Following the violence of the 1871
election riots, The Age railed against a Republican law enforcement administration
that saw fit to pursue investigations into the deaths of colored Republicans like
Octavius Catto, but not the murder of a Democratic poll inspector.153 On the other
hand, The Inquirer blamed much of the violence that resulted in six deaths on the day
of the 1868 General Election to corrupt sheriffs deputies from the Democratic
administration o f Mayor Fox. One of these deputies, Moses Louher, stabbed and
seriously wounded the next month on the day of the Presidential election, was
described as an “old jail bird.” In 1896, the same paper printed descriptions of police
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officers openly electioneering for “The Combine” at the polls, and harassing
Durham’s “reform” voters.154
Just as the dividing line between ordinary street thuggery and the ward
associations was sometimes hard to discern, so too was the activity o f partisan groups
and the police. Often, Election Day injuries to policemen came not when they were
engaged in the exercise o f their official duties but when they participating in a partisan
celebration or parade. For example, in an fight following the announcement of
Cleveland’s first election, Lt. David Roche was shot in the arm when he marched past
the Americus Club with a group of Republican voters and involved himself in the
ensuing riot.155 Voters giving evidence during the investigation into the disputed 1872
state senate by-election mentioned several present or past members o f the police force
as among the most egregious o f those participating in voting fraud.156
Whether or not the police really were simply a corrupt and biased arm of city
hall, the public understanding o f police on Election Day was that they were simply the
best equipped and most efficient of the many sources of political muscle available to
the bosses. The growing presence of the police was, in some sense, the mere
replacement of one set of political toughs with another. But there was a difference,
since the superior resources o f the police made the possibility of a true street contest
unrealistic. The opposition, at least the more perceptive among them, realized the need
to reconcile to this new reality. Witness William McMullen’s response following
Stokley’s dramatic increases in the police force, when he calmed down a near riotous
crowd in his home Fourth Ward and handed the matter over to the police. Since
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McMullen was never shy about using force when he felt it was necessary to advance
his interests, his decision at this moment can be taken as pragmatic recognition that
politics in Philadelphia would now have to accept the police as having the final word
on street violence.137 Having establish their dominance, the police and the state would
then ensure that such violence would gradually die away as Election Day moved into
the 20th century.

Conclusion:
The battle between the mugwump reformers and the Machine politicians of
Philadelphia over the practice o f Election Day amounted to a battle over who would
control the Election Day message. The reformers wanted to send a message of a public
composed of well-meaning rational individuals, connected to each other through a
concern for the common good and their own consciences. The message of the
machine’s Election Day was one of political loyalty and devotion to the party and the
community. Both visions embodied two different elements of Election Day practice.
But both also required that the public itself been controlled: in the one case, to obtain
partisan victory, in the other, to discipline the public into a performance more to the
liking o f the reformers.
Election Days in the earlier part of the Gilded Age communicated a public
more nearly to the vision of the Machine. The semi-public ticket created a bond
between the voter and the local community. The Election Day riots and fights
performed the same kind of image of street power that similar riots had in the
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Jacksonian age, except that now politicians, and not simply reformers, were becoming
more cautious about the Election Day fight, more wary about where such events could
lead. The increasingly complex battles over identity complicated the Election Day
divisions. There were the new immigrants to deal with, the infusion of the black vote,
and the increasing demands of women for the vote. These new voters, or potential
voters, meant for a more complicated Election Day, in part because of the often rather
violent protests they provoked on the part o f more traditional groups in the voting
public. The vote’s ability to significance difference and distinction was under threat if
everyone had the right to vote. There needed to be ways of policing the boundaries of
the public.
The desire to exercise control over the Election Day public meant altering the
forms of communication in which it expressed itself. The introduction o f the secret
ballot introduced a radical new message into Election Day. It prevented the coercion
of the voter, but also made the connection between the individual and the group—the
party, the neighborhood, the church—less important. In that, it was simply part of a
larger series of changes that were being encouraged both by party leaders and
reformers, changes that moved away from the political spectacle and replace old forms
of communicating political identity with newer models based on a national campaign
delivering images and arguments to the voter through print and other forms of the
mass media. Philadelphia’s newspapers switched the emphasis of their role, focusing
more and more on the unifying event of the Election night celebration, less and less on
their role as partisan mobilizer.
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At the same time, the formal instruments of the state began to take more notice
o f the Election Day event. Lawmakers made such traditions as the election night
bonfire, the Election Day drink, the Election night parade, illegal; they produced a
greater police force in order to force the public to obey these and other restrictions like
the ban on betting. Although these traditions had not been at the heart of the
complaints about the Election Day celebration, they arguably contributed to the
corruption, the violence, the injuries that had resulted on that day.
These changes in the Election Day performance did not do away with the
machine. They did not, arguably, reduce the importance of money or social power on
the outcome o f the vote. They did change the moment when that power was used, and
where it was used. The battle for the voter increasingly no longer took place on the
election grounds, but before Election Day ever took place. Thus, as a moment of
political importance, Election Day itself began to recede. Although the power of the
machine still placed a premium on the ability to actually get faithful voters to the
polls, Election Day became a day in which less and less happened. The decision of the
voter’s themselves, certainly, but presumably that decision had been undertaken prior
to the day o f the vote itself. As this happened, the public event o f Election Day began
to recede into private spaces—behind the curtain of the voting booth. There was still
the Election night celebration. That celebration existed, however, only for commercial
reasons, and because it addressed a specific niche. Once that niche could be filled in
other ways, the Election night celebration would disappear as well.
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Chapter Seven:
Election Day in the early twentieth century
Historians of American politics have long recognized that a dramatic shift
happened in the years immediately prior to and after the turn of the twentieth century.
This involved, among other things, voter turnout, which out began to decline during
this period from the highs o f the nineteenth century, and never recovered to its former
levels.1 At the same time, the country’s popular culture changed, with a decline in the
importance that politics played in American life generally. From an era when a
national presidential race could virtually bring a city like Philadelphia to a standstill on
Election Day, politics seemed to become less central to the interests o f the citizens.
Sports, popular arts like vaudeville and motion pictures, and the market: these
elements of public life gradually moved in to replacement politics as a topic of popular
interest.
This would imply that the early twentieth century was the moment when the
Election Day celebration, like other popular displays of the electoral public,
disappeared from Philadelphia and other Northern cities. As we will see, in the case of
Philadelphia at least this is not quite true. It is nevertheless true that Election Day in
the city did change in character, and this change was related to practices that embodied
both a changing style of politics and a revised understanding of political actors’ roles.
Election Day became an event that was increasingly practiced in private spaces, or in
the mass mediated spaces created through new communication forms like the radio. It
became less and less the case that the public met together physically in the center of
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the city to celebrate the vote together, more and more the case that this public began to
segment itself into smaller groups, meeting in smaller spaces. The image o f the public
became a more amorphous one, its outlines less clear. This evolution happened slowly.
Even by the end of the period under consideration here, the early 1940s, there were
still elements o f both the Election Day celebration present in the city. But it would not
last long past the Second World War.

A changing context for Election Dav:
The twentieth century Election Day took place in a political culture quite
different from what even the late nineteenth century had presented to Philadelphia’s
public. At the national level, the period following William Jennings Bryan’s first
campaign resulted in the creation of something like a national consensus over external
and internal policy, a consensus generally overseen by Republican administrations,
with the exception of Woodrow Wilson, who did not strongly challenge that
consensus.2 This new political universe, as noted in the previous chapter, would
develop its own political style. The new style of campaign featured two important
innovations that moved the electoral experience away from earlier forms of popular
involvement. First, it relied to a much greater extent on mass media material produced
by a national campaign headquarters. Partisan newspapers like Philadelphia’s Press
and Inquirer continued to be important methods of party communication, but in
addition to these were now pamphlets and other materials produced by the central
campaign office.3 Second, the Presidential candidate himself began to campaign
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directly. In the nineteenth century, the traditional, republican-inspired norm against
putting oneself forward as a candidate had generally kept Presidential candidates away
from the campaign trail (notable exceptions were Stephen Douglas in 1860 and
William Jennings Bryan in 1896). This began to change in the twentieth century, and
Presidential candidates took advantage of the expanded possibilities afforded by the
development of a national transportation system to make national tours.4
At the same time that campaign practices were changing, Michael Schudson
argues, there was a related development: the rise of the “informed voter” model in
public discourse. This model is one that emphasizes the nonnative ideal of a rational,
sober individual attempting to gather as much information as possible about policies
and candidates and then arriving at a well-considered opinion. In this vision of
citizenship, the link between the individual and die group becomes less clear. Group
allegiances, including party allegiances, are taken to be prejudicial to the proper
exercise of citizenship. Although some form of this argument exists throughout
American history—indeed, as Schudson admits, it is implied by the liberal democratic
form of government itself—it became during the early twentieth century, he argues,
something like the dominant model of citizenship.3
While this was going on, important changes took place in the voting public
itself. With the passing of the 19th amendment in 1920, the formal boundaries of the
electorate swelled to include a huge portion of the adult population—women—that
had heretofore almost universally been excluded from the Election Day performance.6
However, while this constitutional expansion o f the electorate was taking place, a new
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problem arose, already noted above: the non-voter, who chose deliberately to absent
him or herself from the voting booth. As voting turnout began to decline, the question
of how to encourage voting became a public issue.7
At the city level, Philadelphia politics was characterized by the development o f
the Republican machine. Although that machine was in place during the nineteenth
century, it control was not as great then as it became during this period. For much o f
the early part o f the twentieth century, political battles at the city level were waged not
so much between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, the latter
organization having become almost irrelevant, for all intents and purposes, but
between the Republican “organization,” symbolized in the media by the Vare brothers
and their strong base of support in South Philadelphia, and reform movements both
within and without the party.8
Two other changes also occurred at this moment that are of note. First, the
introduction or rapid growth of new forms of communication technology, notably the
telephone and the radio, had an important impact on the practice of Election Day,
since both mediums allowed citizens to get results about national and local races
without physically going to newspaper or political club. Second, internationally, the
1920s and the 1930s saw the development of two political ideologies profoundly in
opposition to the ideals of liberal democracy. By the 1930s, much of the political
rhetoric surrounding Election Day began to refer to the news threats of communism
and nazism, so that the true opposition became not so much between the country major
parties but between these anti-liberal doctrines and American democracy.
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The performance of Election Dav and the secret ballot:
In the copy of Philadelphia’s newspapers, the secret ballot was reason’s
defense against power. Cartoons on Election Day or just prior to it highlighted the role
of the vote in conferring power and dignity on the common man. The Daily News
showed a man caught in the yoke o f foreign dictatorship asking “the American voter”
what an election was.9 An Inquirer cartoon featured, in its first panel, a milquetoast o f
a man huddling under the huge image of the “Democratic boss,” with his bowler hat
and fat stogie. In the second panel, the voter walks out of the voting booth while the
boss stands by and steams. While the boss could determine how you registered, he
could not follow you into the booth. 10 Similarly, an Election Day cartoon featured in
The Record featured the common man again displaying his dignity and democratic
nobility as he stood by himself on a stage before the nation. The cartoon ran under the
title, “It’s his turn at the mike.”11
Papers also began to make a point of describing how the Presidential candidate
had voted in their pages, linking the common man in their imagery to that of political
celebrity, as in this report of McKinley’s visit to the polls at Canton.
The Republican nominee started for the polls at 8:30, walking
down Market street to Fourth street, where the voting booth of Precinct
A, First Ward, is located. He was accompanied by Abner McKinley
and his nephew, Samuel Saxton. It was an easy morning walk, such as
any citizen might take on a fine morning. Men raised their hats as he
passed and the ladies on the residence steps waved their well wishes.
Turning into Fourth street there were cheers from the men and handclapping from the working girls in the upper windows o f the factory. At
each salutation the Major [McKinley] raised his hat and smiled back an
acknowledgment. As he entered the small store in which the booths are
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located there was a stir o f agitation among the officials, and a mild
rustle of applause. The nominee took his place in the line and the
systematic march of the Australian balloting proceeded in truly
democratic fashion. Ahead of Major McKinley was a swarthy faced
workingman, whose hands showed he had just laid down his tools.
With some confusion he greeted the Major and offered to yield his
place but the offer was declined with a whisper in the man’s ear that
made him beam.12
The Presidential voting experience combined the democratic paradox into a
single image. In the fundamental Election Day performance, the candidate became one
citizen, equal but not superior to millions of others, obliged to wait to vote along with
the rest, behind the soiled and otherwise anonymous American working man. “With
no more ceremony than that observed by a private citizen, President Taft went out
Madison road...and cast his ballot.”13 Like the rest o f the voters on that day, on
Election Day the President was simply one person among the great democratic mass,
an undifferentiated American. Thus the vote not only protected the common man. It
elevated him to a status equal to the highest in the land.
This was not the only model of the vote and the voter presented to
Philadelphians at this time, however. Violence continued to plague Election Day in the
early decades of twentieth century Philadelphia, albeit not the mob clashes that had
often been a feature of the nineteenth century. Police were still occasionally accused
of manhandling voters at the polls.14 In 1904, a group of Negro voters stopped a
Democratic ward leader named Thomas Kavanaugh and pulled him out of his cab and
into the street.13 There were scuffles the same year in the Fifth ward following
challenges to Republican voters, and an election brawl in Leiperville, a small town
outside the city, that involved blackjacks, revolvers and stones.16 Four years later, a
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man poured a bottle of vitriol over the face of a teenage boy and badly injured him
after an argument in the center of the city on Election night.17 A colored man suffered
a broken arm after an Election Day fight that year, and a 63 year-old storekeeper was
knocked down and trampled on by a group of boys after he tried to stop them from
stealing wood for a bonfire.18 Policeman George Epperly died on a primary Election
Day in 1917, the victim of gunfire at the polls. At late as 1940, there were partisan
fistfights the day before the Election, as Democrats made raids on booths promoting
Republican Wendell Wilkie.19
As in earlier decades, one important response to the problem of violence was
to increase the presence of the police. In 1912, the city hired 40 temporary policemen
and 300 Bums private detectives to keep watch on the polls (possibly as a response to
accusations of bias on the part of regular constables). Additional men were assigned to
outer wards from the main central police station.20 The Evening News, in a story about
the quiet Election Day of that year, credited the increased police presence for the
calm.21 In 1916, 3,000 extra men were brought in.22 In 1936, when violence had
become less of an issue, the city still decided to add 2,000 extra men to the Election
night detail.23 Although these measures did not eliminate violence from Election Day
entirely, they were successful enough that Irish writer W.B. Yeats was quoted in 1928
as saying that Philadelphia’s elections were “damnably quiet and rather boring.”24
Other problems were not so easily solved. Although the Australian ballot
theoretically made the voter’s choice unknowable to anyone other than the voter him
or herself, work by Joseph Harris in Philadelphia and other urban centers provided
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evidence that party workers often found ways o f circumventing that feature by, for
example, “assisting” the voter in filling out a ballot.25 Moreover, there was the issue of
counting the ballots. As long as corrupt machines could control the count, reformers
charged, they could manipulate vote totals and essentially nullify attempts to defeat
them at the polls.26
Not only did the ballot not eliminate corruption, it introduced an entirely new
problem: it was confusing to use. Much of the space on the Inquirer's Election Day
pages during the first decades of the twentieth century was spent on literally telling
voters where and how to mark their ballots. The academic discourse surrounding
elections in the modem age tends to downplay the challenges presented in the simple
act of voting (although the events in Florida during the 2000 Election Day may change
this somewhat). In 1908, the problem was more obvious. Since the beginning of the
nation, Philadelphians had learned to cast votes in a certain way, using certain
institutional guides—the party vote dispenser on the Election grounds, the identifying
mark on the ticket—to guide them. Whatever challenges voting in the Gilded Age
presented to the voter, they were at least familiar challenges. The Australian ballot
introduced a whole new set of practices, and provided no opportunity at all to leam
these before the day of the vote. Not surprisingly, voting for a time became a very
confusing act. The election of 1892 resulted in 27,000 spoiled ballots in
Massachusetts, 20,000 in Ohio. People marked the wrong boxes, they marked too
many boxes or not enough; they marked the ballots incorrectly.27 Voting had always
been, and remained, more complicated in the Unites States than in other countries,
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given the large number of offices Americans vote for on Election Day and the large
number o f policy questions on the ballot. The new ballots presented to citizens were
extraordinarily complicated. The 1892 ballot required the voter to make 43 separate
choices (voters at this time were still allowed to vote for the state’s 32 Presidential
electors separately). Pennsylvania’s ballot allowed voters to mark a circle at the top of
a slate to vote the straight party line, but this helped matters only slightly. The 1896
ballot contained 11 different parties, with varying combinations of candidates and with
many party slates sharing candidates in common. The McKinley-Citizens and
Republican slates were identical except for the office o f sheriff (listed in small print at
the bottom o f the ticket). There was also a McKinley-Crow slate, different from the
McKinley-Citizens (it contained choice only for sheriff and county commissioner).
The Democratic, People’s and Free Silver tickets all supported Bryan for President,
but the People’s ticket had a different Vice Presidential choice. The Democratic and
Free Silver tickets differed on their local choices for offices. Most of the slates did not
include candidates for all offices; the McKinley-Citizens and Republican slates were
the only exception here. Voting for any slate other than these two, a voter had to make
extra marks to make choices for these other offices.28 Things only got worse. In 1912,
sample ballots were 27 inches by 32 inches in area. Ballots were so large that they
would delay the counting of votes, since ballot boxes needed to be emptied so often.
Sometimes, voting had to stop in order to get more, and bigger, ballot boxes.29
The possibility that the secret ballot might confuse voters was, not
surprisingly, downplayed or ignored outright by reformers pressing for changes to the
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old system. Very likely, they supposed that any voter not intelligent enough to use a
ballot ought not to have his voice counted at all. In lieu of actual literacy tests, the
secret ballot could serve as a kind o f de facto test to winnow out the inferior voter.
Party organizers could not afford to be so sanguine about the new ballot’s effects. The
uncertainty introduced by the new ballot made the machine’s strategy much more
difficult. Even if mistakes were not enough to actually spoil the ballot, they could
stymie the honest efforts of the loyal party voter to vote the way he was supposed to;
hence the effort made by papers to guide voters through the process. Editors begged
the voter to make but a single mark, inside the party circle. “To be sure that he is right
a Republican should MAKE BUT ONE CROSS, but he must put that cross IN THE
PROPER PLACE,” read an editorial on Election Day in 1908. “Pay no attention
whatever to any column upon the ballot except for the FIRST COLUMN. At the top of
this FIRST COLUMN will be found the title—REPUBLICAN. Place the cross in the
square to the right of that title. THAT IS ALL (capitals in original).”30 Most years, the
party paper could use the complicated nature of the ballot to its faction’s advantage:
“It is dangerous to split a ticket. The moment you do that you are obliged to make
various crosses and you thus run the risk of losing your vote entirely because of
errors.”31 In the case o f intra-party fights, however, the argument was more delicate.
For example, in 1912, The Inquirer editorialized that “since Money Bags Flinn has
placed candidates for State Treasurer and Auditor General on the ticket who are no
longer Republicans, there are unquestionably many Republicans who will not vote for
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them. To vote against them the ticket must be cut.”* The paper then helpfully
explained to its readers how to do just this.32
The obvious difficulties inherent in the new ballot system brought forth, in
their turn, new sets o f reforms. A short-ballot movement spread throughout the
country: “[S]o big a ballot makes politics a field for experts only,” wrote the authors
of a New York state pamphlet in 1914. Huge “ambush” ballots disenfranchised all
busy citizens, leaving the professional politician in control of offices, the group
argued, since it made the citizen rely blindly on party label for minor offices; a
workable limit of the ballot was about five offices. The group recommended that the
Governor’s office be responsible for filling other offices. This would make the
citizen’s job much easier and, incidentally, take the choice of minor offices out of the
hands of professional politicians and the public (where reformers did not have much
influence, or success) and put it in the hands o f the professional bureaucracy (where
they had had considerably more).33 Reformers also called for the introduction of non
partisan ballots, in which candidates for local offices were listed without party
affiliation.34
The short-ballot reforms had some minor success (the non-partisan ballot
existed in Pennsylvania only from 1913 to 1919.) But a better technological solution
was waiting in the wings. That technology was the voting machine. The first ever
documented use of a voting machine in the United States was in 1892, when residents
of Lockport, NY, used a contraption invented by locksmith Jacob Myers. Voters

* Republican State Senator William Flinn was a wealthy contractor and political boss from Pittsburgh
who sometimes crossed swords with the Philadelphia machine and state boss Bois Penrose.
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walked into a large, walk-in, metal room, about 10 feet square, and locked the doors
behind them. They then punched a series o f keys, which registered the vote on
counters, and exited through a second set o f doors.35 Although expensive and
unwieldy, the machines quickly spread in popularity. Four years later Myers would
start his own company, the United States Voting Machine Co., and several other
companies sprang up after the turn of the century, including the Shoup Corporation in
Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania. That company and later groups began to produce the
popular lever machine, which hid voters behind a curtain and registered votes with the
pull o f a large lever that moved interlocked rotary counters one-tenth of a turn. This
was the machine that the City of Philadelphia introduced into its Election Day in the
early 1930s.36
It was no accident that the introduction o f the voting machine came hot on the
heels o f the new secret ballot. The machine was an elaboration and extension of the
image of the American voter implied by the ballot: rational, individualist, and devoid
of sectional, religious, or ethnic prejudice. It was also a solution to some of the
problems that the secret ballot had introduced. Theoretically, it eliminated the
possibility of spoiled ballots, since the machine lever would not operate if the voter
had marked the ballot incorrectly. Voters could not put their crosses in the wrong
circle, or fail to mark a square or circle conectly. While undervotes (that is, ballots
cast in which not all offices were voted upon) were possible, overvotes (in which more
than one candidate was voted for in a single office) were not.37 Perhaps more
important, the machine seemed to rule out at least certain forms of ballot corruption,
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or at least make them far more difficult. The problem o f forged ballots entering the
booth was negated: since the machine did not use paper ballots, no phony ballots could
be printed. It also seemed to make the manipulation o f returns far more difficult.
Humans only came in contact with the machine totals at the beginning of the day,
when the totals were turned to zero, and at the closing of the polls, when the back of
the machine was opened and the totals read. Hence, reformers could make certain that
machine workers had not tampered with the vote totals by simply having a
representative present when the machine was closed up in the morning and opened in
the evening.38
In Philadelphia, the machine was put forward as a method of attacking the
Organization and political corruption generally. The 1932 ballot contained a
referendum question concerning the machines. The Inquirer and the Bulletin, which
despite their consistent Republicanism had running battles against the Vare political
machine of South Philadelphia, wrote election stories and editorials supporting the use
of the machines, and using the opposition of “the organization” to the question as
evidence that they would help in the fight against “Vareism” and the “contractorcombine” of South Philadelphia. “The voting machine tells the truth—records votes as
cast,” read one editorial. “The paper ballot can be altered and false returns made.” It
added that “every political corruptionist in the city will do his utmost to destroy this
barrier to fraud.”39 In a “news” story that essentially repeated verbatim a public
statement from the Committee of Seventy supporting the machine, the paper wrote
that the machines would make for speedier and more accurate returns and would
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potentially save the city money in the long run.40 The paper also warned readers that
the Vare group had phrased the ballot questions in a deliberately confusing manner, so
that voting “no” on the ballot actually meant retaining the machines 41 When the
voters of the city overwhelmingly supported the continued use of the machines the
next day, The Inquirer reported that
“[t]he completely dominated organization wards were helpless to stem,
with their comparatively small majorities, the crushing landslide of votes
for the retention o f the appliances with such superlative smoothness in
yesterday’s heavy balloting.”42
Not everyone thought that the machines were entirely successful in defeating
corruption, however. The same day’s issue of the Inquirer carried a charge by S. Davis
Wilson, special counsel looking into election irregularities, that Republican party
leaders in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Erie, and other cities had tampered with the
machines so that they refused to register Democratic votes. The Republicans were able
to do this, Davis charged, by the use of concealed rubber bands, buttons, and small
pieces of metal.43 There were other problems. Some people had trouble using the new
devices.44 The machine left no permanent mark of the voter’s intent, so there was no
paper trail to follow in the event that the returns were disputed. Although reasonably
accurate, the machines could not be made perfectly so: they could always be relied
upon to make a certain percentage of mistakes. They were also unwieldy, and
extremely expensive.45
Most of these problems were downplayed or ignored by the defenders of the
machine, since its advantages over what had come before were so clear—if people had
problem using the machines, then perhaps that was the fault of the voter, not the
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technology.46 Moreover, any potential disadvantages had to be weighed against the
machines’ advantages, and undoubtedly many of the claims that the pro-machine press
made for the new technology were true. They did make corruption more difficult, if
they did not eliminate it entirely. In fact, in terms o f making it difficult to “fix” a vote,
the Shoup machines were probably more effective than the later electronic and
computerized systems that would replace them.47
What the machine also did was to cultivate a far different understanding of
politics and of the political act of voting than the nineteenth century ballot had done.
Unlike the act of voting in earlier times, voting with a machine did not serve as
moment for the voter to distinguish himself (or now, herself) in any clear or obvious
way from the rest of the public. The secret ballot celebrated the features that voters
shared with one another—their equality, the freedom. The voter was no longer, at least
not publicly, a Republican or a Democrat but simply a good American, a good citizen.
Newspapers presented exemplary instances of voting. The day after Election Day,
newspaper readers of the era were generally treated to stories like that o f Ellis Curtin,
a veteran of the “Immortal Light Brigade,” dying of paralysis, who nevertheless took
time to cast a vote.48 Or a voter from Illinois who cast his 1920 vote for Harding in the
same building that he had voted for Lincoln sixty years earlier.49 The new exemplary
voter was no longer one who voted the straight partisan line, but the man who
reaffirmed the greatness o f American democracy by participating in its central,
legitimizing act.50 Challenges to that new voter were going to be somewhat different
than what they had been. There was no longer much danger in getting beaten up at the
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polling booth, or having one’s vote stolen by the Organization. Instead, a much
different set o f problems would come into play, ones that were linked with a much
different image of the voting public, requiring a much different set of skills.

The evolving face o f the voting public:
Women’s role on Election Day began to change dramatically during this
period, horn their tum-of-the-century appearances in return crowds, to the moment in
1916, when suffragettes stood outside Philadelphia’s polls passing out parallel lists of
candidates listing which candidates had declared themselves for or against the suffrage
cause. That year activists also had their own “election wire” to gather returns from
across the country, especially with an eye toward women candidates—two women
were running for Congress that year—and the suffrage cause.51
The Presidential election of 1920 was the first in the history of Philadelphia in
which the woman residents of that city were legally allowed to go to the polls, the
nineteenth amendment having been passed in August of that year.52 In November,
Election Day became a celebration of women’s entry into public life, and the
appearance o f women at the polls was taken to cement their place in electorate. Alice
Paul, national chairman of the Women’s Party, was quoted in an Election Day story
saying that, “[w]hen millions of women have cast their ballots at the polls, the
amendment will be placed beyond all danger of legal attack.” Mrs. Barclay H.
Warburton, chairman of city’s Republican women’s committee, told reporters that she
felt like a signer of the Declaration of Independence. “Thank offering” sentinels
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parked themselves near polls, handing out pamphlets outlining the career of noted area
suffragette Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, and requesting donations for endowed chairs at
Biyn Mawr and the Women’s Medical College of Pennsylvania in Dr. Shaw’s name.
Women were reported to be taking home crayons and bits of paper from the polls as
souvenirs.53
The final success of the women’s rights champions was so overwhelming that
it seemed to pull all partisan groups into a sort o f larger social harmony. In the midst
of battles between the Vare Brothers—leaders of South Philly’s Republican
“Organization”—and local reformist groups, and the bad blood created by a nasty
campaign in the Presidential race, the issue of women’s right to vote seemed to be
something everyone could agree on.54 Old enmities between “suffs” and “anti-suffs”
disappeared. Leaders of the women’s arms o f both major parties worked together to
cover milk bottles with red, white, and blue covers as a way of reminding women to
vote. In Camden, female students from the Camden High School stationed themselves
at polls canvass women voters over support o f a bond issue concerning the CamdenPhiladelphia bridge.55
The expansion of the suffrage to include women meant an arrival of the notion,
if not the reality, o f universal suffrage. Although some groups were still forbidden
from voting, this fact was no longer the public issue that it had been with the
suffragette movement and, to some extent, with the exclusion o f blacks from the
polls.56 But the passage of the nineteenth amendment did not now mean that the voting
public of the city, or the country, was equivalent to the adult population, for the
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electorate began to shrink in other areas. In 1920, less than half the registered
population cast a vote for President, a radical change in country where just twenty
years before more than three quarters of eligible citizens had voted.57 Although
partisan papers still used their editorial pages to rally the troops on Election Day, in
the twentieth century they also tended to emphasize the importance of simply voting.58
Linked in many ways to evangelical movements like Prohibition, Progressives used
the discourse of moral censure and stem advice. Non-voters were laggards, slackers.
They needed to rouse themselves. “Don’t be a sluggard in politics,” blared an Election
Day ad from the Bureau of Municipal Research. American democracy was a game at
which everyone ought to participate. “Politics—professional politics—is a sport for
the few. Government is a game which we all can play.”59 Other suggestions were
raised. A group of women touring the state for the League of Women Voters stressed
the need to make voting simpler, in order to increase the presence at the polls. The
League, and the women’s arms of the political parties, were especially active on
Election Day, driving women to the polls.60
Along with the question of the vitality of Philadelphia’s voting public—
signaled by worries over turnout—came the question o f its wisdom. If the central issue
of Election Day was a question of obtaining the best information at one’s disposable
and applying it correctly, then it was a question of technique. There were better and
worse answers. Candidates won through non-partisan appeals. Experts were central.
Given the demands made upon the lonely figure of the individual voter, the dangers
she had to navigate in order to perform her proper duty at the polls, it was natural that
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the Election Day performance provoked worries. In the early 1920s, Walter Lippman
famously raised doubts about the ability of the modem citizen to accomplish his or her
duties. Although Lippman’s thesis was broader than the question of voting, it was
clearly pertinent to that event. Could the voter be trusted to choose the correct
candidate, given the rather sporadic attention she paid to politics?61
Theories o f propaganda, and worries about the persuasive effects of the new
forms of the mass media, raised further fears about the ability of manipulative
politicians to steer the public away from its proper course.62 If changes to Election
Day were making it more and more difficult for the opponent to cheat through bribery,
etc. then the new danger was that he would distort the voter’s reason was through
honeyed words and illusion. In 1932, the Inquirer compared the facts and the careful
arguments of Hoover with the empty phrases of Roosevelt, and the latter’s concepts
like “a new deal,” which defied analysis. Roosevelt’s campaign performances were
merely “fiery rockets flashing across the sky,” “the painting of a beautiful aurora
borealis, without substance,” “a display of oratorical pinwheels, brilliant to the eye,
but meaningless.” The paper warned that the situation was too serious to prefer a
candidate because “he smiles at us and entertains us,”63 and the day after the election,
its editors grumbled that “there has been far less serious thinking in this campaign than
there should have been.”64
The answer to the problem was information. The Progressive voter relied upon
facts, upon information gleaned through the mass media in the course of the campaign.
Her role would henceforth be to judge to facts, to weigh them, to sift through them and
257

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

compare them with each other. In the Sunday before 1928’s Election Day, the Inquirer
told its readers that Sunday morning was a good time to give serious consideration to
the issues.65 The decision as to which candidate was best for the country could be
arrived at through dedication and application of “common-sense.” The preferred
candidate was thus the candidate o f non-partisanship, of simple reason. (In the pages
o f the Inquirer, that candidate was of course the Republican one).66 Intelligence was
key. Labor was “too intelligent’' to vote for the likes of radicals like Bryan and La
Follette. In 1920, after the landslide victory of Harding, Inquirer editors pooh-poohed
the notion that “the labor vote” could be delivered en masse. Samuel Gumpers and his
ilk might meet and issue orders, but when the working man entered the voting booth
he was an individual, beyond the reach of the labor bosses. Then, they used their
intelligence and reason to choose what was best for themselves and the country. The
individual’s good sense triumphed over group biases 67
There is a link between worries over the intelligence of the voting public and
the disturbing trend of declining voter turnout, one never directly mentioned in the
calls to vote. As McGerr has pointed out, one of the reasons that many reformers and
social scientists were so disturbed about the voting rate is that they thought that the
non-voters were more likely than not to be stable and well-educated businessmen or
professionals. They feared that the modem public was biased toward the menial
laborer, the immigrant, the voter more likely to be under the control of the machine.68
That this suspected vision of the voting public was nearly the exact opposite o f what
social scientists were finding—it was the less well-to-do, the less settled, the working
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classes, who were dropping from the voting rolls—should not be surprising. After all,
it was getting hard to gain a very clear picture o f the voting public on Election Day
anymore. Much o f the action of the day had removed to other spaces, or other points
in time. Election Day was becoming a day when less and less seemed to be going on.

Election night in progressive America:
The Election night spectacle continued throughout early twentieth century
Philadelphia, centering now more and more on the newspaper. Newsboys would hawk
Election Day extras announcing the winner by as early as nine o’clock, loudspeakers
and later electronic billboards blared forth returns. Newspapers like the Inquirer, The
Press, and the Evening Bulletin continued to provide entertainment and fireworks
outside their buildings for crowds awaiting national returns, with a quartet that led the
crowd in the singing of patriotic anthems like, “My Country ‘Tis of Thee,” or
vaudeville entertainments and mime skits. Every Presidential Election night in the
early twentieth century outside the paper’s building featured moving pictures, which
gradually became more sophisticated with time. The announcement of a Presidential
victory would produce pictures of the new President and Vice President upon the
screens.69 Then cannons from the roof of the newspaper building would begin to
boom. Following the announcement of Harding’s victory in 1920, The Inquirer was so
excited to see a Republican in the White House after eight years of Democratic control
that the cannons fired repeatedly until, a reporter wrote, the metal began to glow.70
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Since part o f what allowed the nation to celebrate itself every four years was
the new communication technology that brought it closer and closer together, Election
Day as celebration of the nation also became a celebration of that technology. In the
early days o f moving pictures, the Inquirer would trumpet the wonders o f the
“stereopticon.”71 New technologies brought new wonders. In 1908 The Evening
Bulletin, whose offices lay just next to city hall, announced the introduction of the
“telautoscope” for delivering the returns. Viewers would see a white light flashed on
the screen, and then within that light, a giant shadowy pen that would start noting
down return figures.72 In 1912, the assembled crowd before the Inquirer people was
told to hold still for a moment while its picture was taken. A light flashed, and an hour
later the photo was shone on the large white screen used for displaying returns. The
crowd cheered this wonder o f photography, the most dramatic and explicit method yet
of the body politic watching itself on Election night.73 In 1920, a huge searchlight,
operated by Army engineers, filled the skies over the city. At scheduled periods, the
light would move back and forth across the sky in order to provide residents with
returns from the most doubtful states: 9:15 for Maine, 9:30 for New York, and so on.
A North-South movement meant that Republicans had taken the state, a East-West
movement meant a Democratic victory, and no movement at all meant the state was
still too close to call.74 The telephone and the telegraph provided greater wonders yet.
In 1924, the Inquirer noted that returns from California had moved across the country
more quickly than a man could have saddled a horse in Washington’s day.75

260

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

But even as the technology behind the Election night spectacular grew ever
more impressive, the crowds for such events were getting smaller. People increasingly
were doing their celebrating in segregated spaces—hotel restaurants, cafes, theaters.
City restaurants like Reuben’s or Golden Gate, and the Food Fair commercial museum
promised their Election night patrons that Election returns would be broadcast
throughout the evening. Theaters announced that they would deliver returns in the
intermissions of their productions.76 By 1932, the Inquirer gave up on moving pictures
and return screens, choosing instead to emphasize its radio production, its telephone
service, and its Election night Extra editions. Visitors to the newspaper’s office were
promised mere loudspeakers, blaring out the radio broadcast into the street.77
Ironically, some o f the same communication technologies that were bringing
the nation into a single national picture on Election night were allowing the local
celebrants themselves to experience Election night apart horn each other. One of these
technologies was the telephone: a service for obtaining results by telephone was
already in place by the 1908.78 These services became increasingly sophisticated in the
years to come, as papers like the Inquirer hired upwards of 100 extra operators for the
night and began to use a special phone line to distribute returns; its Election Day
edition made a point of telling readers how to dial the special number for returns and
warning them not to phone the paper’s regular number.79 By the 1920, thousands of
people were receiving their Election night news via the paper’s phone service, rather
than heading down to the comer of Market and Eleventh streets in order to push and
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struggle against the center city crowds.80 Citizens could now learn the contours of the
political nation without ever leaving their homes.
Radio accelerated the move into the private space of the citizen’s home. The
influence of that new medium spread even more rapidly and thoroughly than did the
telephone. In 1924, Democratic John Davis became the first ever presidential
candidate to use an electronic mass medium to transmit his Election Eve appeal to
voters, thereby beginning an American political tradition.81 That same year, stations in
Philadelphia and throughout the eastern seaboard held Election night specials that
featured interspersed news o f returns with music and other popular entertainment. One
station, WIP, announced in 1924 that it would broadcast its special from within the
confines of the venerable Union League, and hinted at commentary from various
league members, such as former Republican governors Stuart and Smith.82 In 1940,
the same station hooked up with Bob Vale, editor of the Daily News, for an election
night analysis.83
Although the segregation of the Election night celebration had started long
before the introduction of radio, this new medium did make such segregation easier,
by making it more attractive. Even more than the telephone, radio was able to ape the
style of the public celebration o f Election night. Specials became ever more elaborate,
as stations added commentary, music and vaudeville acts to their programming. In
1928, a special produced by Warner Brothers featured an array of Broadway stars.84
And yet, despite the flagging health of the newspaper’s return spectacle, the
public celebration of the vote did not disappear in the Progressive era. Reversing their
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laggard behavior o f four years earlier, upwards of 1,000 Union League members
marched down Broad Street for Herbert Hoover in 1928, following the announcement
of his landslide win over A1 Smith. They carried a banner reading, “Love of Country
wins,” and waved American flags.85 Earlier that evening, promising returns from
urban centers in the east had sent Smith supporters outside droves to cheer for their
man. Groups of disheveled young men carrying pictures of Smith walked up and down
the street, or yelled out the windows o f cars, their windshields plastered with
Democratic posters. Along South Broad Street, between City Hall and Walnut, the two
headquarters of the Hoover and Smith campaigns blared returns at each other with
competing loudspeakers.86 In 1932, a group o f Democratic loyalists went to the home
of Republican boss William Vare with a brass band and sang patriotic songs outside
the residence. Another group marched down Broad Street with brooms, shouting, “a
new broom sweeps clean.” Celebrants at the headquarters of the women’s branch of
the party sang “Happy Days are here again.”87 Similar scenes of bedlam were enacted
four years later, when a horse drawn wagon covered with Roosevelt banners, and 150
“Roosevelt Couriers” (a group of young women supporting the President’s re-election)
marched through the streets of Center City.88 In 1940, the city’s Republican campaign
chairman Robert T. McCracken was quoted as saying that only “paupers” voted for
Roosevelt. That remark, which national Republican leaders tried unsuccessfully to
ignore, brought a brisk business in “Paupers for Roosevelt” buttons on Election
night.89
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These Election night revels were different from their nineteenth century
predecessors. They were, in the first place, considerably less dangerous. Only six fires
were reported in Center City on Election night, 1932, and only one serious incident
occurred, when sparks from a fire lit up a room in brewery. (More of a nuisance than
the fires themselves were alarms for non-existent or minor fires that sent fire
companies chasing through the city and cost the city almost $7,000 for the evening.)90
Although there was some bitterness in the air—Democrats jeered Republicans in the
street, and the leader of the G.O.P. women’s auxiliary snapped that Republicans who
had voted for Roosevelt “should be run out of the city,” there were no knifings, no gun
shots.91 The numerous police officers sent to keep a watch on the crowds had little to
do but try to direct traffic through the tie-ups enveloping the downtown core. “The
attitude of the celebrants was the good-natured attitude o f the average American
citizen who has achieved his particular ideal.” To the extent that there was anger
among the population, it came not from political fights but from frustrated motorists
unable to get through the crowds.92
The reason behind the celebration was also much different now. In the
nineteenth century, men had come to the center of the city because this was the
quickest way to get a clear idea of how the race was going. Now, the downtown party
became, almost exclusively, a celebration of the victory, an expression of public joy. It
was also a celebration of the distinctiveness, not of this or that group within the nation,
but of the nation itself. Mass media at the time carried reports o f changes in European
governments, o f the rise of fascism and communist dictatorships. By the very fact of
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the celebration, Americans told themselves that they were different from this. Election
Day was what helped define them against the threatening ideological clouds abroad.93
The Election night o f 1940 illustrates this perhaps better than any other. For
over 75 years, the headquarters of the Union League, on Broad Street, a block and a
half away from City Hall, had been the home of Philadelphia’s Republican leadership.
Given the dominance of that party in both Pennsylvania and Philadelphia for most of
the second half of the nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth, the clubhouse
also became the center o f Philadelphia political life, and a major shrine on Election
night, especially on those occasions when Republican’s were able to announce victory
in the gubernatorial, mayoral, and presidential races.94
The symbolic importance of the Union League made it ripe for mockery and
derision when the Democrats, under Franklin Delano Roosevelt, finally did manage to
break the G.O.P.’s stranglehold on the city and on the national consensus. In 1932,
long-suffering Democrats went nearly delirious with Roosevelt’s victory, and the
logical spot to vent their spirits was in front of the citadel of power and arrogance that
had too long presumed to rule over them. They marched up to the doors of the Union
League, twice. Early in the evening, they carried a stuffed toy donkey wearing a high
hat before the clubhouse. Then at 11 pm, about 1,000 Roosevelt supporters serenaded
club members with Bronx cheers and threatened to break its doors down.95 Again in
1936, crowds of Democratic supporters stormed the League steps and nearly
threatened to break its doors down, while the club’s members sullenly sat inside and
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stewed about their loss of power. Eventually fed up with the public humiliation
entailed by such a scene, they ended up calling on police to disperse the crowds.96
By 1940, the League’s membership had not needed to make an Election night
parade down Broad for over a decade, and it was clear that this year would be no
different. Polls had given President Roosevelt a clear lead over his Republican
challenger, Wendell Wilkie. In his Election eve radio Monday night, a time in which
the candidate normally exhorted his supporters to get to the polls, Wilkie sounded
almost as though he were already conceding the race. He called on Americans to rally
around whoever won the Presidency, no matter how bitter they might feel after the
election. “People of America,” Wilkie said, “I want to end this campaign without
bitterness. There had been no bitterness in my heart, and there is none now.”97 Perhaps
this is why, according to Inquirer reporter R.E.S. Thompson, the League members
took the loss on Tuesday night much better than they had on previous occasions. Once
Roosevelt’s victory was clear, they moved out to the clubhouse balconies. Under the
red, white and blue lights spelling out Willkie and McNary, and the legend, “Love of
Country Leads,” they started to joke and speak to the Democratic throng assembled
below.98
One league matron, moving down the clubhouse steps and home, ran into a
group of young men with their arms around each other, enjoying the evening. The
woman was wearing a mink coat, an orchard, and a Wilkie button. The young men
sported a “We told you so” banner across their chests. “The matron looked rattled and
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stood stock still,” wrote Thompson. Then one of the youths threw an arm around her
and said: “we love you anyway, lady.”
Her face was a blank for a second. Then she smiled, then she laughed.
She got hold o f herself and answered:
“That’s swell. I’m for you, too.”99
Even Republican reporters seemed transfixed by the events of Election night, 1940, as
men and women poured off of trains from surrounding areas and into the city’s streets.
Estimates from police put the total at around 250,000, greater than New Year’s eve, or
even Mummers Parade crowds. Without the slightest evidence of malice or ill-feeling,
they walked through downtown in celebration of Roosevelt’s election. Police
remarked upon the unusually happy mood of the crowd. “It was almost tangible—not
merely good nature, but an evident desire to let bygones be bygones, and to pursue a
new unity in the face of outward challenge.” A union band leading the first
Democratic victory parade up Broad Street halted in front of the Union League and
played the “Star Spangled Banner,” while thousands of celebrants removed their hats,
and sudden, spine-tingling silence crept through the massed ranks.100

The enemies of the public:
Election Day in Philadelphia was a less violently partisan one in the twentieth
century than it had been in the nineteenth. Philadelphians of all political stripes
seemed to be comfortable with the idea that members of the opposition were also good
Americans, that some larger sets of principles were accepted by members of all
political stripes, that there was something that linked Americans as Americans.
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Election Day was still a moment of partisanship, it would inevitably be that, but this
partisanship was no longer threatening. Increasingly, Election Day was able to
accomplish the difficult task of embodying mild partisan differences wrapped in a
larger, unified national community.
To the extent that Election Day provided an image of the enemy, this enemy
was increasingly conceived along lines other than strictly party ones. On the one hand,
there was the shadowy figure of the boss. Philadelphia was of course suffused by
machine politics in this era, but often it became useful to rally Election Day troops by
referring to a particular boss, and a particular threat: the “organization” o f South
Philadelphia State Senator William Vare and his older brothers. Vare was a useful
Election Day villain because he was also a number of things that the Progressive
citizen was not: working class (Vare had been a contractor before he entered politics),
vulgar, corrupt, comfortable with physical coercion at the polls.101 Editorials were
printed against “Vareism” and corruption. “The old machine is still powerful, but it
can and should be smashed today,” the Inquirer wrote one Election Day.102 The next
day, it blamed the defeat of a loan bill, which the editorial staff had favored, on the
“Vare combine forces.”103 The other useful opponent on the Progressive Election Day
was the radical, the socialist. In 1924, the Inquirer spent far more effort attacking third
party candidate Bob La Follette than it did on the Democratic nominee John Davis. It
urged readers to overthrow the “American menace,” represented by La Follette and
socialist leader Eugene Debs.104
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By the 1932 election, however, these “dangerous” ideas had migrated to a
much more impressive figure, the Democratic Presidential candidate himself.
Philadelphia’s largely Republican media spent much of their campaign copy in the
1930s attacking F.D.R. and his “dangerous” and foreign ideas, comparing him to
communists, fascists, and dictators generally. Here is one example:
Citizens:
Today is YOUR day.
Today, YOU have the opportunity to do YOUR part in saving
America.
Don’t neglect this priceless opportunity.
YOUR vote is needed in the great battle of the ballots fought in
this country today to drive from the seat of American Government the
subversive doctrines and dogmas of the un-American New Deal.105

“We Don’t Want This Country to Ape Soviet Russia: Vote to Save America!”
screamed another front page editorial the Saturday before the 1936 vote. A cartoon
showed a battered Uncle Sam with his arms around “the American Voter,” saying it
was “all up to you” to save the American form of government from “alien ideas.” A
front page ad asked, “WHO IS THE MASTER IN AMERICA: FRANKLIN
DELANO ROOSEVELT OR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.” Ads were also run
“warning” voters on relief that WPA bureaucrats would attempt to illegally force them
to support Roosevelt.106 In turn, the Record, Philadelphia’s only major Democratic
paper at the time, went after Roosevelt’s opponents as “Economic Royalists.”107 AntiRoosevelt hysteria was the result o f “wormwood and gall.”108 Jack Kelly, the leader of
the city’s Democratic forces, uncovered a plot in which phony Republican machine
inspectors were to head into largely Democratic districts and hold up the count with
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fake “inspections.”109 If the Republicans charged FDR with being some sort of
political Svengali intent on seducing and corrupting the public, the Record used
another charge that would become increasingly familiar in the twentieth century: the
media conspiracy. The campaign had not been a fair one, because the country’s media
were in the pay of the G.O.P., the paper argued, and had presented only one side.110
Although it had added some features, the Election Day debate within
Philadelphia’s city papers during the Roosevelt years also had something of the past in
it. Old tropes reappeared—the desire to link the opponent with a foreign power in
order to discredit him, the label of “aristocracy.” This style of debate, this aspect of the
Election Day ritual, moved the discussion away from a focus on shadowy opponents
outside the party system, and brought it back into the voting public itself. This feature
was of a piece of the revival of the Election Day celebration more generally, during
the same period. The celebration and the contest were elements of one and the same
event.

Conclusion:
The experience o f voting in Philadelphia in the first four decades of the
twentieth century was no longer a very effective method for members of the public to
declare any form of social particularity, as it had been in the nineteenth century. As a
result first of the secret ballot, and then the introduction of the voting machine, voting
now served simply to mark one’s membership in the American public. That group was
marked off by its distinction from illegitimate members of the body politic like the
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city’s machine, and foreign elements like fascism and socialism. It was also
distinguished simply through the fact that it was not part o f that increasingly large
number of “slackers” who chose not to go to the polls on Election Day. What might
have served to define this latter group from citizens who did vote was never made
clear in public discourse. They were a puzzle, a problem. Perhaps they simply lacked
civic enthusiasm, or did not understand the importance o f voting. Newspapers
attempted to rectify the problem by harping upon the duty of the citizen, and the
central role that voting played in democratic life.
If the vote itself became less o f a public event, so too did the Election night
celebration. Introductions of new technology allowed members of the public to
segregate themselves into smaller spaces—bars and restaurants—or to stay home
altogether. To the extent that the physical congregation of citizens in the center of the
city had served to communicate some idea of the public to itself, then that message
was increasingly lost. Significantly, the decline of Election night bonfires, a symbol of
the city’s younger residents of the excitement that the election had produced,
disappeared not with their formal banning, but with the decline of the Election night
crowd.
This change did not come about in a vacuum. It was part and parcel of a
number of other shifts in the way that democratic citizenship was conceived, in the
way that the public was configured as a political entity, the place of partisanship in
American democracy, and the notion o f what purpose electoral politics served.111 As
politics became more a matter of technique, a process o f simply determining, through
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the proper use of social knowledge, the proper course for the polity, the construction
of what an Election Day was good for changed as well.
The exception to this argument seems to be the decade o f the 1930s.
Roosevelt’s policies were a direct attack on the political consensus that had developed
over the previous twenty years. As a result, the attacks in Philadelphia’s Republican
press were more strident, as was his defense in the city’s democratic mouthpiece, the
Record. Opponents were more likely to identify Roosevelt with groups outside the
legitimate body politic, with “foreign” ideas from communist Russia. Reports of
violence and corruption, on the part not of the machine but of the partisan opposition,
were raised in the partisan press. The Election night celebration also make a
comeback, as Democrats gathered in public to cheer the success of their candidate, and
also the victory he represented for them over the city’s social and financial elite.
Part of the dynamic of the Election Day is the movement to bind the together
what had been tom apart. An Election Day celebration that focuses overmuch on what
makes the members of the polity similar, a celebration that marks the victory over an
opponent who is not in the end so very different than myself, is one that lacks drama.
Philadelphians in the 1930s did not have that problem. Popular discourse clearly
perceived the differences between FDR and his Republican opponents, and the
Election Day rhetoric from the newspapers probably strikes the modem ear as
somewhat hysterical, even demagogic. But at least when the citizens went out to
celebrate the day, they were celebrating the healing of a real breach that had occurred.
And they could point to this very act of overcoming that division as the feature that
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defined them against the foreign challenge. In doing so, they were able to draw on a
set of cultural practices that were still near enough to serve the purpose of illustrating
that fact to themselves. But as the city and the nation moved farther from the political
culture of the nineteenth century, those practices would eventually be lost.
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Chapter Eight:
Election Day in the Television Age
Four years after the 1940 celebration that so charmed Philadelphia’s
journalists, the city’s streets lay mostly quiet on Election night. Although newspaper
reports noted a noisy crowd of some 50,000 in New York City’s Times Square
cheering returns that gave Franklin Roosevelt a record fourth term, in Philadelphia
people watched the electronic billboards and listened to the blaring megaphones
without comment. The next day, reporters credited the sober response to the ongoing
war effort—Philadelphia, like the rest of the country, was involved in a more serious
battle than the one taking place between Republicans and Democrats.1 Yet in 1948,
more than three years after World War II was ended, the celebration was quieter yet.
Day-after stories noted, with a mixture of something like amazement and dismay, that
the city’s streets were deserted. Owners of downtown drinking and eating
establishments were despondent—Election night was one of the most important of the
year, and the loss in expected revenue would be hard to take.2
In fact, Philadelphia’s Election Day celebration shrank so much in the second
half of the 20th century that by the end it was just about big enough to fit into an
electronic screen, 17 square inches large. Television stations first began widespread
broadcasting of Election night returns to Philadelphians in 1948. That year, the
Inquirer and television station WFIL joined together to present viewers with a night
time’s worth of numbers and commentators. The broadcast was from the paper’s city
desk, and featured Inquirer reporters as expert analysts, with chalkboards in the
background that listed running totals.3 Within ten years, the major networks had
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brought in huge computers that allowed them to predict Presidential victories by the
early evening, making other sources of Election night coverage redundant.4 By 1968,
most Americans were getting their Election night returns from television. Newspapers
gave day after analysis and were used by some for supplementary information. Radio
had virtually ceased to be a source of information about returns.3
This chapter will mostly be about television, since it is through television that
Philadelphians and other Americans increasingly experienced the national ritual of
Election Day. Television brought the Election Day celebrants inside, enticing them to
stay in their living rooms with extensive analysis, computer graphics, and the delivery
o f ever-faster results. Living room celebrants received the same information as
newspaper crowds and restaurant-goers, but without the disadvantages: cigar smoke,
drunks in the street, braying winners, sullen losers, noisy, ill-mannered ruffians
throughout, com-pone humor, vulgar slogans and songs, and out-of-tune horns. It was
no longer necessary to brave the indignities of the democratic, vulgar herd in order to
discover the picture of the political nation. Television transformed the national ritual
and civic ritual of Election Day into a series of moving pictures on a screen.
But was not only through its direct effects on the way that the Election Day
celebration took place that television effected the meaning of Election Day in the late
twentieth century. It also played an indirect role in understanding Election Day, as a
metaphor for talking about the more general dissatisfaction that surrounded the day:
and charges that it had become a shallow and dull event, and in the end perhaps a
meaningless one.
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The change in Election Day space:
While the disappearance of the Election night celebration from the streets of
the Center City is the most notable change in the post-War era of Philadelphia’s
Election Day, it would be wrong to so say that the celebration disappeared altogether.
Philadelphians still did get a view o f Election night festivities, only these were from a
distance. Political parties and the campaign staffs of the candidates started opening the
doors of their private celebrations, with fancy buffet trays, balloons, confetti, bands,
shouting and cheers, to the general public via the television set.6 Eager to fill up air
time and to give their remote reports some color, local and national television
newscasts often broadcast clips from these private parties, featuring campaign workers
in the background—either ecstatic or depressed, as the case might be—and quotes
from VIPs explaining how to interpret the response of the voters.7
At the same time that the televised celebration of the election replaced the
festivities in the streets, individualized Election night celebrations began to spring up.
Or rather, a push was made to develop the idea. An article in the 1952 Election Day
edition of the Inquirer provided recipes for an Election night party. The paper
suggested decorating the house with red, white and blue ribbons. It explained how
homemakers could make up a political centerpiece: a grapefruit or orange, covered
with the names of various favorite candidates.8 A few people must have taken the
suggestions to heart, since newspaper columnists began writing about these parties in
their Election Day stories.9 These get-togethers came across in the pages o f the
280

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

newspapers as genteel affairs, very different from the raucous crowds o f an earlier age.
Just how widespread they now are, or ever became, is not clear. Polls about Election
Day behavior tend to focus on voting and related political behavior stumping for a
candidate, driving voters to polls, displaying a sign in the window. They do not ask
about attending Election night parties. Certainly, the parties do not seem to figure
greatly in the public discourse surrounding Election Day during this period, suggesting
that they were, and are, a rather restricted phenomenon. The most plausible hypothesis
is that if one was a certain kind o f person—well-educated, wealthy, politically
involved—one was more likely to attend such a party, from time to time, just as one
was more likely to vote. Election night parties were performances of social status, put
on for the benefit of a select group of friends and families.
The changing space in which these celebrations took place suggests one way in
which television transformed the Election Day space. Distinctions between public and
private space were more difficult to discern, now. Television replaced an actual,
physical space—the center of the city, the local tavem or restaurant—with an
electronic space in which viewers met without coming into actual bodily contact. The
living room, long considered private space, had become the location for the
celebration o f the central political act o f most viewers’ lives. Private parties of the
candidate and workers, heretofore private and kept out of public eye, were likewise
brought into the public space. The ordinary citizen, outside o f party politics, watched
others celebrating the victory. Viewers did not participate in the celebration of
Election night by marching in the streets or blowing on homs. They participated
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through watching others cheer and dance in hotel rooms and restaurants. Although
television precipitated this move, it was soon enough followed by newspapers, which
began to center their day-after stories on the reactions o f campaign workers and
partisans at the candidates’ parties rather than the reactions o f people in the streets.10
In the Television Age, the private victory celebrations or the private losses of
the candidate were no longer really private. They were, in a sense, public
performances o f the campaign and the party. In 1972, a man named Perry Abrams,
who called himself the national mascot for the Republican party, dressed up in a
Elephant suit for President Nixon’s 1972 re-election party. Abrams and a young
blonde woman wearing a President Nixon straw hat, along with about fifteen other
people, congregated in front of the cameras, dancing and cheering as the favorable poll
numbers came. The band playing the event complained because “no one but the
elephant was dancing.” The musicians misunderstood the rationale of the party.
Abrams and other Republicans were not dancing for themselves; they were dancing
for others, the folks at home, who might otherwise think that the GOP was a party of
squares and gray suited businessmen.11
As a result of the public intrusion into the once-private world o f the candidate
celebration, the ordinary citizen could glimpse divisions and infighting that might
have remained hidden in earlier times. In 1960, the Independent Committee for
Kennedy celebrated apart from the Democratic Party.12 This became standard practice
on Philadelphia’s Election night. These separate parties indicated wider cultural and
ideological splits among traditional political allies. In 1964, the Inquirer ran several
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stories highlighting the fact that both major parties were holding two different Center
City parties on Election night. While the city’s G.O.P party chairman was busy
denying the existence o f “Goldwaterites” at the Republican official Election night
party on Fifteenth Street, a reporter noted that Goldwater volunteers had started up
their own celebration at the Warwick Hotel, several blocks away, complete with their
own catering, phone lines, and tote boards for tallying the returns.13 The split between
Democrats was based on the distinction between “vols” and “pols.” Regular
Democratic workers (the pols) met at the party headquarters in the Bellevue-Statford
and crowed over the Democrats’ overwhelming victory in the city. At the same time,
the Volunteers for Johnson, a more reformist bunch, celebrated Johnson’s victory and
bitterly discussed Genevieve Blatter’s Senate loss. The volunteers blamed the defeat in
part on the city’s decade-old Democratic machine, which had supported a different
candidate in the primary. Amid accusations of sell-outs and ethnic prejudice (Blatter’s
Democratic primary opponent had been an Italian American), the two groups had little
to say to one another on Election night, and little contact. Joe Clark, leader of the
city’s reform forces, made an appearance at the Volunteer celebration but not the
regular party celebration.14 The day after the 1972, Frank Rizzo, newly in control of
the city machine, was pictured holding a dead chicken with a McGovem/Shriver
button pinned to its chest. The mayor had supported President Nixon over the
Democratic candidate, and was celebrating the Republican President’s win over at the
Democratic Party headquarters. Meanwhile, at the candidate’s headquarters,
McGovern’s more radical supporters seethed.15
283

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Eventually, national campaigns for President developed their own, massive
celebratory parties that the winning candidate could then use to define himself for the
country, a sort o f warm-up for the Inauguration Ball. In 1992, national viewers saw
Bill Clinton and his wife step up to the balcony of the Arkansas Governor’s mansion
as the people of Little Rock cheered deliriously and Fleetwood Mac blared over the
speakers. A new generation was taking control of the country, one that had come of
age during the 1960s and the 1970s, its values—and its taste in music—more in tune
with the nation.16 On the 2000 Election night, A1 Gore held a huge party in Nashville,
TN, his home state. George Bush celebrated with a group of country and western acts
outside the Governor’s mansion in Austin.17 As with the Clinton’s bash, these parties
probably had a symbolic purpose. Bush’s identification with country music helped to
cement his image as the champion of small town, rural, middle class white Americans,
what would come to be known as “red America” following the Election night. Gore’s
party could be read as an attempt to reject the notion that Gore was a Washington
insider and East Coast liberal, by playing up his Southern roots.
Two points ought to be made about this change in Election night space. The
first relates to the richness of the experience. In one sense, television resulted in a
diminution or a thinning out of the experience of Election night. However intriguing
these parties might be, whatever glimpses they might provide the democratic viewer of
the party lives of the powerful and politically famous, it is hard to believe that they
could have meant for as vivid an experience as the older style of celebration. They
engaged only two senses—sight and sound—and these only in a partial form. Earlier
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celebrations had called on all senses—the bright flares of exploding crackers and
bonfires in the night air, the sharp sounds of cannons booming, the huge roar of
thousands of people cheering, the smell of gunpowder and beer and cigar smoke. The
spectacle offered by the television was a poor substitute. Radio broadcasts had tried to
simulate some of the excitement of the Election night celebration, with vaudeville and
music interspersed between the returns. Television dispensed with entertainment, and
played up its advantages, which were speed, a wealth of numbers, and the technical
ability to perform intricate quantitative analyses of these numbers.18
The other important change resulting from the transformed Election night
space relates to the question of segregation. The nineteenth-century Election night
spectacle was a remarkably varied affair. Working class voters from Squire
McMullen’s Fourth Ward, middle class voters marching down from the suburbs, the
rich and powerful, all came down to the same central point to see what was what. It
was a more open, inclusive event than the vote itself, certainly, since several groups
who were not allowed to vote —including Asian immigrants, women, children—
eventually found themselves waiting outside the newspaper offices or party
headquarters. Partisans of differing political persuasion, nativists and Irish workers,
Catholics and Jews, losers and winners, were all part of the democratic mix of
Election night. People that normally might not have much to do with one another were
forced to abide their neighbors, at least for a few hours.
The televised spectacle was a calmer sort of event, because the citizen was not
bothered by the presence o f other social types. To the extent that the citizen did wish
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to celebrate with others, it would be part of a private party, with people who generally
agreed with one’s own opinions, with one’s own outlook, and therefore could be
depended upon to react to the vote, either gleefully or woefully, in the same general
manner, without too much offense given to one’s political and moral sensibilities.
But the Election night broadcast also, paradoxically, probably increased the
ideological diversity of the Election night experience for many Philadelphians at the
same that it reduced what one might call its corporeal diversity. Although a
celebration of the whole body politic, the street-level Election night festival presumed
the individual would participate as a member of only a segment of that body. Mass
media addressed him, by and large, as a partisan. Interpretations of the results, calls to
arms, were made in a partisan fashion. As late as the 1940s, newspapers like the
Inquirer, the Evening Bulletin, and the Philadelphia Record (the main Democratic
organ) were relatively unproblematic partisan mouthpieces.19
In the case o f television networks, where ideological choice was not available
to viewers, strict on-air neutrality needed to be maintained. This dovetailed with
changes to the ethos of American journalism that promoted a nonpartisan, “objective”
interpretation of events, so that by the mid to late 60s even long-time partisan sheets
like the Inquirer had, by and large, moved away horn their overtly pro-Republican
stance.20 This led to two changes. For one thing, journalists now relied on others
(campaign workers, party leaders, partisan intellectuals) to give a partisan twist to the
interpretation. The second change is that networks and mass broadsheets—the latter
obtaining, by the 1970s, much the same dominant market position as networks—
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tended to call on interpretations from both Republican and Democratic positions, and
occasionally from third-party groups as well.
As an example of this changed perspective, take the broadcast of PBS’s
AfacNeil-Lehrer News Hour for 1984’s Election night. Much of the hour’s newcast
was taken up with Election Day events, and in particular with an interview between
anchor Robin MacNeil and four different scholars and writers—Norman Podhoretz,
John Kenneth Galbraith, Eleanor Holmes Norton, and John Ehrlichman.* Because the
Election result itself was not news—President Reagan’s victory had been a foregone
conclusion for some time—most of the broadcast was taken up with analysis of the
“meaning” of the election.
Prior to MacNeil’s interview, the newscast featured a brief segment with two
grassroots party activists, Democrat Harald Jinks and Republican Mary Nell Reece.
Jinks said Reagan’s win was a triumph of style over substance, and argued that the
public simply didn’t understand tax policy well enough to realize how the President’s
proposals would damage the country. Reece responded that the rural voters among
which she worked supported Reagan because he made them feel good. Although the
economy had not picked up in rural areas, Reece told PBS correspondent Kwame
Holman that farmers had learned the value of patience and new that Reagan’s policies
would benefit them eventually. (To a surprising degree, the further analysis by the

* Although none of the guests were formal members of either of the major candidates’ campaigns, their
political preferences were public knowledge—Ehrlichman and Podhoretz were Reagan supporters,
Galbraith and Norton liberal Democrats—and we can assume that many, if not most, PBS viewers
knew their biases.
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network “big guns” ended up being simply a re-articulation and elaboration of Reece’s
and Jinks’ arguments.)
MacNeil then began the roundtable discussion by asking Podhoretz whether
Reagan’s landslide meant that a realignment in American politics had occurred.
Podhoretz replied that main issue around which any possible realignment might take
place was the resurgence of American power, and whether it ought to be further
pursued, or abandoned. The interviewer then turned to Galbraith and asked a similar
question. Galbraith responded that some realignment had occurred, the result of
increased divisions among rich and poor in America and the loss of a middle-class
consensus around certain basic social guarantees. Next up was Ehrlichman, who
credited the Democratic woes with their failure to present new ideas and their
unwillingness to recognize that their domestic agenda was too leftwing for the
American public. Holmes Norton responded that the main problem for Mondale had
been psychological, not political, since Americans agreed with him on the issues. The
United States had gone through great changes in the past 20 years, and Americans
wanted a leader like Reagan, who put them at ease and comforted them, Norton told
MacNeil. Podhoretz responded to this claim by saying that Norton’s lack of respect for
the intelligence of the American people was a good example of why Democrat’s were
so weak politically, and the interview then carried on in this fashion, with a
representative from one side given an opportunity to “spin” the results, MacNeil then
giving one of the members of the other side a chance to respond, and so on.21
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“Analysis” of the election result that aims at rationalizing defeat or victory
with the interests of party in mind was certainly not new. What is important here, what
is new, is the structure of the interview, the alternation between the two different
viewpoints. A Philadelphia Republican in the 1920s would have turned to the pages of
the Evening Bulletin or the Inquirer the day after an election to get a Republican
understanding of the result’s “meaning.” A Democrat would have gone to the Record
for a similar reason. But it would be virtually impossible for a partisan viewer to
watch the MacNeil/Lehrer analysis without being forced to listen to the opposing side
voice their opinions about why the election had turned out the way it had. The fact that
partisans might simply discount the opposing sides’ interpretation—as typical
Republican stupidity, or typical Democratic arrogance—is not as important as the fact
that they are forced to listen to it. The message of the broadcast structure, rather than
its content—the meta-message of the broadcast—is that the other side’s opinion is a
necessary and legitimate element of the polity that is being celebrated. In this sense,
the Election night broadcast is similar to Dayan and Katz’s media events category of
contests. What is celebrated in the contest—the Olympic Games, the Presidential
debate, or in this case the democratic vote—is not only, or even primarily, the victory,
but the fact of contest itself, o f a pluralistic view of the human world.22
The changing space of the Election night celebration, then, provided at least
three important messages for Philadelphians of the late 20th century. First, the
segmentation of space allowed for, and in some sense encouraged, a kind of hierarchy
of the citizenry and its duties. Certain people—campaign workers and insiders, and the
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candidates themselves—continued to celebrate the election bodily, just as they
continued to be responsible for much o f the rest of the political world. Certain
others—those particularly interested in political issues—might get together for an
election night celebration with other, like-minded friends. The rest o f the city—
probably most of it—which might not have an interest in political issues per se, was
allowed to ignore the celebration if it wished, or to pay only sporadic attention. The
other forms of entertainment or spectacle that might have brought this last group out to
a nineteenth century Election night festival—the lights, the technological wonders, the
music and fireworks—was eliminated by the celebration’s movement onto television,
a medium that by and large did not do a very good job at transmitting this sort of
richly textured, multi-sensory experience. Like much of the rest of the culture, it
declared such things unnecessary to Election night, disposable. To the extent that this
population experienced an Election night celebration, it was vicariously, by watching
others cheer and celebrate on television. The changed celebration suggests Lazarsfeld
and Merton’s famous “narcotizing dysfunction,” in which mass media replace acting
with watching others a ctP
Although the televised spectacle did not do a very good job of forcing
Philadelphians into contact with each other, it did a much better job of celebrating the
notion of ideological diversity than it had in the past, by making the broadcast a forum
for multiple points of view. Not all points of view, certainly: Gus Hall and George
Lincoln Rockwell did not appear on the networks’ Election night broadcasts to give
their views on the result. Nonetheless, thanks to changes in social attitudes arising
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from the Civil Rights movement and related events, the interpretations of a wider
spectrum of Americans was being presented on Election night broadcasts. The simple
presence o f Podhoretz and Holmes Norton sent a message: that the responsibility o f
interpreting the nation’s political identity was no longer the purview only of White,
Anglo-Saxon males. A different image of what America was—o f who America was—
came into view. Principles o f dialogue, of rational exchange, o f universality, were
more explicitly realized at this point than it had been at perhaps any other time in
Election Day’s history.
Significantly, however, this message of political tolerance was not a message
for all. The televised celebration, like the act of voting itself, was an activity in which
only a certain segment o f the American population took part. Estimates for the
dramatic 2000 Election night were in the neighborhood of 61.6 million viewers.24
Although this was the largest ever televised audience for an Election night return—
and 70 per cent larger than the audience had been four years earlier—it was nowhere
near the audience levels for major American televised events, like Super Bowls or the
Academy awards25 The televised event was a celebration of politics put on for the
benefit of a certain segment o f the population. It did not have the populist feel of a
late-twentieth century sporting or entertainment event.

TV’s portrait of the nation:
In terms of giving an up-to-date account of the results of the Election Day
contest, television’s Election night broadcasts seemed to do everything better than
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their forebears. They brought the results faster, they were generally more accurate, and
as a rule more complete, all thanks to the intersection between television and several
other, newer, technologies—the computer, and the modem science of public opinion
polling. The televised Election night’s superiority on this score not immediately
obvious, although it might seem so now. In 1948, thanks to the closeness o f the race,
the CBS broadcast with Edward Murrow and the network’s other correspondents had
to sign off with the race still in doubt. Dewey did not read his concession speech until
11 o’clock the next morning.26 Given that newspaper crowds in Philadelphia during
the 1920s and 1930s had grown used to knowing by 10 PM on Election night who
their next President would be, the quickness of the returns was somewhat less than
under whelming. But in the event of a more lopsided race, the effects of the new
technology became readily apparent. In 1952, UNIVAC, which CBS was using to
calculate the returns, predicted an Eisenhower landslide by 8:30 the night o f the
election. The result was unexpected, since campaign polls had made the vote much
closer, and CBS and Murrow sat on the information for 2 and a half hours (CBS radio,
using the older form of forecasting based on key precincts, told listeners shortly after 8
that Eisenhower had cracked the solid south and seemed to be on his way to victory).27
By the second Eisenhower-Stevenson Election night, the networks were more
comfortable with computers, and all three major networks had predicted an
Eisenhower victory by 8 o’clock.28
We will address the problem that early projections presented to the electorate
presently. For the moment, it is worth noting that the most immediate crisis they
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provoked was with the networks themselves. The situation is this. If one wishes to
provide a night’s worth of news coverage to the audience, and the race o f most
significance to the viewing public is, for all intents and purposes, over by the
beginning o f the evening, then how does the network keep the viewers interested in
the program? The possibility o f entertaining them, or dazzling them then with
spectacle, is not realistic. In an age when most o f the television sets were o f poor
sound quality, and all of them were in black and white, it was not likely that the
networks could keep Election night crowds to the living room sets through attempting
to duplicate the older Election night attractions. Television simply could not compete
with the downtown scene on that score. And it probably didn’t even want to try. Older
forms o f journalism, both print and radio, were already publicly contemptuous o f
television’s upstart status. As in every battle of news media forms since at least the
introduction of the penny press, print and radio’s defenders characterized television
news as sloppy, as banal and shallow, as second-rate. In an age when the informed
voter was the accepted normative model of what a citizen should be on Election night,
any attempt to confuse the issue by mixing in entertainment with the news would have
simply added fodder for the critics.29
But information, or more precisely the ability to provide a great deal of
information in a very short space of time, and an ability to deliver information in
several modes, was exactly where television was superior to either print or the radio.
Naturally enough, the networks played to this advantage. They brought in political
insiders and crack reporters to comment on what the victories and losses meant.30
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They trumpeted their new computer technology.31 They developed sophisticated
presentations o f the massive amount of data they gathered through exit polls and
official returns.32 In 1972, the three networks spent only a third o f their time reporting
returns. The rest o f the broadcasts were spent on interviews, candidate speeches, and
reports from campaign headquarters.33
These broadcasts were also more explicitly national in scope. Earlier mass
media had been centered in the city o f Philadelphia. The picture the audience got of
the nation was as viewed from the banks of the Schulykill. In the age of the network
television broadcast, on the other hand, the viewer got almost as much information and
interpretation about nationally important Senate races in North Carolina and
Wisconsin as on the results from Pennsylvania’s first Congressional district. Political
experts spun the results into a kind of vision o f the national political culture, taken as a
seamless whole: the President’s short coat-tails suggested the death o f traditional party
loyalties, the swing to the Republicans o f the solid south was evidence of a sea change
in the nation’s political divisions, and so forth.34
An interpretative, analytical picture of the nation is necessarily an incomplete
picture of the political nation. The interpretative broadcast required something else to
make the nation vivid to viewers and readers. Hence, post-Election commentary was
also filled with visual images of democratic bodies, of candidates and voters, and often
candidates as voters. Taking a cue from earlier media forms, especially the print
coverage of the candidates voting, networks often placed images o f the Presidential
candidates going to the polls at the head of their broadcasts. Television cameras would
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follow the candidate to the voting booth, after which he would be expected to give a
quick comment to the press, assuring his reporters of victory (even in those occasions
when such assurances were manifestly unreasonable) or, if leading by enough in the
polls, perhaps make a joke: “well, that’s one vote I got, anyway.”35 Besides identifying
the candidate with Everyman—Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale had to vote in the
same, drab, high school gyms and post offices as everyone else—the trip to the polls
provided the national broadcast with a kind o f a beginning to its narrative that it would
then follow the rest of the night. The story began at the polls, then passed through a
period of uncertainty, as journalists sifted through the various returns and divined its
meaning. The ending came with the candidates’ final speeches of victory and
concession.
These speeches were already a tradition by the time that television came onto
the scene, but like the trip to the polls, television was able to elaborate upon and refine
them.36 The speeches are a key moment in the modem Election night television
broadcast, because they signal the official end to the election. Most relevantly, they
signal an end to division and a reintegration into a wider political whole, the moment
when Republicans and Democrats begin a metamorphosis back into Americans. At
one point journalistic institutions lead the charge on this score. Anti-Roosevelt
newspapers in 1936, for example, featured editorials the day after the election calling
for support of the President, and an acceptance o f the result. Roosevelt was the leader
of all Americans; the nation’s ability to accept the result is what made it different from
Fascist and Communist dictatorships.37 In the post-war era, candidates, not the
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objective and non-partisan media outlets, become the primary spokesmen for their
various factions at the moment of reintegration. Their duties were clear. The victor
needed to avoid gloating, needed to give on the appearance of humbleness. Often, it
was a good idea to call on God for strength in the immense trials ahead.38 This
softening of the victory celebration was important not only to assuage the hurt feelings
o f the opposition. As the candidate became the symbolic bodily presence of all
Americans, it was important for the nation to see its most favored qualities in him:
quiet strength, dignity, and the wisdom of the good sport. Street urchins in the 1860s,
mocking the losers the day after the vote, were allowed to be malicious: they were of
no account anyhow, mere partisan whelps. But the successful Presidential candidate
represented the viewer, and his actions and behavior were thus a vision of the viewer’s
own.
Perhaps more important than the behavior o f the winner was the image of the
loser, who was required to accept his failure with grace and dignity, to play the part of
the wounded warrior. When he failed to do this— for example, when A1 Gore refused
to concede the race to George Bush—even his own partisans became somewhat
uneasy. Gore’s actual concession speech, coming the day after the Supreme Court
decision, brought nearly unanimous praise from media commentators. MSNBC’s
Chris Matthews, a frequent critic of the Vice President during the Florida recount
struggle, was perhaps most effusive, calling the concession “majestic,” “almost
sacramental.” “[Wjhoever wrote that speech... understands not just the law o f America
but the myth of America,” Matthews told his viewing audience. By refusing to
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continue with his challenge any longer, Gore had allowed to nation to begin the
necessary role o f coming back together. Combining the grace of the winner with the
dignity o f the loser, the election night broadcast gave Americans a portrait o f their
country, the pluralistic vision at the heart of American Election Day, if not o f
American democracy.39
The other democratic body o f Election Day is the voter him or herself. Election
night broadcasts and day after reports of the vote thus often carried photos or clips o f
average voters going to the polls, illustrating some feature or another of the American
Democratic process, a comforting image, showing the gears of democracy meshing,
more or less well. In 1940, the Evening Bulletin ran a photo of two poll workers
jokingly pulling a third man, the voter, from either side. All three men had smiles on
their faces, the photo obviously an orchestration. By making the subject of party
competition humorous, a game, the photo more or less defused it. Party battles were
not serious; they did not really divide us. They were merely something that we put on
for a short time and would easily dispose of once the election was over.40 Other photos
showed voters waiting patiently at the polls, or walking out of the polling booth with
smiles on their faces: good citizens all, just doing their democratic duty in a humble,
sensible spirit41
Post-election stories rarely held news any longer of voter bribery or violence.
Instead, they often tended to portray the polling booth as a peaceful, almost quaint
space, from another time or place. One story in the 1980s from the Inquirer's pages
described a polling station located in a neighborhood salon as a scene “out of small
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town America.” Indeed, the polling station of Inquirer columnist John C. Cummings,
located in a fire station, seemed like Mayberry R.F.D. Cummings went to the polls in
the morning with his wife and dog. Once he got to the polls, there were cakes, pies,
cookies, baked by the women of the ladies auxiliary. After he finished voting, he
passed the time with the town police chief, Chief Rossiter (who was there in a
unofficial capacity, there being “no need for police protection at a Center Square
election”), and a spunky young Democratic poll worker who was not having much
success. Cummings took his leave of the scene “on a note of Democratic optimism.”42
What picture o f the national public did the Election night broadcast present to
the public of Philadelphia during the Age of television? A public first o f all that could
be analyzed and interpreted through the use o f statistics and computers: a set of
numbers 43 A public, second, in which many o f the most important responsibilities of
Election Day, like the celebration of the vote itself, or the moment of reconciliation,
were performed by the candidates, for the rest of the public to see. In contrast, the
citizen’s duty on the day was restricted, more and more, to a single space, the voting
booth, and to a single act. For the ordinary citizen, this short period at the polls was all
that marked Election Day off from any other day in the year.

The problematic performance: technology, and early returns
Television is very nearly the universal symbol of late or post-modemity. As
such, it is often forced to carry a great deal o f responsibility for the fault lines in
modem society. Such was the case with Election Day. If Americans found fault with
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the way that the celebrated democracy on Election Day, then one o f the main culprits
was the modem media, and particularly that most ubiquitous example o f the media,
the television set.
A clear instance of television’s controversial effects was the practice of
“predicting,” or “projecting,” the winner o f the Presidential election while many polls
were still open. The issue first came to prominence with the 1964, and Johnson’s easy
win over Goldwater. The extent of Johnson’s victory was so great that NBC actually
projected a victory at 6:48 Eastern time, long before polls had closed anywhere in
American except, perhaps, Dixville Notch, NH. All three networks made a more
definitive call for Johnson around 9 o’clock, after the polls had closed on the East
Coast but still long before the closing o f the polls in California, Oregon, and
Washington.44
The ability to deliver returns to the population ever more quickly was not the
result of television but of a technological system of which electronic communication
was one part. In order to provide early returns, television networks also drew upon
modem polling techniques, increasingly sophisticated methods of statistical analysis,
and of course the computer. Particularly in the 19S0s, when the technology was brandnew, computers figured prominently in the networks’ advertising campaigns and
promotional efforts. NBC and CBS trumpeted their computers’ ability to analyze the
data as soon as possible and to spit out the results to a hungry, waiting nation.43 As the
technology became more familiar its use as promotional material was negated.
Networks turned to the computer instead to provide ever more sophisticated graphic
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presentations, and to provide it with more data for analysis. In the 1990s, viewers
could see not just how the country as whole, or various states and regions, had voted,
but how African Americans had voted, how members of upper income households had
tended, how suburban mothers had voted.46
The advantage of the new forecasting technology was that it was unbiased,
unlike earlier forecasting technologies like readers’ predictions, straw polls, or
prognostications from interested party leaders. The poll and the computer could be
depended to tell the truth: they were not political tools, but scientific ones. Although
Election night anchors might anthropomorphize the computer for the sake o f humor, in
fact it was understood that the computer and the scientific poll were far more
trustworthy than a person. “[T)f we say that someone’s carried a state, you can pretty
much take it to the bank,” CBS anchor Dan Rather famously declared on Election
night 2000.47 What this technological belief forgot was that humans were involved
with the technology, and therefore mistakes were not simply possible but in the long
run inevitable and that their analysis could be used in partisan ways. Famously, polls
failed to pick up on President Truman’s late surge in 1948, and mistakenly predicted a
Presidential win for Dewey.48 In 1968, the nation news media’s entire vote-gathering
effort was forced to shut down in the midst o f Election night, when the main computer
at the News Election Service—then the centralized data-gathering point for all major
news services—began to spew out nonsensical data. The problem was eventually
traced to a programming error, which led a NES official to remark that, “[tjhere was
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no machine failure. It was that simple little problem with the programmer. It was a
human failure.”49
The nature of the modem election-gathering system often exaggerated
mistakes, thanks its centralized source point. The NES had been created in 1964,
when, faced with rising Election night costs, networks quickly joined with wire
services and several major national newspapers to create a single office responsible for
gathering returns.50 But the pressure to get the news of the contest out ever more
quickly forced the networks to search for ways to anticipate the vote count through
other means. This is turn led to the practice o f exit polls, getting information from
voters directly as they left the polling place. Exit polling gave the networks a quicker
method of predicting the race, and also provided it with more data for the Election
night analysis, but it was expensive. In 1993, another consortium—the Voter News
Service, or VNS—sprang up. The VNS was a single group, financed by money from
the major news services, which was responsible both for returns and for conducting
exit polling throughout the country.51 It saved the networks money, but it also meant
that, as in 1968, any mistake would be duplicated throughout the nation’s newgathering system. Since all news outlets were using same news source, they could not
be relied upon to correct the mistakes of competitors.52
For most of the period in question, however, the real problem with the
televised returns was not that they were occasionally wrong—this happened relatively
rarely—but that they were generally so accurate that they threatened to make voting
nonsensical. Early returns—that is, projections o f winners announced on-air before the
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closing o f polls in some or all voting districts—garnered a great deal of commentary,
both by scholarly analysts and within the television community itself. The early return
dramatically reduced the incentive to vote: of one’s choice had already lost, or won,
what was the point? Critics o f the practice quoted studies about the effects o f
television returns on voter turnout.53 Networks tried to deflect criticism by presenting
an image o f responsibility. In 1964, Walter Cronkite told CBS viewers around 7 PM
that while the network could project Mr. Johnson the winner, ‘that isn’t the way the
game is played here.” At NBC, anchor David Brinkley was telling viewers who hadn’t
gone to the polls yet to stop watching TV and “get out and vote.” Criticized by George
McGovern’s campaign manager for projecting Nixon a winner by 7 PM, NBC’s John
Chancellor announcer defended the network’s projections as generally pretty
accurate.54
Chancellor’s claim is beside the point; accuracy was not the problem here.
What the McGovern campaign was complaining about was that the reporting of the
vote was interfering with the act o f voting itself. The charge would increasingly
become a dominant theme of the televised election night. Democrats on the West
Coast of the country charged that the early prediction of Ronald Reagan’s Presidential
victory, and Jimmy Carter’s subsequent concession speech, both of which aired
nationally before polls closed in California and other far western states. The early
concession led many Democratic voters in those states to conclude that going to the
polls would not be worth their time. Because of the decision o f Democrats to stay at
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home, Democrats charged, they lost several important Congressional, senate, and state
and local races.ss
In order to work as an instrument of communal choice, Election Day requires
two separate events. First, the electorate must transmit a series of messages to the state
electoral administration. Second, various social institutions—both private and
public—must accumulate these messages and return them to the electorate, to tell the
public what it has decided. The central “scandal” in this case was that by broadcasting
the contest’s result before it had ended television threatened to confound the logic of
Election Day, and in so doing made it internally incoherent. The declaration of a
decision before the decision in fact took place renders the vote irrelevant, almost
irrational.
For the voters o f Philadelphia, the early returns were only a theoretical
problem. As East Coast residents, it was unlikely that they would hear about the result
before voting. But they were faced with a similar problem in the case of the campaign
poll. Because of the accuracy of polling, the result o f a campaign in many instances
could be known before the vote was taken, which seemed to make Election Day
redundant. For this reason, polls, like early broadcast returns, were also attacked as
destructive instruments. Journalists and politicians—especially those running behind
in the polls—called on citizens to prove the pollsters wrong, as though George Gallup
were about to steal democracy away from Americans.56
The effects of Election night broadcasts and campaign polling played into
common fears about mass media’s seemingly Godlike ability to create its own reality.
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Unrepresentative institutions and non-elected officials—networks, news anchors—
seemed to be arrogating for themselves a decision that only the people had a right to
make. Debate over returns seemed to prove exactly what critics of the television
culture had long argued: that the networks were destructive o f public culture, that they
cared for little beyond their profits and their ratings. The culture of journalism also
came under attack. The desire to be first with the scoop triumphed over responsibility
to the body politic.57
With the election of 2000, a new communication technology came to the fore,
one that threatened to replace television as the dominant mass medium for the nation.
Pro-technology journalists and intellectuals lauded the Internet’s potential for
advancing the cause of democracy. It gave citizens the opportunity to choose their
own media menu, rather than having it foisted upon them by the corporate America. It
dramatically expanded the opportunities for gathering information about policy issues.
It allowed for interactive media use. At least in theory, voters could ask candidates
questions directly, rather than relying on journalists to do the job.58 From the
viewpoint o f Election Day, however, and in particular as regarded the question of
early projections, the Internet did not solve but rather threatened to exacerbate the
problem. Because of their monopoly over exit polling results through the VNS, and in
response to public criticism, the major news media could, and did, agree to wait on
projecting winners from any state until that state’s poll had closed. This agreement
required the consent of only relatively few groups: the major networks, CNN, a few
others. The advent of the Internet had meant that returns might now be available to a
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huge number of news outlets, many of whom did not feel obligated to abide by the
agreement. After threats o f legal action, however, these smaller outlets, which include
the on-line version o f the National Review and Slate magazine, agreed (grudgingly)
not to air the early returns.59 This did not solve the theoretical problem that the
Internet presented, however, to the rationale of voting at all.
The problem presented by the early return can be taken as part of a much larger
issue, whether is the end Election Day actually meant something, or was simply some
empty gesture. If a single vote did not make any realistic difference to the outcome of
a race, then why go to the polls? If the two candidates were pretty much the same in
the end, they who cared who won? If polls already gave the public a pretty accurate
notion about who was to win before the voting booths ever opened, then what was the
point of having an Election Day at all? Philadelphians had always harbored doubts
about the way that they performed Election Day, but this new worry was somewhat
different. It seemed to raise doubts about Election Day as such. Had the day become,
simply, a meaningless ritual?

Problematic performers (part D: the media candidate
Much of the debate over television’s baleful influence revolved around a
distrust of political spectacle, of style and of performance, and in particular centered
on the image of the media candidate. Suspicion of politics in the television era was of
a piece with American’s suspicion of the medium itself. Television emphasized the
fluff, the surface, at the expense of the issues. Even when politicians tried to discuss
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substantial things, real things of real interest to real Americans, television worked
against them. As an Election Day editorial in 1976 declared, “the medium sometimes
droned out the message the candidates were trying to spread.”60 The allusion to
McLuhan is no accident. Given that the worries about television and the worries about
the triumph o f style over substance, of personality over issue, had arisen at roughly the
same time as television itself, it was natural for American journalism to presume that
they were somehow related. McLuhan’s theory gave journalists a ready-made
explanation for the baleful influence of television on the body politic.61
Television’s intimate connection to modem American capitalism only
increased suspicions. Television was not only shallow, it was corporate, an oligarchic
system that imposed a hegemonic view of the world, one entirely appropriate to the
agenda of economic and social power.62 Thus it was entirely fitting that it was the
medium through which the populace experienced the modem election, an empty event
that provided the illusion of choice covering the reality of a single-party system,
designed to foster the interests o f the wealthy and powerful. Given that access to
corporate media required money and social prestige, only candidates willing to
capitulate to the corporate agenda were able to get the airtime necessary to present
their views. Those men or women too threatening to corporate capitalism, like Eugene
McCarthy, George McGovern, and Ralph Nader, were marginalized either through
journalistic rhetoric, or through institutional safeguards (as when the Election
Commission kept Nader off of the nationally televised Presidential debates in 2000).63
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Fears of the banality o f television culture and the control o f capitalist
hegemony coalesced in the figure of the media candidate. Theorists of the new media
forms suggested that the power of the electronic medium stressed the irrational over
the rational, hence personality over issues, hence candidate over party. As electoral
politics came to revolve more and more around the ability to get airtime, either by
being photogenic or television friendly—a la John Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, or John
McCain—or by building a huge campaign war chest, in order to bombard voters with
commercials, it was the candidate (and his shadowy “spin-doctor”) rather than the
party, that became a problematic figure. The shallow candidate of the television age—
full of honeyed words but empty of substance, like FDR in the pages of the Inquirer
several decades earlier—became an increasingly important part of Election Day
rhetoric in the twentieth century. Politicians who were skilful orators, who projected a
charming personality, were to be mistrusted. John Cummings judged the eloquent
Adlai Stevenson to be a clever speaker—“we enjoyed Mr. Stevenson, his quips and his
mannerisms.” Nonetheless, while “our funnybone tells us to vote for Adlai,” common
sense, fortified by a desire to clean up Washington, “dictates a vote for Eisenhower.”64
Similar attacks dogged the successful candidacy of Bill Clinton, who became “slick
Willie,” a smooth-talking, corrupt pol in the old style southern tradition. In 1996, long
time network newscaster David Brinkley attacked Clinton on Election night as a bore
and a spineless vote grubber.65 George Bush, Jr., on the other hand, was portrayed as
an idiotic mannequin, an image without intelligence or reason, propped up by money
and campaign spin.66 As with the more general notion of the televised political
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spectacle, the concept of the media candidate often brought allusions to the central
historical event o f the 20th century, and the ability o f fascist leaders to use mass media
to promote personality and irrationality over reason and policy.67
Although a general trend, the video candidate was probably most closely
associated in the modem media discourse with the figure of Ronald Reagan. For his
critics, Reagan seemed the apotheosis of modem democracy: a simple-minded, docile
tool of corporate America and social conservatives, a surface of genial amiability
covering a dangerous and mean-spirited policy agenda, and wholly the creature of the
television age. What Reagan did better than all other politicians, so this theory went,
was sell himself. His former occupation as actor fit perfectly into the reading. Reagan
was not a real politician; he just played one on TV.68
On the Election Days of Reagan’s two presidential victories, one debate that
surface in both print and television was revolved around the question of surface versus
substance. For Reagan’s opponents, the image of the shallow video candidate was the
appropriate one. “The Reagan campaign has been a distinguished example of slickness
and cosmetic moderating of positions” wrote the Inquirer, in endorsing President
Carter on Election Day, 1980:
Mr. Reagan has charm and a soothing, comforting manner. In an age of
technically supersophisticated campaign management, with principal
emphasis on television-projected imagery, he has emerged as a
reasoning, positive, sensitive, and hope-filled man.
Beneath that surface there is the substance which would
constitute the character o f leadership and decision-making which Mr.
Reagan would bring, if elected, to the White House, the nation, and the
world.
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That substance promises danger. For it holds a deep threat of
both irresponsibility and superficiality, in vision, intent, and
commitment.69
In interpreting the results for the viewers o f PBS’s MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour
in 1984, Eleanor Holmes Norton drew on pop psychology to explain Reagan’s reelection. Americans were comfortable economically, and simply didn’t want to be
bothered with thinking about the issues, Holmes Norton explained to viewers. They
had undergone great psychological stress in the preceding decades, and now wanted a
grandfatherly figure like Reagan to reassure them.70
If the body politic is to reconstitute itself after the divisions instituted by the
campaign, then the losers need to be reconciled to the result of the Election Day vote.
Since the dawn of the American public, electoral losers have soothed their pride with
assurances to each other that the cause was lost not through the public’s disagreement
with principles or men but through the illegitimate machinations of the opposition.
Just as federalists told stories about ballot tubs with false bottoms and Jeffersonian
Jacobins plying the democratic hordes with beer and rum, just as Whigs and
Democrats traded accusations of wholescale personation and colonization o f voters,
just as Progressive reformers railed at the corrupt strong-arm tactics of the rings and
bosses at the polls, so Election night commentators in the mass media age comforted
themselves, and their fellow partisans, with jibes against the media itself, and
nefarious PR men and masters of the political spin. In the event of a Democratic
victory, conservative commentators could appease the wounds of Republicans with
jeremiads against the liberal media’s fawning over Bill Clinton or Jimmy Carter. In
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the case of the Republican victory, Democrats could cite the infantile nature of mass
media coverage that resulted in yet another triumph for conservative dolts from
Reagan to George Bush the younger.
But the debate over the video candidate involved a more substantial reflection
on the Election Day celebration. In a modem democracy at least, the celebration of
Election Day is always, in part, a celebration of equality. The power of the mass
media, and o f the mass media’s controllers, threatened to turn Election Day into
simply another demonstration of social power. Given the limited access to a scarce
resource, television air time, which apparently necessary to the ascension of political
power, how was Election Day to be understood as a democratic event? It was either
the victory, repeated at four-year intervals, of the cultural elite (in the case of
complaints about the liberal media) or the economic elite (in accusations of corporate
sell-outs). In either case, the ordinary citizen could no longer take pride in his status as
free citizen at the polling booth. He was merely a puppet for various groups to
manipulate.
As a metaphor for the evident systematic social inequalities of the political
system celebrated by Election Day, and as a balm for the wounded pride of the losing
side, the media candidate undoubtedly served an important symbolic purpose. But this
came at a price. The argument, in order to be plausible, required a radical rethinking of
the voter him or herself. If it was this easy to fool the electorate, that is, the people,
then how reliable was Election Day itself as a ritual for legitimating power?
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Problematic performers (part ID: the voters
“In this division we have a number of people who look as if they could stand a
drink,” Democratic watcher Joseph Dillon told an Election Day court in 1960,
defending his practice of handing out dollar bills to voters after they exited the polls.
“I don’t know how they vote—it isn’t for any vote.” The judge disagreed, calling the
practice “disgraceful and irregular.”71 In an earlier age, Republicans might have
trumpeted a man like Dillon as evidence of Democratic perfidy; reformers could have
pointed to him as an example of the evils of big city machine politics, but by the end
of the century, his ilk were becoming, increasingly, an anachronism. Television
stations might run Election night stories about fraud at the polls,72 but the problem of
voter fraud no longer occupied a prominent space in the discourse surrounding
Election Day. “Street money” was explained away as payment for Election Day
workers who took the day off to man the polls. The fact that such money might serve
as bribes for voters was never explicitly stated. (When political operatives did make
the point explicit, they were publicly chastised.)73
In the discourse of the times, stories of the Ward captain and the party worker
took on an almost nostalgic tone. Election Day editions often featured sympathetic
interviews with or profiles o f machine workers—ward leaders, committee members—
and their struggles to persuade an increasingly disenchanted public to get and vote. A
reporter trailed Ella Dunn, Democratic leader of the city’s largely African American
44th ward, over the course of the day as she spoke to voters through mail slots,
struggled with the measly street funds handed out by the city’s Democratic machine,
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worried over a low voter turnout, and increasingly desperate, enlisted her son as a
door-to-door canvasser late in the day. So the well-trained, militant “committees of
surveillance” had devolved to this: a bored teenager running errands for his mother. In
an era when fewer and fewer people were politically involved, the ward boss or
precinct captain felt like a throwback to earlier, more politically innocent time. Ella
Dunn at least took Election Day seriously.74
She was one of the few who, it seemed, any longer did so. Explanations for
voter decline became a small industry in the social sciences.75 It also became a central
theme to much of the Election Day coverage. How would voter’s respond to the
candidates? Would they reverse the general trend of downward turnout?76 Although
papers like the Inquirer continued to endorse candidates on Election Day many o f its
Election Day editorials and op-ed pieces were directed to simply encouraging voters to
go the polls. “The polling place in a free election is the great equalizer,” the Inquirer
wrote in 1952.77 By 1964, the paper had become more severe and lecturing. Much was
written about the vote as a cherished right and privilege, the editorial read. “Perhaps
there should be greater emphasis on voting as a solemn duty and responsibility.”78 In
1976, sociologist Andrew Greeley still was willing to write an lukewarm op-ed piece
in support of the vote, comparing the choice Americans were offered to the non-choice
of countries like Russia, China, and Cuba. “We know that even when the it works
badly—and the choice offered us this year is an example of it going badly—the
American system still gives you a chance to throw the rascals out.”79
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Worries over voter competence, like the turnout problem, one that had started
in the early twentieth century, were also a constant story. As with turnout, it was an
issue that concerned both social scientists, and the public discourse of Election Day.
Studies found that citizens lacked basic knowledge about fundamental political
institutions and concepts, about the words of the United States constitution and the
Declaration of Independence.80 Such worries about political knowledge sometimes
found their way into Election Day copy of Philadelphia’s newspapers, just as the
worries over turnout had.81 Reformers had fought for the secret ballot and the voting
machine in order to free the voter from the clutches o f the boss; now they found that
this meant she was also free from their own influence, failing to take account of the
large body of knowledge and facts produced for her benefit, to guide her choice. Who
knew what the hell she was doing once she got in that booth and pulled the lever?
Maybe it was nothing more than a stab in the dark, a wild gamble based on little more
than a hunch, or the cut o f the candidate’s suit, or a video on his hometown. Perhaps
there were some people who just shouldn’t be voting. Perhaps if you were too stupid
to appreciate the value o f the vote, then you were too stupid to be trusted with it.82
Like the arguments surrounding the media candidate, arguments about the
incompetent electorate struck at the heart of the Election Day ritual, raising a
fundamental question about whether it was doing what it was supposed to be doing. If
many voters no longer even bothered to vote, and if many of those who did were not
acting in a reflective and considered manner, how could its role as a representation of
the democratic body be considered valid? As a moment when the roles of democratic
313

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

representatives and democratic electors were brought out into stark relief and
inevitably found wanting, Election Day became a day for ruminating on the failures o f
modem democracy.83

Conclusion:
By the end of the twentieth century, Election Day was the occasion for a
national grump on the state of politics, a crabbed, shrunken event that had little if any
resemblance to the raucous celebrations of the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries.
Amidst an electorate that was growing increasingly cynical about the political regime
under which Americans lived, Election Day’s problematic character only seemed to
reaffirm the doubts and distrust. It could be taken as simply one example, a symptom,
of a larger disenchantment with the body politic. Like much of modem life that
dissatisfied Americans in the latter half of the twentieth century, television was
blamed for the woeful state o f electoral politics. Television was a banal, shallow
medium for a supposedly banal, shallow political culture. The distrust of the voter at
the poll was in part due to the suspicion that Americans had decided to trade their
democratic rights and responsibilities for the right to indulge in hedonistic, mindless
and materialistic pursuits and comforting entertainment. The modernized Election
Day, dominated by and in a sense performed for television, was perhaps simply
another instance of this larger change in American life.
But the very ubiquity of television’s role as social villain in modem discourse
ought to make us suspicious. Television has been credited and blamed for so much in
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modem life. Its main role in modem communication may not be so much as a method
of transmitting information, but as a metaphor for discussing other divisions: the
division between white and black, rich and poor, powerful and weak, image and
reality, empire and colony. In the case o f Election Day, television became a way to
talk about the central problems raised by a vote within a large democratic society.
Instead of referring to social inequality directly, Americans worried about the way that
wealth could buy access to government offices through media campaigns. Wealth
created the media candidate as it own puppet, and thereby made a mockery of Election
Day’s claim to celebrate the equality o f citizens. In terms of the tension between
pluralism and unity, television ushered in an age that was diametrically opposed in
some sense to the partisan Election Days of the nineteenth centuries. On the former
occasions, the danger was that parties, goaded by their champions in the press, would
prove too divisive. In the twentieth century, the exact opposite problem arose. As a
national, nonpartisan institution, the national television network was in danger of
creating a consensual electoral political universe in which real differences between
parties were either ignored or even considered illegitimate.
The uniqueness of the modem Election Day message lay not in what television
delivers or does not deliver in terms of reliable information. To the extent that the
televised campaign was simplistic and shallow, this does not make it all that much
different from the campaign of 1840, or those of the late nineteenth century. What
made Election Day different for Philadelphians during this period were the messages it
did not send. First, there was relatively little discussion about the problems that had so
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plagued earlier Election Days: worries about illegal voting, and physical clashes at the
polls, these were almost totally absent from the Election Day discourse and the
performance of the vote itself. Second, there were rarely attacks on any specific group
that a journalist or politician might accuse of being especially responsible for
corruption at the polls. The changing political universe of the times did not allow for
explicit attacks on racial, ethnic, or religious groups. The worries about the voting
electorate were now couched in more general terms, about whether the population was
too disillusioned, or too ignorant about policy matters, or too apathetic to do the job
required of it. Rarely mentioned was that the specific people discussing these
problems did not, generally, think of themselves as dealing with these issues, but some
other, ill-defined group of citizens. The problem of Election Day, in other words,
lay—as it always had—not with us, but with them.
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Chapter Nine:
Election Day 2000

Election Day, 2000, took place after a fall campaign that did not definitively
establish a leader, with the two candidates virtually neck and neck on the eve of the
vote. Polls in the several weeks before the vote had given Bush a slight but consistent
edge, always within the margin of error. On Election Day, papers raised the possibility
that the candidate who won the popular vote might not win the Electoral College vote,
a situation that had not occurred since 1876. Another, even more disturbing possibility
was that the Bush and Gore might tie in the Electoral College, thereby throwing the
decision to the Congress.1
Due to the closeness of the race, and due as well to Bush’s strength in the West
and most of the Southern states, three large Eastern states—Pennsylvania, Michigan,
and Florida—were considered keys to victory. Gore needed to win all three to have a
realistic chance at Electoral College victory. Many commentators doubted the vice
president could do this, especially since Bush’s brother Jeb, the governor of Florida,
was expected to put the full force of the state’s Republican party behind an Election
Day get-out-the-vote-effort. The two other key states also had powerful Republican
governors—Tommy Thompson in Michigan and Tom Ridge in Pennsylvania.
Moreover, after running behind Gore much o f September, Bush had managed to
demonstrate that slight but consistent lead in the polling data. The weekend before
Election Day, several stories in the press took on the character o f a Gore campaign
post-mortem, analyzing how the vice president had managed to lose the race.2
320

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

At 7 pm, as polls closed in the East, and Election night broadcasts began to
report the returns, the results were generally as expected. Bush was taking most o f the
southern states, Gore most o f the Northeastern ones. Early on, all three key eastern
states—Florida, Pennsylvania, and Michigan—were declared “too close to call” by the
networks. This again, was as expected. Gore’s first piece of good news came around 8
pm EST, when the networks began to project him the winner in Michigan. About 8:45,
following the advice o f VSN, the networks called Florida for Gore, who was also
running ahead in the Pennsylvania count. Shortly 9 pm EST, the networks called
Pennsylvania for Gore.3
At this point, the tone of the Election night coverage began to change. As CNN
commentator Jeff Greenfield put it, it now became increasingly difficult to see how
Bush could take the Presidency. Perhaps for this reason, many of the Republicans
interviewed by the networks began to challenge the projections, in particular the
Florida call. Well-known GOP campaign worker Mary Matalin argued that the
networks had not taken into account the large absentee vote in the state, which she
claimed would tend heavily Bush. Interviewed by television reporters, the candidate
himself said that he still felt he could win Florida, based on information from his
brother. Newscasters and commentators dismissed these claims as partisan pleadings.
They pointed to the past success o f their projections as proof of their accuracy.4
All the same, the popular totals in Florida continued to narrow. It appeared that
Republican claims about the large absentee vote were correct. Just before 10 pm, the
networks made a momentous decision. They decided to rescind the earlier projection,
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and put Florida back in play. Since the rest of the nation was going pretty much as
expected, with Gore taking the East and the northern mid-west, Bush the high plains
states, the national race increasingly looked as though it would be decided in Florida.
This was good news for Bush, who gradually began to creep toward Gore in the
Florida vote count, then passed him. By 2:16 in the morning, with most of the vote
Florida vote counted but with less than two thousand votes separating the two
candidates, networks began calling the state, and the nation, for Bush. Crowds
assembled outside the governor’s mansion in Austin began to cheer, and Vice
President Gore readied himself to telephone a concession.5
However, at this point, Gore’s vote totals began to inch back toward Bush’s.
Network anchors grew increasingly, and visibly, nervous at the possibility that they
might have to rescind the state a second time. Meanwhile, reports were beginning to
trickle into the networks o f voting irregularities in Florida. The reports centered on a
district in West Palm Beach, home to a large community o f retirees. Totals from these
precincts indicated a large number of votes for third-party candidate Patrick
Buchanan, a strange result indeed from this heavily Jewish district, given Buchanan’s
revisionist notions about American involvement in the Second World War. Residents
told reporters that the ballots used in the voting booths at West Palm Beach, so-called
“butterfly ballots,” were confusing. Some of these residents added that, although they
had intended to vote for Gore, they feared that they might have voted for Buchanan.6
By around 3:50 am, most major news networks decided that they would have
to bite the bullet and indeed rescind the Florida call, therefore also rescinding Bush’s
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Presidency projection. Arguably, the damage to Gore’s Presidential hopes had already
been done. By prematurely declaring Bush President-elect, the news media had in
effect created a presumption in American public opinion that Bush was the winner of
the election. This is turn made the Democrats’ fight for votes in the Florida recount
seem like so much poor sportsmanship, and hampered Gore’s attempt to force a hand
count.7 Republicans had their own set of accusations about the Election night gaffe.
The first call for Florida, giving the state to Gore, may have dissuaded some
Republican voters in the western panhandle to stay home, therefore taking votes away
from Bush.8
Controversies were not to end with debates over the news media’s
performance. In the next weeks, criticisms would be raised against Florida’s Election
Day result on two fronts. One set o f voters, including those in West Palm Beach,
argued that they had been effectively disenfranchised by the confusing nature of the
ballot given to them. Another group, composed mostly of minority and immigrant
voters, claimed that they had not been allowed to vote because their names had
illegally been purged from the rolls. Minority group advocates also noted that ballots
in areas with heavy minority populations tended to be disproportionately disqualified.
Since all of these groups tended to vote Democratic, Gore partisans claimed that the
state’s voting machinery had systematically worked against their man.9
The charges and countercharges eventually became so confusing that the case
wound up m the Supreme Court. A mshed judgment, and a vote along strictly rightleft lines resulted in a split ruling that effectively gave the Presidency to Bush. This
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ruling, combined with the controversies over disfranchisement in Florida, and then
combined with the fact that Gore had won the popular vote and yet lost the
Presidency, led many Democrats to charge that Republicans had “stolen” the election.
Even before the race was decided, many commentators wondered how any President
was to rule such an obviously divided nation. The phrase “blue and red America”
gained currency in the political vocabulary, referring to the numerous Election night
maps showing a clear geographical split between Democrat and Republican
supporters. These geographic divisions were assumed to mirror similar cultural,
ethnic, and racial divisions: the split between white and black, urban and rural, etc.10
This is a rough sketch of Election night 2000, and the several scandals it
provoked. In general, these scandals fall into four general categories:

The distortions o f the media: At one point in the Election night broadcast on CNN,
anchor Judy Woodruff went to reporter John King, covering the Gore campaign from
the campaign’s celebration party in Memphis. In the midst of the interview, Woodruff
interrupted King to ask about the droning in the background, outside the headquarters.
King, looking somewhat sheepish, replied, “well, that’s me, actually.” The campaign
had set up a large television screen to keep the celebrants in Memphis up to date on
the race. The screen was tuned to CNN. Thus as King was reporting back to the
central news station in New York, his words \yere almost immediately looped back to
the site of the report: King’s comments on his own remarks were played backed to the
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crowd, which cheered them, which cheer in turn was caught by the television cameras,
as so on, mimicking a sort of hellish, Borgesian circle of political minutiae.11
The scene was emblematic o f the hyper-reflective nature of the Election night
broadcast, as the message going out from the networks affected what happened on the
ground, which was then reported by the networks, and so forth. There were at least
two points where the media’s reporting in effect could have changed the Election Day
event. The first was the decision to call Florida before the polls in the far western part
of the state had closed, thereby reducing voter turnout, thereby affecting the outcome
of the very race the news media were projecting. The second was the decision to call
Florida for Bush when the voter totals were probably still too close to justify the step,
thereby creating a public impression that Bush had won before all appropriate legal
and institutional steps had been taken. VNS’s faulty analysis cannot be blamed here,
since the service never called the race for Bush: the networks did. Journalist Scott
Stossel, writing for the left-leaning magazine The American Prospect during the
Florida debate, proposed that the man who had first made the call was John Ellis, head
of the Fox News Network’s Election night effort. The rest o f the networks, in the
attempt not to be scooped, then quickly followed Fox’s need, Stossel argued. What
made the role of Ellis significant was that he was not only an avowed conservative,
but the cousin of George Bush as well.12 Several months after this, Democratic
Congressman Henry Waxman, in hearings about the Election night debacle, asked
NBC news president about a rumor that Jack Welch, chairman of General Electric,
which owns NBC, had been seen on the network’s Election night set, asking reporters
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to call the election for Bush. NBC denied any such influence on the part o f Welch, but
also refused Waxman’s request for the network’s videotape of the night’s events.13
There is nothing new, or particularly surprising, in the notion that the news
media create the reality upon which they then report. This is arguably why they exist.
Nor is it surprising that this socially constructed reality is often controlled, either
overtly or covertly, by the rich, the powerful, and those well connected to the rich and
powerful. If the distortions and constructions on an Election night deserve special
mention, it would be for two reasons. First, the amount of time during which events
takes place is so small, and the amount of information so great, that Election night
offers no opportunity for human actors to reflect on what they are doing, to correct
themselves. (Part of the cause of the second false call for Florida may have lain in the
nervousness and shock produced by the first mistake.) The second reason this claim is
different horn other, similar claims is that Election Day is a unique moment in a
representative democracy. For almost a century, Americans had been working toward
a certain vision of how the voting process ought to work, trying to get party bosses and
urban machines from interfering with the people’s wishes. Now, when the process had
seemed complete, it seemed that this vision was being threatened.

The failure o f technology. Undoubtedly, one reason the various institutions distorted
the Election night picture was that technology failed, and in a number of instances. In
the first place the polling data, andits subsequent analysis, was flawed. Exit polling
can only take account o f voters who venture to the polls. It says nothing about
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absentee voters who mailed in their ballots. In an age when absentee voting was
becoming a more and more popular method of voting, this was an obvious deficiency,
since VNS’s analysis clearly did not take the large number of absentee ballots into
their projections.14
, The other area where technology failed, or at least was seen to have failed, was
in the voting booth itself, in the form of the confusing butterfly ballots. This was not,
or at least should not have been, much of a surprise. As early as 1987, a federal judge
had already ruled that the Votomatic’s confusing ballot style put those voters who
used the machine at a disadvantage from those who did not. The butterfly-style,
Votomatic system had failed in numerous elections since its introduction in the mid1960s, many of the problems coming in the counting of ballots after the vote. (This is
arguably a more serious problem than the West Palm Beach incident, since it lay in the
system’s failure to correctly record the voter’s wishes, rather than a failure on the part
of the voter to correctly indicate those wishes.)15
But whatever evils there may be with the operation of the Votomatic or other
butterfly-style machines, it is probably an unfortunate fact that no ballot system in the
United States is without flaws. One of the major reasons is that voting is a far more
complicated affair in the U.S. than in most other Western democracies. It demands
more from voters because the number of offices and initiatives on the ballot is much
greater than in parliamentary-style elections, for example, where the voter must decide
only one office. The informational challenge presented to the American voter by the
secret ballot is the result of its extreme democratic nature.16
327

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In part because of the inherent complicating factor o f the large ballot, and in
part because no human technology is completely without flaws, flaws that are
inevitably magnified when performed millions of times over, voting will inevitably
create problems on Election Day. Similarly, the demand for horse-race coverage,
combined with the telescoped time-frame of the modem Election Day, also suggests
that mistakes on projections are inevitable, if not inevitability as severe as those on
Election night 2000. Any national Election Day requires modem technological forms
in order to work at all, and yet that very technology will also ensure that Election Day
will always be problematic. To be sure, the institutional specifics of Election Day
2000 aggravated the situation. In particular, the decision to use a single center to
provide the number and analysis to all news outlets meant for no institutional checks.
The lack of legal sanction against delivering early projections, before the polls in
western Florida closed, probably also contributed to the problem. Yet no institutional
changes can ensure an error-free Election Day.

The inequality at the polling booth: It has been an argument running throughout this
dissertation that part of the importance o f the vote on Election Day is that its serves as
a public marker o f distinction for the voter. Bestowing the privilege of the vote on the
voter is a public acknowledgement that he or she is a fully rational, full capable and
competent political agent. This is one reason why groups lacking full citizenship in the
nation have made the struggle for the vote a central aspect o f their struggle for equal
rights. Denial o f the vote to any group o f citizens—women, African Americans in the
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post-Reconstruction South, or Asian Americans somewhat later—is a public denial of
that group’s full membership in society.
The other central fact of the vote is that it is equalizes the voice o f the citizen.
It is a declaration, an enactment of equality. The vote declares that no citizen’s opinion
is to count more than any other in the most important decisions of the body politic, its
choice of leaders. Because of this declaration, and because of the ideological
importance of equality in America democracy generally, the possibility that equality
does not obtain between citizens strikes at the heart of the celebration. A general
assumption among American social scientists is that universal suffrage took hold there
much earlier than in most countries. As Alexander Keyssar had written, that
understanding is largely a myth. Universal suffrage cannot be said to have become an
institutionalized fact until the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. At that point,
the problem of universal, equal suffrage seemed largely solved. But the events in
Florida belied this. There was first of all the problem with the butterfly ballots. If it
was true that the difficulties of the ballot led to a greater likelihood that this type of
ballot would be disqualified, then equality of voices did not hold. Moreover, several
minority groups suggested that largely African American districts were more likely to
be disqualified than in largely white district, and some journalists reported that large
numbers of African American voters and lower income white voters had been
illegitimately purged from voting lists. Because these voters were likely Democratic
voters, and because the administration responsible for purging the lists was run by the
Republican candidate’s brother, it was easy enough for Democrats to read the purged
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lists as a political maneuver, aimed at stripping one o f the fundamental rights of
citizenship from a single group o f Americans.17

The inconclusiveness o f the result: The fundamental task of any Election Day is to
provide a clear picture to the population of its mind. It was on this score that Election
Day 2000 failed most spectacularly. This failure cannot be credited only to the
corruption or the incompetence o f Election Day institutions, in Florida or in the nation.
The simple fact was that, with a difference of less than 500 votes out of nearly
6,000,000 cast in Florida, and given the various in counting standards and voting
technologies used throughout the state, it was practically impossible to state with any
degree of confidence who had “really” won that state’s Electoral votes, and thus won
the election. Extensive examinations into the result following the election were
generally inconclusive, or contradictory, about the result. Most continued to give Bush
a slight lead, but also highlighted the often contradictory standards used in
determining valid from invalid ballots.18
The theoretical possibility that a single vote could sway an entire election has
always been an element in the justification given for voting. As rational choice
theorists have shown, however, this is a rather slim reed upon which to rationalize the
decision, since in most Presidential elections the difference in vote totals numbers in
the thousands or tens of thousands. One vote does not, literally, make the difference,
whatever the civic catechism o f representative democracy holds.19 It did not in
Florida, either, but it came considerably closer than on most other occasions. In fact,
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the central problem with the Florida count was precisely the fact that the totals were so
close. Florida was not the only state with problematic election machinery. As
subsequent news stories showed, problems were evident throughout the nation.20 But
these were not so severe that they threatened to override the actual result. The
paradoxical fact is that American election institutions probably work well enough
when the result is not close, that is, when the individual voter’s decision to go the polls
makes no rational sense. It is only in the occasions when an individual vote really
might make the difference that the institutional structure is inadequate to the task.

Conclusion:
The central function o f an election for President is to create a leader, a symbol,
around which all members of the nation, including those supporting the losing side,
can unite. The winning President becomes a unifying symbol inasmuch as he can
claim to reflect the People’s Will. Because Election Day 2000 failed so spectacularly
in this, it is easy to see it as a moment with few precedents—perhaps 1824 or 1876. It
is also easy to see it as the culmination of several trends that plagued late twentiethcentury Election Days—the increasing power o f the mass media, problems with the
ballot and voting machines, the increasing ability of an economic elite to control the
country’s politics through manipulation of messages, the scandal o f early projections.
But in another way, Election Day 2000 is not so much a refinement of trends,
an omen of the future, as it was a throwback to an earlier time. Despite its failures, in a
sense because of them, Election Day 2000 outlined the divisions within the nation in
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much the same way that earlier Election Days had done. It also brought back politics
to Election Day and to the act of voting. Access to the polls became politicized,
control over information about the returns became politicized, and most famously, the
Supreme Court’s decision to stop the recount and essentially give the vote to George
Bush was widely perceived as a politicized act. Perhaps because of this politicization,
the lines between citizens began to harden, almost to the point of violence. Republican
and Democratic supporters clashed in Florida’s streets, and outside the office of the
Miami’s election commissioners. Old friends refused to talk. Polls captured the degree
to which Americans experienced, in effect, two different events. Democrats called the
election a “stolen” election, regarded George Bush as the thief in the White House.
Republicans thought of Al Gore as a poor loser who, by his failure to concede
graciously, threw the nation into upheaval.21
In other words, Election Day 2000 was not simply the pivotal point in one
Election, it was the hinge upon which two quite different election campaigns swung.
The first campaign was a typical late twentieth century Presidential campaign. It
lacked passion, provoked worries over media-centric candidates, raised fears that the
two major parties were not in any essential respect all that different, and thus did not
offer the electorate any real choice, and provided a great deal of hand wringing over
the generally shallow nature o f modem American democracy. Once Election Day was
over, and a victor not yet announced, a whole different campaign sprang up. This was
a campaign for public opinion and in the courts, and because it could not be put to a
vote, necessarily ended in an unsatisfactory manner. With each side convinced that the
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others were illegitimately attempting to “steal” the election, a great deal of
partisanship, passion, and bad feeling was created in the month following Election
Day.
Rituals are supposed to bring a group back together, to provide an image of
unity and concord, as the Election o f 1940 did for many in the city o f Philadelphia.
The 2000 Election could not do this, because it could not convince the losers that they
had truly lost, and that their duty was therefore to concede graciously. A December,
2000, CBS poll found that a vast majority of Democrats thought that the Republicans
had stolen the election.22 The percentages for African American Democrats was even
higher than for Democrats generally.23 By the time that the Supreme Court had
decided on a winner, journalists were voicing doubts about the efficacy not simply o f a
modem vote but of the American system:
The country wants to see the loser reconciled to the winner and given a
consoling pat on the back. It wants an affirmation that the system
worked as promised, that the machinery of democracy is still running
more or less smoothly. I’m afraid that I can’t endorse that conclusion.
Not because the wrong guy won, but because the system really did fail.
No we didn’t face a deep crisis or a Third-World-style succession
struggle. But a system that cannot generate confidence that the winner
actually won is more than a system that hiccuped. It’s a system that
choked.24
The “Florida fiasco” was symptomatic of the whole modem electoral process in the
United States, Weisberg wrote: a perpetual campaign suffiisd with money, a
malfunctioning primary system that invested all the power in the hands o f a few small
states, full of misleading 30-second ads and “thin, paltry” news coverage25 Lest
anyone think that the fault lay only in Florida, and not the nation, The Los Angeles
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Times published an investigative study outlining how the deficient voting practices
highlighted in the Sunshine State were a problem throughout the United States.26
Others, while equally scathing about the unsightly spectacle unraveling in full
public view, were more optimistic about its eventual effect. For Neal Gabler, writing
on the op-ed page of the Time, there was some essentially positive about all the
disenchantment. Election Day 2000 certainly helped to “demystify” and thus
“delegitimize” the idea of the vote as some pure route to democracy, Gabler allowed.
Given the mood of the times, the need of the modem media culture to show audiences
the hidden workings of what lay behind the curtain o f public spectacle, something like
the Florida mess was bound to come to light sooner or later. But since Election Day
was a sham anyway, a kind of “pseudo-event,” in fact “the biggest pseudo-event of
all,” this was not such a bad thing. “The power of demystification is that it serves as
the great equalizer,” Gabler wrote. It was “another kind of empowerment, the kind that
said we were too smart to get fooled again.”27 Election Day 2000 was a strange, starcrossed event, caused by a series of problematic decisions and unusual occurrences.
And yet, as the last Election Day in a century that had seen the ritual of the election
itself come increasingly under attack, it was perhaps an appropriate way for
Philadelphians, and other Americans, to signal an end to an era.
1Inquirer, Nov. 7, 2000, p. A13.
2 For an anlaysis of the state’s Gore needed to win, see the election night analysis of ABC’s Terry
Moran, circa 7 pm, ABC 2000: The Vote, Nov. 7, 2000, Burrelle’s News Transcripts. For a “premortem” of the Gore campaign, see for example, Michael Kinsley, “Down to the wire: it was Gore’s to
lose, will he?” San Diego Tribune, Nov. S, 2000, p. Gl. Also the comments of Mark Shields reported in
the introduction to Electing the President, 2000, p. 3.
3 ABC 2000: The Vote, Nov. 7, 2000, Burrelle’s News Transcripts. The times for the Florida calls are
from Stossel, “Echo chamber of horrors,” p. 18.
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7 Stossel, “Echo chamber of horrors,” p. 20. See also the discussion between Robert Shram, Stanley
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15Dugger, “Annals of Democracy: counting the votes,” p. 40.
16Schudson, The good citizen, p. 3.
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British journalist working in the United States. See “Florida’s ‘Disappeared voters,’ disfranchised by
the GOP, The Nation, Feb. 5,2001; and, with Julian Borger, “Inquiry into news claims of poll abuses in
Florida,” The Guardian (London), Feb. 17, 2001, p. 1.
111The claim that it was statistically impossible to know who really won the election was made by John
Paulos, who suggested the fairest way to solving the Florida controversy would be to toss a
commemorative “Gore-Bush” dime: “We’re measuring bacteria with a yardstick,” The New York Times,
Nov. 22, 2000, p. A27. Several news organizations looked extensively into the Florida recount and
failed to come with any sort of conclusive argument about who really “won” the election. See The New
York Times, July 15, 2001, pp. 1, 17; USA Today, May 11,2001, pp. 1A, 2A.
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representative democracy. See Downs, An economic theory o f democracy, pp. 265-71; Hirschbein,
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Pathologies o f rational choice theory, pp. 47-71.
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2000, p. 46.
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24 Jacob Weisberg, “The End,” Slate, Dec. 14, 2000. URL: http://slate-msn.com/BallotBox/
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Chapter Ten:
Conclusion
In this dissertation I have presented the history o f Election Day in Philadelphia.
I chose to organize the narrative around the question o f why a number of elements of
the Election Day tradition in the city’s past—bonfires, betting, parades, Election night
crowds—disappeared from the day’s events. I referred to this as the decline of the
Election Day “celebration.” That question was intended help answer a second
question: what the experience of Election Day meant for those who participated in and
observed it, what message it sent to the public about itself.
In order to help myself and the reader better understand the point that I wished
to make about Election Day’s role as public communication, I used the concept of
ritual to frame this account of Election Day. Ritual was a useful term for this
dissertation because of the fact, first o f all, that rituals are publicly performed. The
interest in ritual, from an anthropological or sociological point of view, is in how a
group or a public uses this communication to make sense o f its social life. In the
Durkheimian tradition, ritual is also the form of communication through which the
group communicates an image of itself to itself.1 Thus it was appropriate to the issue
that I wanted to address. How did this event communicate a vision o f the public body
to members of that public? How did it communicate the nature and the meaning of the
public, and how did it communicate the boundaries o f that public? My proposition was
that the manner in which this ritual was practiced would influence how that public saw
itself: in that sense, influence what that public was.
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Numerous democratic theorists, from de Tocqueville to Tarde to Dewey to
Habermas, have emphasized how communication in a modem democracy works not
simply to transmit ideas but to create the public itself. In Dewey’s argument, to take an
example, for a public to act as a public, it needs certain forms o f communication—
notably conversation and journalism—through which meaningful symbols are created
and propagated.2 More recently, writers in the field of cultural studies and cultural
history have argued that mass public events—like public celebrations, festivals, or
demonstrations—also play a significant role in communicating a vision of the public.3
The English novelist John Berger, for example, has argued that popular
demonstrations can be considered a sort of rehearsal, or a political metaphor, for a
revolutionary public:
I say metaphor because the strength thus grasped transcends the
potential strength o f those present, and certainly their actual strength as
deployed in a demonstration. The more people there are, the more
forcibly they represent to each other and to themselves those who are
absent. In this way a mass demonstration simultaneously extends and
gives body to an abstraction. Those who take part become more
positively aware of how they belong to a class. Belonging to that class
ceases to imply a common fate, and implies a common opportunity.
They begin to recognize that the function of their class need no longer
be limited; that it, too, like the demonstration itself, can create its own
function.4
Not surprisingly, given the thrust of his analysis, Berger exempts from this
claim what he calls “officially encouraged public spectacles,” a category under which
he would presumably fit an Election Day, whether we consider a rally of a ward
committee in downtown Philadelphia in the 1880s, or voters waiting in line to cast
their ballots at a Fire Hall in the same city in 1996. Such spectacles lack the sense of a
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“rehearsal” for the moment when the public breaks free o f its masters in a
revolutionary moment o f freedom.5 Although Berger does not explicitly say so, we are
led to assume that the official public spectacle, rather than being critical of power, is
instead simply a celebration of the status quo, managed by an elite ruling class.
The charge generally made against the public of Election Day is somewhat
similar, namely that it is a tamed public. It is tamed because it implicitly agrees to the
limits set upon it by the performance o f the act o f voting itself. The message is one o f
political quiescence, of obedience to the state of society as it exists, more or less, and
an obedience to the very limited political role allotted to most members of the public.
Citizenship becomes defined solely through the performance of this single act, taken at
relatively rare intervals.6 In this argument, elections and voting are the most important
rituals in liberal democracies,
partly because o f their central place in the official ideology of such
societies, partly because of the high degree of mass participation they
involve...Participation in elections can plausibly be interpreted as the
symbolic affirmation of the voters’ acceptance of the political system
and of their role within it. The ritual o f voting draws their attention to a
particular model of ‘politics,’ o f the nature of political conflict and the
possibilities of political change. Moreover it both results from and
reinforces the belief, in which there is normally little truth, that
elections give them an influence over government policy. 7
The public of Election Day is tamed as well because it accepts, again implicitly, the
limits of political argument which electoral politics sets on public discussion. As a
writer like Murray Edelman suggests, the form of that discussion is contrived to
produce problems, not to solve them. The function of electoral politics under such a
regime is simply to continue debates over problems that serve, primarily, to justify the
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political spectacle itself. The role of the citizen is to watch the political spectacle, and
occasionally to take the walk to the polls and provide a change in the cast o f a neverending melodrama.8 Election Day and the act o f voting, in short, provide the means by
which a public living in a manifestly undemocratic polity is nonetheless able to tell
itself that it is a democratic public. To the extent that the message is successful, the
elite who govern safeguard themselves from the more radical demands that a truly
powerful public might put forth.
The history that I have just presented presents a great deal of evidence
consistent with such an interpretation. Throughout that history, and continuing to the
present day, there has always existed a group of people who have had an inordinate
amount of power to affect what happens on Election Day. Party or factional organizers
and leaders have generally controlled who would be on the tickets—through informal
meetings, the caucus, backroom deals, or more recently, through dominating the mass
media’s discussion of candidates. They have generally tried to set the terms of the
debate of the issues and personalities. They have even, through their control of the
various forms of media, attempted to determine a frame for the vote itself, one most
consistent with their interests. The history of Philadelphia’s Election Day can thus be
read as a confirmation, of what critical scholars have known all along, although it is
interesting that there was rarely a moment when some segment of the city’s population
did not in fact make the same sort of argument that these scholars now make: that the
determination of tickets by caucus or the machine or the national leadership robbed
them of the right to make up their own minds; that the limited choices on the ballot
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made their vote, in some sense, meaningless. Moreover, these arguments were not
made in marginal discourse, but often came through in mainstream media. If Election
Day was simply a method o f tricking the populace into a belief in the supreme
rightness of modem democracy, it was not a very effective one. Many people were not
conned.
Liberal defenders o f the vote have a different theory of what an Election Day
means. In the work of George Kateb, the message o f the vote is not one o f political
obedience, but of political power.9 What Kateb suggests is that the vote contains a
message that critical scholars, mainstream political scholars, and perhaps even a great
many would-be political puppet-masters, fail to realize. He argues that the simple fact
o f the citizenry’s participation in regularly contested elections for political office will
tend to cultivate certain habits o f mind: a confidence, even arrogance, when dealing
with political authority, for example, since that authority’s legitimacy rests upon the
consent of the citizen. Kateb does not believe these habits are restricted to behavior in
the electoral realm. He suggests that they end up infecting the whole of social life
within a liberal democracy.10
This understanding o f Election Day’s message is also consistent with the
narrative. Whatever description we might give of the public performance of
Philadelphia’s Republican electors on the day of the 1796 vote—as they let out cheers
of “no King” walking to the voting booth, many of them, perhaps, in front o f their
Federalist employers—to argue simply that they were embodying a message of
political acquiescence to some set o f political masters is inadequate. The parades of
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the 1880s, in which voters would march down Broad with the declaration on a banner
that their ward had delivered a “2,000 majority for Hayes,” were not a celebration just
of the candidate but of the public’s own role in creating political authority. The jeers
of the Democratic mob before the nabobs of the Union League were not in support of
the status quo, they were a celebration of the vote’s ability to give power, for this
moment at least, to the common many over the rich few.
What this history suggests, in other words, is that Election Day has sent several
messages, at the same time, to the voting public o f Philadelphia. It has communicated
an image o f a public that is both obedient to its political leadership, and to the norms
that keep this leadership in place, but not always under the terms, and not always with
political and social implications, that the leadership might prefer. It has sent other
messages as well. It has communicated an image of the public that both accepts and
even values political debate and difference, but at the same time continually strives to
exclude from its ranks those people and groups—whether defined by class, race, sex,
or ideology—who seem too different. It has presented an image of the public as
composed o f rational individual voters, each arriving at their own independent
decisions, while all the time explicitly displaying the importance of party, ethnic,
religious, and racial membership in its performance.
Why would we expect it to be otherwise? Why would expect this ritual to send
only a single message? We do not suppose other rituals from other cultures to be so
simple-and so easily read. Rather, one of the features of ritual is precisely this ability
to communicate complicated, multi-vocal, and in fact often contradictory messages.
342

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

There is no reason that the central ritual of democratic life should be any different.
Just as other rituals embody and illustrate, in appropriately public fashion, certain
central tensions in a culture, so Election Day embodies certain central tensions that are
at the heart of modem democratic life—between freedom and order, between the
individual conscience and public obligation, between respect for a plurality o f interests
and the need for social cohesion, and between the celebration of personal excellence
and the celebration of social equality.11
This is my first central claim: that Election Day in Philadelphia has, throughout
its history, embodied the central tensions of the political culture in that city. The
debates over the Election Day performance have, in turn, provided the engine for
changing the style of that performance. They have not resulted in the disappearance of
the problems embodied in Election Day: whether they have resulted in the partial
amelioration of these problems is not for this study to answer. They have, at any rate,
constantly rearranged those problems, reconfigured them. The debate over Election
Day is one way for Philadelphians, and other Americans, to consider the central
political principles that define their regime and define themselves as a public, not by
debating them, but by performing them. It is the abstract tension between the freedom
and equality given a concrete, human, and vivid form, presented for the whole o f the
population to see and consider.
Election Day is not simply when the political understanding of the community
is enacted, however. It is also a moment when the political boundaries o f that
community are performed, when the question of who are in and who are outside the
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community is decided. The result of the struggle over how to define Pennsylvania’s
political community in the 1830s was that black citizens and women found themselves
excluded from this form of enacting political power. Election Day in Philadelphia, as a
celebration o f the city’s public, has often been a celebration of racism, sexism,
religious and ethnic prejudice, class inequality, and the power o f money, because that
public has defined itself, at least in part, through these features. The question is how
debates over the public’s political understanding of its character, as embodied in the
Election Day performance, were transmitted into an understanding of the boundaries
that composed it. In other words, what is the relation between the disappearance of the
Election Day celebration and the nature o f the boundaries that surround the modem
voting public?
We should note, first of all, that such celebrations in the city of Philadelphia
have always their chorus of disapproves. Isaac Norris did not like the vulgar displays
of emotion following Election Days in the 1720s (not even when they were by
partisans of his own side). John Fenno was horrified by the “Jacobin” performances of
political aggression in 1796. The editors o f the Public Ledger disdained what they saw
as the childish and irrational exertions o f party men in the 1836 election, just as the
editors of the Inquirer in the 1870s looked down upon night parades. There are two
elements that seem to link such critiques. First, they do not clearly distinguish between
what we might find colorful in the Election Day celebration—the transparencies, the
bonfires, the cheering crowds, perhaps even the betting—and features such as bribery,
rioting, vote manipulation, and the fights at the polling booth. Second, in the eyes of
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the critics, the same people seemed to be a part o f all of these practices. In the
discourse of critics and reformers, those who drank too much on Election Day, those
who accepted bribes, those who tended to vote unthinkingly along party lines, and
those who celebrated with war whoops and bonfires, were generally people whose
membership in the public was, for one reason or another, dubious—mechanics,
Germans, foreigners, Catholic immigrants, blacks, children. The disapproval o f the
Election Day celebration was one way for the elite classes to voice their discomfort
and their displeasure at the presence of so many apparently unqualified, low class,
illiterate voters at the polls. Given the link made in the rhetoric between the corruption
of Election Day and its celebration, the attack on one inevitably led to an attack on the
other.
How was the disappearance of this celebration, and the elimination o f this
battle, accomplished, in the case of Philadelphia’s Election Day? Changes in the mass
media environment certainly had an effect on the Election Day celebration. Whereas it
was the introduction of the telegraph that helped create the Election night crowd, by
establishing partisan centers of information—clubs, newspapers—around which
citizens could congregate, the introduction o f later forms of technology helped to
dissipate that crowd. First telephones—and perhaps, to a minor extent before that, the
light shows that newspapers like the Inquirer and the Press used as Election night
gimmicks—allowed residents to get information about the outcome of the Presidential
race without having to venture to the city’s center. This would have appealed to those
citizens who did not care for the November winds in Philadelphia, or the occasional
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rains, or for the company o f many o f the inebriated, aggressive, and coarse citizens
one met in front of the Inquirer Building. The introduction of the radio further helped
segregate the Election night celebration. The street was no longer the spot to
congregate to hear about the news o f the election. One could go to a bar, or a hotel
lobby, or even get the news during the Intermission o f a play. To the extent that the
street crowd continued to figure into the Election night celebration, it did so as a space
for spontaneous celebration of partisan victors, as in the celebrations of FDR’s first
three Presidential wins. Newspapers like the Bulletin continued to offer an electronic
billboard for people in the street to get the latest news on the returns, but these crowds
were no longer the center of attention for the next day’s report on Election Day events.
Instead, the press turned, increasingly, to analyzing what the results of the vote might
mean for the country, and perhaps to recap the campaign. By the time that television
had arrived, the street celebration was such a degraded copy of what it once had been
that it disappeared relatively easily and quickly. The television offered everything that
the radio return had offered, but added a visual element and the new technology of
computers to present the audience with faster results and ever more elaborate
dissections of the vote. Celebrations, to the extent that they continued to exist, moved
into the private home, and friends gathered around the television to discuss the vote,
and watched crowds in Center City hotels, or Little Rock, Arkansas, provide a
sanitized version of the sort of celebrations that citizens themselves had conducted one
hundred years earlier.
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But the credit for the disappearance o f the public Election Day celebration
cannot be simply traced to the introduction o f the electronic media. For one thing,
those media did not eliminate other civic celebrations—the Mummers Day Parade, the
Fourth of July. For another, the tradition o f the Election Day celebration was more
than the crowds around the newspaper buildings. It consisted, as well, o f the bets that
went on, of the bonfires, of the flags flown out of office buildings on the day of the
vote, of the voters and observers that gathered around the polling places, of the ad hoc
congregations on street comers, discussing the latest news on the race.
To explain the disappearance o f these elements of the Election Day
celebration, we need also to look at changes in laws, and changes in other practices of
the political culture in which Election Day was one event among many. As to the laws,
Pennsylvanians had attempted to control the behavior of the Election Day public since,
almost, the founding of the commonwealth. In the colonial period, the Assembly
passed laws forbidding the treating o f voters, laws that moved the tumultuous election
of Inspectors away from the Election Day proper, laws that established a voter list to
better control illegal voting. They moved the polls off the Court House balcony, which
made the voting process easier, inasmuch as it made its speedier. In the nineteenth
century the legislature continued to pass laws attempting to control the Election Day
celebration. In the early 1850s, the central polls at the State House were broken up,
since the political leadership had decided that the location, in an era of strong partisan
identification and keen competition, was too conducive to violence and corruption.
But the move did not destroy the Election Day celebration, nor did it solve the
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problems o f bribery, violence, and other forms of vote manipulation. It simply
rearranged them.
It was not until the later part of the nineteenth century that the opponents of the
Election Day celebration began finally to win the war over their opponents. Laws
made drinking on Election Day, bonfires, Election eve parades, illegal. The secret
ballot was also an important tool. As a communication technology, the ballot had a far
more decisive effect on Philadelphian’s Election Day behavior than did the radio or
the television, since it affected the central act o f Election Day, the vote. The secret
ballot went hand in hand with a new image of the voter, and of the public to which the
voter belonged. That voting public became an increasingly abstract idea, vague in its
outlines, composed of those who did not necessarily share any of one’s social traits, or
even one’s political beliefs, but were simply good, informed citizens.
Other changes in the political culture worked in tandem with the vision o f the
public that the secret ballot implied. The elimination o f the spectacular campaign,
combined with the rise of the advertised candidate, changed the relation of the voter to
electoral politics. The duty o f the voter on Election Day became, to put into action the
information that the campaign had managed to deliver. It was not to be a faithful party
soldier in the war against political tyranny and corruption, as exemplified by the
opposition.
Changes in mass media content were consonant with this difference. Slowly,
the main media outlets in Philadelphia began to move away from the overt
partisanship that nearly all o f them had displayed in the nineteenth century. The
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national television networks, reporting on the Presidential race, assumed a stance of
neutrality. The Inquirer and the Bulletin, formerly dependable supporters o f the
Republican ticket, began to move away from that party in Presidential years,
particularly with those candidates considered out o f the mainstream—like Goldwater
and Reagan. Election Day editorials no longer called upon the voter to vote the
straight party ticket, but simply to vote, to do one’s duty as a citizen. Discussion of the
Election Day performance turned increasingly to worries about whether the voters
were too disconnected from politics, too unknowledgeable about the issues and the
offices, too lazy for the demands placed upon them. There were Election Day
warnings, too, about the way that the mass media had turned politics into a vision of
show business. These were, in a sense, another variation on worries over unreliable
voters, voters who could not see past the sham of the media candidate (which is to say,
people very much unlike the media analyst him or herself, or presumably, the reader
of the article, who could pierce the deception).
By the 2000 Election Day, one editorial writer for the Philadelphia Inquirer
was so troubled about whether many voters were smart up to the job required o f them,
that he suggested they might just want to think about staying away:
What’s the point of studying up on the candidates and voting if your
ballot vote is going to be canceled out by some idiot who registered
more or less by accident, and who’s voting because some an AnheuserBusch ad told him to? (if only the ad had included a little slogan, such
as “Budweiser—the one beer to have, when you’re voting more than
once.”)
So if you don’t feel like voting today, don’t bother. You won’t
be missed. Let those o f us who have been paying attention handle this
one for you. Trust us. We know what we’re doing.12
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So what linked this modem Election Day public was not any sense of explicitly
acknowledged social distinctions among its members but a set of criteria—political
interest, knowledge, and public-spirited action—that members strove, often
unsuccessfully, to meet. The voting public presented to the newspaper readers in
Philadelphia would thus seem, at first glance, to be neutral as regards class, or race, or
geography. But in fact, it has been clear for some time that the modem American
voting public is skewed toward certain social characteristics. Non-voters tend to be, on
the whole, poorer, younger, less well educated, less likely to own a home (and thus be
settled, dependable citizens), and more likely to be non-white, than voters.13
Let’s return to the observation, noted in the second chapter, that at least some
segments of the modem voting population, while despairing of the vote’s usefulness as
a tool to produce political change, nevertheless choose to participate in Election Day.
This is rather strange behavior: to undertake an act one feels will be useless. Unless
the purpose of the act is not simply to affect a change in government policy, but to
communicate some other message. A vote sends a number of different messages. It is,
among other things, a public declaration that the voter is a legitimate and full member
of the political community. It is also a declaration—to oneself and to the rest o f the
public—that one’s voice on political matters ought to, and in fact does, count for
something. Thus, it is not surprising that well-educated people from comfortable
backgrounds are likely to choose to vote on Election Day, regardless their opinions of
modem politics or politicians. Their vote is one o f acknowledgement o f their
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importance, an affirmation of their tribal membership in the public that this ritual
creates.
This is the second claim o f this dissertation. The image of the public that is
created through the Election Day ritual is one that serves to mark off members o f that
public, not only from citizens o f other political communities, but from citizens of that
community who do not vote. The experience of the modem Election Day declares that
the voter is a member of a public that is distinct from, and in some sense superior to,
the larger public that includes voters and non-voters alike. That smaller public, in the
discourse of politics that surrounds the event, no longer defines itself through explicit
class or racial divisions, but by a set o f skills. Members of the voting public are simply
assumed to be better, more dependable citizens, by virtue of their access to those
skills, than those who are not. Naturally, they are the ones who exercise the most
important message of power given to a democratic public: the ballot. Given the
egalitarian mores of American society, in which political hierarchies are considered
nefarious, this function of Election Day cannot be too explicitly performed. Hence,
Election Day is a ritual of social solidarity and social exclusiveness that attempts to
disguise the fact, by shedding as much of its explicitly symbolic trappings as possible,
and by ridding itself, again to the extent possible, of its public character, so that its role
as the ritual celebration, not of the people, but of only a subset of the people, does not
become too much of a public scandal.
My argument about the disappearance of the Election Day celebration can be
taken as an example or illustration o f the larger argument, made by Carolyn Marvin
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and David Ingle in Blood sacrifice and the nation, and by Marvin elsewhere,14 about
the relationship between textualized understandings of the world and bodily ones. Text
and body, Marvin and Ingle claim, are antithetical poles in a centuries-old discourse,
and symbols—within that discourse—of a clash between social classes. Textual
classes owe their power to the exercise of skills associated with education and with
literacy, bodily classes are those whose power relies on “whatever value their bodies
have for cultural muscle-work.”15 Through the elimination of forms o f communication
in which the role o f the body is made explicit—such as the celebration, the festival,
the ritual—and their replacement with more textualized forms, social power is also
rearranged. “Written language conceals and denies the body in order to exercise
control over it, or more accurately, to give bodies that control texts power over bodies
that do not.”16 A nineteenth century Philadelphia voter on Election Day was engaged
in a social ritual that, while delivering a message of democratic empowerment and
equality, also delivered messages of community solidarity, of social hierarchy, and
social exclusion. The same is true of a voter in that city, one hundred years later. To
paraphrase a claim made by Feyerabend, the difference between the two is that the one
realized what he was doing, and the other does not.17
At this point, we are able to answer the two questions with which I began the
dissertation: the question about how and why the Election Day celebration
disappeared, and the question about what message Election Day communicates to the
public. As to the first question, the answer would be as follows: the disappearance of
Election Day was the product both of changes in law and changes in communication
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media that directly or indirectly attacked both the means and the opportunity for
Election Day crowds to gather in Philadelphia’s city streets and celebrate their
existence as a public. However, those changes were made in the context o f a more
general re-construction o f the meaning of the vote, o f the citizen, and of democratic
politics generally. This change in the understanding o f politics was reflected in the
evolving practices of Election Day—so that ceremony and spectacle gradually
disappeared from the event—and also in the altered public that was now performed on
that day. It was a public defined largely through reference to a set of skills that only
part o f the eligible voting population would be expected to exercise with any sort of
confidence.
The significance o f this change lays both in the manner by which Election Day
contributes to defining the boundaries of the modem voting public, and in the role it
has played in the public discourse of the city of Philadelphia. That performance has
often been the occasion for Philadelphians to wrestle with important questions, not
simply about the policies of government, but about what democratic politics means
and who it ought to include. The Election Day celebrations were often not comfortable
or admirable portrayals of the public. That is not simply a judgment delivered from the
heights o f the present on to the past: it was the opinion of many Philadelphians
themselves at the time. Election Day communicated certain truths about the public of
Philadelphia to itself that could not be communicated, or could be communicated only
imperfectly, through other means. In defining the democratic public through a
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particularly vivid and dramatic style, it also communicated the identity, the vitality,
and the potential power of that public.
It was not a revolutionary public, to be sure, and if that is the standard by
which we are to measure all democratic communication then Election Day, but not
only Election Day, will fall short. There is a sense in which any ritual, Election Day
included, carries within its very structure a conservative political emphasis. Maurice
Bloch has noted how the restricted speech codes o f political performances serve as an
elite method for controlling what all the participants can say, which is similar to the
argument critics make of the democratic ballot.18 This means, among other things, that
ritual simplifies the world. Election Day forces citizens to make clear cut, black and
white decisions about matters that involve a great deal o f gray. The ballot does not
allow for subtlety. It does not allow the voter to support this candidate’s policies on
the environment, and that one’s on the economy. It presents instead a very stark, all or
nothing, choice. Moreover, as a ritual, it celebrates a vision o f the public that is a great
deal more hierarchical than official democratic ideology is comfortable with; it divides
citizens into those who are competent to judge, and those who are not.
For these reasons and others, it is easy to point out the way in which this
celebration does not live up to the ideological claims often made for it. But that is
perhaps part o f the point. It is so very easy to criticize the Election Day message,
because it makes the fault lines of politics so manifest, because it draws them so
clearly. In doing so, it provokes discussion about issues that might not otherwise be
addressed. This widespread publicity is not so clearly present in other forms of
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democratic communication. Conversations—whether they happen in a coffee shop, or
in a Paris salon, or at an academic conference—also embody assumptions about power
and social exclusivity.19 So does the front page o f the New York Times. In these cases,
however, the lines of power are less easy to see, being somewhat more refined than a
Jacksonian Election Day riot between Irish Democratic and Nativist Whig voters in
Moyamensing, or the confusion of the 2000 Election. The key here, obviously, is the
question of publicity. To the extent that Election Day serves not only to establish
political power but also to provoke questions about power, then it must be seen. It
must be publicly celebrated. To the extent that its performance is carried out in private
space, to that extent the political system is safe from reflections about its workings that
the performance o f Election Day might raise.

Conclusion:
The aim of this dissertation has not been to uncover the evolution of
Philadelphia’s Election Day, and the disappearance of many of its more emphatically
public practices, in order to make an argument for specific policies or changes that
might improve the health of the American public, or of electoral democracy. That is
not because I consider these unimportant issues. I consider them extremely important.
Simply changing the practices by which a public conducts itself on the day of the vote,
however, is unlikely to do much to alter the modem public landscape. The question of
how Election Day and the act of voting are currently configured in modem American
discourse, both popular and academic, is of a piece with how we think about politics
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generally, and I began this project with the belief that much of the current discussion
about politics and political communication has been misdirected. The argument that I
have tried to make in this dissertation about what Election Day meant for the public o f
Philadelphia, and how and why it changed, and the implications of that change, are
efforts at provoking a different set of questions about the public and political discourse
than the ones most scholars now ask.
First of all, my method of approaching the message o f Election Day is one that
attempted to keep in mind at all times a focus on the democratic body as it performed
on Election Day: what that body was doing, where it was doing it, whom it was doing
it with. To the extent that I have been interested in the effects o f the mass media, this
has not been in relation to its role as political propaganda or as persuasion, but rather
its role in creating and changing social spaces, and the relation of bodies to other
bodies in these spaces. I have also been interested in the media’s role as a ritual device
for drawing boundaries both within a modem public—that is, between the parties—
and for drawing a line around that public. These sorts of questions are important for
two reasons: first, as Marvin suggests, because the failure to acknowledge them has
important implications for social power and social inequality. It behooves academics,
particularly, as the preeminent textual class in a modem democracy, to consider their
relationship to bodies and to texts in a critical light.20 Moreover, as Michael Schudson
has argued, the physical experience of voting, or any other form of political
communication, is often the most vivid and memorable method o f instructing us in the
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democratic life. It may teach us important lessons that are missed in textbooks or
university classes.21
Secondly, what I have tried to do here is to challenge a rarely questioned
assumption in much of the academic discourse about the role of political ritual,
political spectacle, and political ceremony, as this relates to democratic forms of
communication. Too often, the use of such terms has been linked to the notion of
artifice, thus to illusion and deception, and thus in turn to some argument about elite
manipulation o f the masses through the use o f spectacle and political theater. But the
notion of artifice need not—and traditionally did not—imply falsity. It was simply a
piece of the constructed world, that portion of the world held in common; the public
world.22 Thus all politics has an aesthetic sense, all politics has ritual, and that includes
politics in a modem American city like Philadelphia. This political style, in turn, will
have implications for political power within the community. The Election Day
performances o f an earlier age in Philadelphia’s history may have been a sort of
manufactured political theater, and yet still have delivered an important, even
democratic, political message through that performance. I have argued here that it did
deliver such a message, which had real effects on the image that the public had of
itself, not all of them to the liking of that public’s supposed political masters.
Like the argument about the role o f bodies in the democratic life, this claim is
also related to a larger argument, in this case, Richard Sennett’s narrative about the
fall of public man. Sennett sees in the progression of modem civic life—in the day-today rituals and roles played out on city streets and in public buildings—the gradual
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replacement of the self-conscious use of convention and public masks with a style of
public life that emphasizes authenticity and intimacy. Such a change, he argues,
signals a loss not only for our public lives but also our private lives, since we are led to
place demands upon our inner worlds that they cannot bear.23 A similar kind of
narrative could be written about the evolution o f Philadelphia’s Election Day. The
event has seen the gradual movement away from public spaces, like the Election
grounds in front of the State House, or the parades on Broad Street, into private spaces
and private homes. It has seen the slow but continual erosion of many public
conventions. In so doing, Election Day gradually loses the ability to communicate to
participants their place in the political world, and their links to their fellow citizens.
The physical public enacted on Election Day becomes more and more constricted, the
ties that bind voters one to another, in a public, become more and more difficult to see.
Finally, I have tried, through the treatment of Election Day as ritual, to frame
the act of voting as something more than simply a utilitarian tool aimed at either the
protection of freedoms or the advancement of the public or private good. Along these
lines, I have argued that Election Day’s importance as a democratic message lies, in
part, in its ability to deliver a message both of universality and exclusion, freedom and
restraint, equality and hierarchy, pluralism and social cohesion. It is an argument about
the ritual's ability to contain the paradoxes and contradictions of modem democratic
life within a single set of practices.
Ignoring the way that Election Day, as a public event, has in the past and
continues to be a battleground where questions of social identity and the nature of
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democratic life are fought over, allows scholars and citizens generally to use electoral
institutions, and forms of mainstream political communication, as convenient
whipping boys. Electoral politics becomes inherently suspect—a political spectacle—
whereas other forms of communication become inherently democratic, as in Berger’s
argument about the revolutionary public demonstration, or Nancy Fraser’s opposition
between the inegalitarian, stifling bourgeois public sphere, and the libratory
communicative practices that inhere, at least in theory, to subaltern publics.24 What
such oppositions fail to come to terms with is the possibility that all political rituals
may share certain qualities as a form o f communication, whether they are undertaken
by groups one approves of or those one does not.
Election Day, due in part to its formal importance in a representative
democratic system, is a particularly notable instance of political ritual and human
artifice. Hence its inability to measure up to the current ideals of public
communication is particularly egregious. The result is that as a public event it
produces not a message of power but a message of cynicism. Writers o f a post-modem
or critical persuasion argue that the disillusionment modem publics often demonstrate
toward electoral politics and the meaning of the vote—either through public opinion
polls or their lack of participation—is the inevitable result of the increased
“reflexivity” o f the modem world, the ability to see through the con of liberal politics
and democratic institutions.25 This flatters modem democracy with an insight it does
not deserve. Our cynicism about what a vote does, and what democratic politics
means, is not evidence of a hard-earned political sophistication unavailable to earlier
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generations, but of mistaken assumptions about the forms of communication necessary
to any polity, democratic or otherwise. The results of this cynicism are not as libratory
as these critics might suppose. A democratic vote is the moment when political power
is legitimated, the moment when the democratic public identifies itself with that
power. Cynicism about the vote’s role as communication does not send a cynical
message about the state merely, as though that state were easily distinguishable from
the public in whose name it acts. It throws in doubt that public’s ability to operate
politically. A public that has no ability to effect political change through this central
act of political will does not simply end up distrusting the government, but itself.
The easy dismissal of the election as mere ritual, or as political spectacle, also
forecloses a more critical examination of many aspects of the message that the modem
Election Day now sends about the modem public; the way in which it draws
boundaries around that public, for example. The changing style and manner of the
twentieth century Election Day, the change in the social construction of the meaning
of a vote and an election, were perhaps advances in some sense for democratic
participation. But they were not universally so. A great deal o f the rhetoric and
practice surrounding the modem Election Day serves, either consciously or
unconsciously, to exclude from that performance certain parts of the population. This
is not a problem for many members of the voting public, who do not want uneducated,
or political unsophisticated, or disinterested citizens at the polls. But for the members
of those disconnected populations, which have so few other forms o f social and
economic power at their disposal, it is perhaps rather more of a problem.
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There is no good reason, given what we can see of the manner in which rituals
work generally, and in the history of this ritual in particular, to suppose that Election
Day will ever be as inclusive an event as many democrats would no doubt like it to be.
There is no reason to suppose that it will ever be as pluralistic a ritual, as egalitarian,
as official ideology would have it. But this does not excuse us from trying to make it
more inclusive, more egalitarian, than it now is. In an unequal world, a ritual such as
Election Day, which celebrates the equality of participants, will by its very nature be
problematic. For that reason, the critique o f the democratic election, the reflections on
it and on the questions it raises, the continual attempt to improve it or to change it, are
central to the modem democratic life. But to dismiss what happens on Election Day as
a ritual, to dismiss it because it is a ritual, is to dismiss the fundamental method by
which a democratic public constructs itself as a political body that is capable not
simply of expressing wishes or complaints but of exerting power on its world. If critics
of the democratic vote really believe that it is unsalvageable as a form of
communication, then they have the obligation, at the very least, to propose a realistic
alternative to the ritual message that it has delivered to the public, and still does.
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